As the @WSJ notes, this dumb stmt is not China's official position. "Countries across Eastern Europe condemned remarks by China’s ambassador to France claiming that post-Soviet states lack a firm basis for their sovereignty under intl law." wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ Amb Lu's statement is dumb, not just politically, but also b/c Russia (and China!) recognized the sovereignty of Ukraine and every post-Soviet republic. See, e.g., chicagotribune.com/news/ct-russia…

Excellent @WSJ deep dive into the Huawei-Meng episode suggesting it might be a turning pt in US China relations. wsj.com/articles/huawe… @WSJ Lots of juicy tidbits: Xi personally very involved in this whole case.
"Mr. Xi penned more than 100 notes about her case, and he discussed the Michaels with two U.S. presidents. Mr. Xi refused to free them until Ms. Meng was released."

Some real cloak-and-dagger spy stuff in this indictment. The FBI has been feeding false info about the Huawei prosecution to alleged Chinese intelligence agents through a double agent. s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2317… Evidence Huawei knew about the Chinese intelligence operation. DOJ says "Company-1" demanded to speak to the FBI's double-agent directly about for inside info not the case. "Company-1" was getting the FBI's agent's info. (Company-1 is clearly Huawei.)

Good nuanced article on why China's attitude to restructuring debt matters in Sri Lanka (and based on this chart, everywhere else). wsj.com/articles/sri-l… "China typically takes an unorthodox approach to debt restructuring, disregarding the common wisdom in the West that debts of struggling borrowers should be written down... .... Beijing often fights to get every dollar originally promised by borrowers..."

China's view on the legality of using force under the UN Charter used to be relatively consistent, until Ukraine. Chinese spokesman invariably say: "China always opposes the use of force in international relations." And until Ukraine, it almost always did. 1/n Let's start with China's unequivocal condemnation of NATO strikes on Serbia in 1999. "China strongly opposed such an act blatantly violating the principles of the Charter, as well as international law..." un.org/press/en/1999/…

This is depressing. “While the Western world generally sympathises with Ukraine, feelings in India are different. A study found that out of 29,000 Indians surveyed, 62 percent support India’s abstention from condemning the invasion. “ vice.com/en/article/akv… “The problem of cornering India into taking a stance also reflects the “Cold War mentality” in the West, said Indian dipl Anil Triguniyat. “[Western countries] believe only in the alliance system, while India doesn’t believe in one..India has to think about…it’s natl interest.”

Interesting NYT allusion to an internal debate with the Biden Team on how to deal with China on Ukraine. Some think there is a chance to "pry" China way from Russia. Others think China is a lost cause. nytimes.com/2022/03/12/us/… This mirrors a debate on China Twitter, most of whom also see China as a lost cause, but a few holding out hope that China will come to its senses and shift away from Russia.

Have to admit I never knew this org existed. Nor does this situation seem to fit Art. 4 (which is triggered "In case of aggression against any of the Member States.") What is the "aggression" here that Kazakhstan is suffering from?

https://twitter.com/XHNews/status/1478873486915477509

The CSTO is styled as a NATO-like collective defense organization, but this outside intervention is about putting down domestic opposition. I know Kazakstan is saying the riots are caused by "external" aggression, but is there any evidence of this?

⁦@yaledailynews⁩ grants a student author anonymity b/c of threats of Chinese govt retaliation. “As a concerned Yale student, who has to remain anonymous for fear of putting those I love in danger, I’m writing to you so that she won’t be forgotten.” apple.news/AJ1XTlVmiTsSlJ… “The author is a student with family in China who might be harmed by the piece being published w/ the author’s name. As a policy, the News does not accept anonymous submissions. However, we believed this piece could not be published w/out guaranteeing the author’s anonymity.”

Fascinating work from @paulmozur and the large @nytimes team on this. Though shady, none of China's tactics here seem illegal. But it shows how there is an asymmetry in China's info operations competition with the West. nytimes.com/interactive/20… @paulmozur @nytimes China's state media can use (relatively) open platforms like FB, Insta, Youtube to influence global public opinion. But the US equivalent media can't do anything like this within China to influence Chinese public opinion.

This is a recipe for doing nothing.“Sherman made it clear that the administration prefers a more targeted and deliberative approach to determining which goods are the products of forced labor. She also told Merkley that getting allied buy-in was critical.” washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/… Existing law already prohibits importation of goods made from forced labor. Creating a rebuttable presumption that goods from XJ are from forced labor will force cos to really cleanup their supply chains or pull out.

