Leveraging a newly translated high-level Chinese policy text, I outline a three-pronged framework in my report with @ITIFdc for understanding China's uneven techno-industrial ecosystem and Beijing's technology security strategy. Writing about China's approach to technology security involves acknowledging the inherent variances within its strategies across different sectors. The landscape is marked by peaks of excellence alongside valleys of underdevelopment. This piece is a contribution to the thoughtful analyses already out there on the following questions:

▪️What is Beijing’s strategy for enhancing its technological security?

▪️What factors could influence Beijing’s technological ambitions?

▪️And how far is the Chinese Party-state willing to go to ensure this strategy’s success?

You can access the report at ITIF's website: itif.org/publications/2….

Xi's meeting with private tech titans goes beyond an alignment b/w the state & the private sector. It's part of a detailed tech security strategy by China's Central National Security Commission in "The Total National Security Paradigm (2022)," translated here for the first time: For a project with @CSTranslate, I translated the chapter "Safeguard Technological Security" from "The Total National Security Paradigm: A Study Outline 《总体国家安全观学习纲要》" (April 2022), authored by the CCP's Office of the Central National Security Commission (中央国家安全委员会办公室). This office plays a crucial role in coordinating national security matters across the Chinese party and state apparatus. This chapter offers essential insights into how the Chinese Party-state plans to enhance its national security through technological means.

Chinese policymakers treat this technology security strategy with the gravity of a military doctrine, viewing innovation as a critical response to national security challenges.

Here are some interesting quotes and reflections:

A summary of the four horsemen of China's macroeconomic slowdown and their impact on the sectors hardest hit in the Chinese economy.

1. Real estate
2. Local government fiscal constraints
3. Insufficient domestic demand
4. Economic bureaucracy

1/35 After decades of double-digit growth, China’s economy is grappling w/ a prolonged secular slowdown. The economic model China has used to drive much of its growth—namely, debt-fueled investment in real estate & infrastructure—is becoming more untenable. The four main issues: 2/35

As you read CSIA’s (China Semiconductor Industry Association, major chip trade association in China) statement on reported JP-NL-US chip export controls, note that its officially provided Eng translation does a poor job of conveying the PRC’s dismay at the measures.

1/7 It’s either an unintentionally sloppy Eng translation, or it is intentionally playing down the original rhetoric to appear more composed.

For example, in the 3rd paragraph, you can see the translation & rhetorical delta b/n the CSIA translation and my closer translation — 2/7

Want to understand the intricacies of China’s economy? Read Arthur Kroeber’s China’s Economy: What You Need to Know (2016).

Kroeber sets the expectation up front--China’s economy is like a jigsaw puzzle w/ pieces that constantly change. It takes humility & grit to grasp. 1/52 **Only after wrapping the 2016 version, did I realize there’s a newer edition of the book with updated # s and insights up to 2020. I am reading the new edition and plan to follow up with another review. 2/52

Some thoughts on PRC elite leadership, specifically, the ENGINEER vs. LAWYER approach of shaping state power.

w/ China’s data ambition and the eCNY as a case study.

Shifts in Chinese political elite’s degree distribution influences the way the PRC governs. 1/N Back when PRC leadership mostly consisted of engineers, the kind of governance style is much more methodical. Gutting through provinces, reengineering the environment for policy needs, exemplified by the South-North Water Diversion Project (南水北调). 2/N

China’s security regulatory body to require foreign funds to set up internal Communist party cells (党支部) bit.ly/3tEmcEA Mentions PRC has broader laws stating all foreign firms must create party cells, but these rules had long been dismissed as symbolic. However, 1/N ...this time around, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) specified in a clause to its rules in early 2022 (see CSRC rules and clause here: bit.ly/3NXGlxz), on pg. 13 - 2/N

I dispel misconceptions about China’s CIPS (Cross-border Interbank Payment System) v. SWIFT, and discuss why CIPS matters in the int'l financial system in this piece for @lawfareblog.

Why China’s CIPS Matters (and Not for the Reasons You Think) lawfareblog.com/why-chinas-cip…

1/N I implore readers to lean into forward thinking in a scenario where China successfully leverages CIPS to catapult the RMB in int’l finance. Do not dismiss China’s CIPS just because it currently has a small footprint compared to the Western-led SWIFT.

2/N

1/ So, CIPS vs SWIFT. There is a lot of analysis on the differences b/w the two (first being a secured messaging mechanism that ensures information flows, the latter a clearing & settlement mechanism that ensures transaction flows). Saying CIPS is China's SWIFT is oversimplified. 2/ I also do not believe CIPS can help Russian entities evade the weight of sanctions in any significant way. However, it is analytically useful to think about why SWIFT and CIPS were created.