Thread: This report analyzes 1000s of unredacted, detailed internal police files from Urumchi in 2018-2019. Part of a dataset maintained by a state contractor named Landasoft, built using Oracle software and obtained by @theintercept. theintercept.com/2021/01/29/chi…

https://twitter.com/dtbyler/status/1387498826315927552

Finding 1. Reports from the Mobile Police Network of the Urumchi Public Security Bureau from 2018-2019 skewed dramatically toward Muslims. More than 84% of reports focused on Muslim minorities. Only 16% focused exclusively on the Han population, which make up 71% of the city.

Thread: Over the past six months I’ve been pouring over a “safe city” feasibility study recovered by @MareikeOhlberg & Jessica Batke. It provides a detailed analysis of what surveillance platforms are designed to do in Xinjiang. chinafile.com/library/report…

https://twitter.com/ChinaFile/status/1344304031922065408

2. This particular proposed system centered around a Megvii algorithm called Face++. The system would use a base data set collected from the entire population within its jurisdiction, to place people on particular watch lists.
chinafile.com/extensive-surv…

Excellent overview from @JimMillward & @RianThum of the dispossession, institutional capture, & domination of Uyghur society, which together build a new frontier of global capitalism & state power. CC: @BeijingPalmer @niubi The structural antagonisms in Xinjiang cannot be understood outside of a drive for natural resources and commodity crops as China becomes manufacturer for the world. livingotherwise.com/2019/07/22/ada…

Mini-thread on the 19 year history of the discourse of Muslim terrorism in China.

Exactly 1 month after 9/11 the discourse of Muslim-exclusive "terrorism" entered China for the first time--attaching an American form of Islamophobia to Uyghurs.

https://twitter.com/dtbyler/status/1304623695961272322

1. It was on this date 19 years ago on October 11, 2001, that “East Turkestan terrorist” was used by Chinese officials for the first time in a public news conference. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

While Han migrants from outside of Xinjiang were encouraged to move to Xinjiang, Uyghur migrants were viewed as needing to be “transformed” through “legal education” and “training”—all euphemisms used to describe the "reeducation camps." livingotherwise.com/2020/09/10/the… According to Chinese government data, as of 2015 there were officially close to 2.1 million migrants. archive.fo/nZIaU Out of this “floating population,” around 75 percent (1,461,238) were from outside of Xinjiang. c.m.163.com/news/a/FK7R622…

Thread on the way institutions in Xinjiang were shaped around Han migrant needs (and often both intentionally and unintentionally excluded Uyghurs). Something I discussed briefly in this @ttsgpod episode: goodbye.substack.com/p/darren-byler…

https://twitter.com/mauracunningham/status/1291354613157892096

1. Drawing on a number of interviews conducted between 2014 and 2020 I should how the police, the schools, the hospitals, the stores centered around supporting Han desires for a "bright future," which gave them a sense of prestige, often for the first time in their lives.

When it comes to the allies and actions leftist Uyghurs might want, it depends a lot on the social positions of the people involved. I agree with a lot of what the OP says, but agree with @NDLoubere that the co-construct of capitalism-colonialism must always be refused.

https://twitter.com/Dave_Brophy/status/1286091142975467521

I also find the OPs view of left action problematic in its erasure of Uyghur voices. In the years of fieldwork I did in the Uyghur region I have not found evidence to support the OPs claim that Uyghurs overwhelmingly view themselves as East Turkistani & loath the Chinese state.