It's actually worse when you listen to the whole response. Dalio is asked if he is OK w/ China disappearing people, and he responds by saying that the characters for nation in China is 國家 (state-family) which is why we shd see China's system as a family w/ a strict parent.

https://twitter.com/SquawkCNBC/status/1465660719756681218

He couldn't even bring himself to say: "I disapprove of disappearing people, but it's not my job to interfere in how China governs." He also claims lack of knowledge on these issue of human rts in China. How hard is it to get that knowledge? He has opinions on everything else!

@BonnieGlaser While It is true that neither the WPR nor the TRA authorize the use of force to defend Taiwan, it is doubtful that such authorization is needed to legalize any action to defend Taiwan. Presidents have long invoked Art. II of the Const to use force w/out Congress. @BonnieGlaser This 2011 DOJ opinion by Caroline Krass on the legality of President Obama's actions against Libya (Krass is currently DOD Gen Counsel) argues that POTUS can use force (w/out Congress) to defend the "national interest" beyond just US territory. justice.gov/sites/default/…

Worth noting: No agreement by Meng to cooperate in the DOJ Prosecution of Huawei; no agreement by Meng to pay any fines.

https://twitter.com/julianku/status/1441497090539073541

I am not an expert on deferred prosecution agreements, but I think they generally involve some kind of promise to cooperate and some kind of fine. The fact that Meng essentially faces no consequences for her admitted misconduct is a pretty big defeat for @TheJusticeDept.

Great deal for Meng. "The agreement, which is expected to be entered in court later Friday, will require Ms. Meng to admit to some wrongdoing in exchange for prosecutors deferring and later dropping wire and bank fraud charges, the people said." wsj.com/articles/justi… via @WSJ I don't know if it is also a great deal for @TheJusticeDept. It depends, but it may be Meng's ability to string this out for years battling extradition tipped their hand. Something is better than nothing, I suppose.

This law really does two things. 1) It formalizes the process for sanctioning foreign govt officials who implement sanctions as well as their families and perhaps think tanks, NGOS, or people who advised on those foreign sanctions). E.g. the recent sanctions on EU

https://twitter.com/NPC_Observer/status/1402990377812955143

The other thing the new law does is prohibit any companies operating in China from complying with EU or US sanctions and expose them to civil lawsuits for damages caused by such compliance. E.g. the XPCC could sue HM, etc.

Saudi Arabian leader Mohammed bin Salman "firmly supports China's legitimate position on affairs related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong." This kind of support from a leading majority-Muslim country is why pushing China on Xinjiang is so difficult. globaltimes.cn/page/202103/12… Interestingly, GT reports China's FM Wang will also be meeting with Turkish diplomats. Curious whether the Turkish will endorse China's Xinjiang policies as well.

Nike's statement on Xinjiang is actually carefully written to avoid condemning or accusing the Chinese govt of doing anything bad. It just says there are no Uighurs in our supply chain so we are fine. Apparently, this is not good enough. purpose.nike.com/statement-on-x… Moreover, in the Department of Ingratitude, these companies being targeted in China seem to have lobbied successfully against the Uighur Forced Labor Ban in Congress. Still not good enough apparently. msn.com/en-us/money/ma…

Even @globaltimesnews correctly differentiates the “one China principle” from the US “One China POLICY”. Now all we have to do is convince @politico of the same! cc: @jessicadrun globaltimes.cn/page/202103/12… More nuggets from the Chinese side. The CCP’s ruling status is not just a redline, it is the “ultimate redline.”

This could be a big deal, although it has some potential downsides. "U.S. Says China’s Repression of Uighurs Is ‘Genocide’" nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/… A US govt legal designation of something as a "genocide" has traditionally been a difficult bureaucratic and legal task. See, e.g., the fight over the 2004 US designation of Sudan's actions in Darfur as "genocide" theatlantic.com/international/…

This is quite a speech on Taiwan by @USAsiaPacific
Chief Stilwell. It says almost everything Taipei would want the US to say: E.g.: China is the problem, not Taiwan; Taiwan needs more international room. US will keep selling arms to Taiwan. state.gov/The-United-Sta… @USAsiaPacific It declassifies cables related to the 1982 "Six Assurance" given by the US to Taiwan, and reaffirms US commitment to those assurances. The Assurances run from the US to Taiwan, but were meant to clarify the limits of what the US would do w/r/t Taiwan when negotiating with China.