Kudos to the US and PRC for pulling off such a constructive meeting in Bali. Dare we hope that the Biden-Xi meeting marks the first signs of an inflection point that begins to decelerate the spiral towards conflict and makes room for tackling common challenges? A short thread: 1. It's encouraging that both sides agreed to empower senior officials (including an agreement for @SecBlinken to visit China) to develop principles to manage the relationship and working groups to make progress on specific issues.

.@POTUS' comments are dangerous, even if not an official change in policy (per @WhiteHouse clarification). More explicit here than in previous gaffes is the suggestion that the US would send troops to fight for Taiwan, regardless of what Taiwan does. 1/

https://twitter.com/jimsciutto/status/1571645653314322432

Not supporting Taiwan independence is longstanding US policy. But this new combo (a pledge to send troops + decisions about independence are Taiwan's) suggests an unconditional commitment, one that will strengthen perceptions that the U.S. is issuing Taiwan a blank check. 2/

In @ForeignAffairs, @TomPepinsky and I write that the true sources of China’s foreign policy influence are transactional and coercive, not ideological. foreignaffairs.com/guest-pass/red… A thread: 1/ The Biden administration is correct to emphasize the challenges facing democracy around the world, but the more immediate threat to U.S. democracy lies within, not without. 2/

Delighted to share my new article with @jerometenk on China and the future of international order, now out at @IntOrgJournal Thread: 1/ cambridge.org/core/journals/… We argue that four characteristics of contemporary
CCP rule are at odds with the liberal international order as a rules-based order that privileges democracy,
free enterprise, and individual political freedoms. 2/

New piece at the @monkeycageblog on the U.S. decision to close the Chinese consulate in Houston, with @ProfSaunders washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/… @monkeycageblog @ProfSaunders Building on yesterday's thread

https://twitter.com/jessicacweiss/status/1285952465754521600

Some quick reactions to the US decision to close the Chinese consulate in Houston: 1. Unless more evidence is forthcoming, this looks like a stepped up effort to use China as the bogeyman and distract U.S. voters from the Trump administration's disastrous response to the pandemic 2. If the consulate has been engaged in "massive illegal spying and influence operations,” why was the announcement so thin on detail? Why did we not learn that the consulate had been warned previously to stop, and when they did not, this was the punishment meted out?

Important piece by @rosenbergerlm. Some key points: "Beijing’s strategy is likely driven both by insecurity at home and by opportunism abroad...to deflect blame from Beijing’s own failings and to highlight other governments’ missteps" 1/

https://twitter.com/rosenbergerlm/status/1252952168195391488

@rosenbergerlm "Racist and xenophobic tropes about the virus and anti-Chinese hate crimes—which state media have aggressively recounted to audiences within China—have only helped the CCP" 2/

Two pieces in this morning's @monkeycage blog refute State Dept Policy Planning director's remarks. wapo.st/2GWbhNl @Steven_m_ward notes that calling China the first non-'Caucasian' competitor is wrong & dangerous. Elevating race helped fuel Japan's aggression in WWII 1/ But Skinner's remarks went beyond race, describing a new 'clash of civilizations' and calling China an ideological rival. My take on why that's wrong, in three ways: washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/… 2/