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๐“ž๐“น๐“ฒ๐“ท๐“ฒ๐“ธ๐“ท๐“ช๐“ฝ๐“ฎ๐“ญ.
May 18 โ€ข 8 tweets โ€ข 4 min read
I have a different take than @Chellaney here.

๐Ÿงต

1.

GoI had clearly given "anti-terror" as the operative political imperative for the forces for the commencement of 'appropriate military response' in its directions.

thehill.com/opinion/internโ€ฆ 2.

Had given out the likely rationale of the GoI on the matter on 24/04/2025. The aim was to carry out a demonstrated, publicized anti-terror strike at targets without allowing Pakistan to change the narrative from a pure anti-terror op to another Indo-Pak fracas, same as 2019.
May 11 โ€ข 13 tweets โ€ข 7 min read
A thread on a collection of QTs & SS from 22 Apr 25 to provide a context on how things were well catered for, in advance.

Below, SS from 2019 & 2025 to show difference between approaches. In 2019, an offramp was given with deniability built in.

This time, was different. (1/n) Image
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The QT's are a series of tweets themselves. Would urge you to read them if you can.

(2/n)

Apr 24 โ€ข 9 tweets โ€ข 2 min read
An apt perspective by you.

Let's clarify something.
The political directives to Armed Forces, in 2019, were to carry out strikes in a way that the adversary could not make the narrative into an India-Pakistan military conflict, hence the restrictions put in form of RoEs at (1/n) the time, which saw a pure defensive approach by the IAF. The uproar in Indian Defence Space over the same notwithstanding, the approach allowed India to effectively keep the narrative to a pure anti-terror operation & 'restraint' in response to PAF shenanigans & Indian (2/n)
Nov 2, 2024 โ€ข 8 tweets โ€ข 4 min read
Now, commentary on this.

1. The MEA asked for cooling off in Sept 2020 asking army to look at the 'larger picture'.

2. That the armed forces had been allowed to get dated in 2000s & 2010s, added to the complexity of the situation in 2020. A military confrontation would (1/n) need a longer lead time to prepare for.

3. Also, wars are bad for business. GoI wanted to avoid it. Yet, didn't want to lose the 'strong on national security' image. Another complication was that a war with China would be unpredictable, prolonged & messy. And China had (2/n) Image
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Oct 3, 2024 โ€ข 5 tweets โ€ข 1 min read
Indian handles revelling om KGB castrating Hezbollah operatives resulting in return of diplomats.

A certain IA unit, in 1990s, had men ambushed. Khalsas. CO told SM that he didnt care. Retribution has to be there.

The terrorists involved were Afghan hardcore. 3 were killed. 1 officially, was taken prisoner & presented before CO with 5 AKs & plenty of warstores. SM reported the capture.

A day later, CO realized that something was amiss. 4 terrorists & 5 weapons?

Quietly came to know that the self styled BM, the leader, was tied up in the cow shed of
Sep 4, 2024 โ€ข 6 tweets โ€ข 1 min read
Let me tell you all a story.

Back in 60s, 70s, a program was launched to penetrate Sikh & Hindu communities of India using Int assets by an adversary, with asset acting initially & easily as a Sikh/ "refugee Hindu". These assets were planned as long range, dormant assets who were instructed to lie low, to be used in extreme cases only, were primarily deployed with a view to occupy positions of power/influence/decision making, either directly or through "guided" progenies, using local issues & friction points as their "launch points" for gaining
Aug 11, 2024 โ€ข 8 tweets โ€ข 2 min read
๐๐š๐ง๐ ๐ฅ๐š๐๐ž๐ฌ๐ก. ๐–๐ก๐š๐ญ ๐œ๐š๐ง ๐ˆ๐ง๐๐ข๐š ๐๐จ?

A quick bulletpoint summary:

โ€ข Continue a sustained diplomatic offensive with maintenance of secularism & sustenance of democracy being the cornerstone.

โ€ข Engage all the players in the current power structure, (1/n) especially the BD Army leadership, with which it has excellent relationships, to ensure & insure minority safety & security.

โ€ข Seal & secure Indo-Bangladesh border & declare it no go on either side to prevent any unwarranted facilitation of crossings from own side (2/n)
Apr 15, 2024 โ€ข 17 tweets โ€ข 4 min read
Very interesting, the takes on recent events in Israel, & extrapolation to an Indian context.

Few points:

1. The AD effort was multi-tiered & multi-national.

2. Most of the interceptions were made well before Israeli airspace.

3. Adequacy of warning existed. This

(1/n) permitted marshalling of resources well in advance.

4. Nations not likely to be targeted also deployed assets to assist in interceptions.

5. Use of predominantly liquid fuelled missiles (with long lead times to launch) & slower long range drones, gave adequate warning.

(2/n)