Konstantin Sonin Profile picture
Political economist, John Dewey Distinguished Service Professor, @HarrisPolicy at @UChicago.
Feb 17, 2023 4 tweets 3 min read
One thing that haunts Putin - and will haunt until the end -he is uncapable of getting rid of subordinates, even if they proved utterly incompetent. Just today he moved General Muradov, responsible for the Vuhledar disaster, to command of the Eastern Military District. 1/4 Media commentators love to speculate how Putin punishes this or that general or minister, but the fact is that he endlessly rotate the same group of individuals in positions of responsibility. The same idiot General Gerasimov is back in charge of the army. 2/4
Jan 20, 2023 8 tweets 2 min read
Many people, including experts, are upset about Germany's leadership vacillation over sending most effective weapons to Ukraine. They are right to be upset, but they should not be surprised. German's political elite's slowness in military matters is a feature, not a bug. 1/8 Back when NATO was created, its goal was much "keeping Germans in" as "keeping Russians out". The fear of military powerful Germany was so acute that it was, essentially, a deal - Be peaceful, break with recent history in a way - in exchange for protection from US/NATO. 2/8
Jan 16, 2023 4 tweets 1 min read
I am regularly asked, by media and friends, about what happens to Russia next, Marshall plan, etc. These are reasonable questions - after the Russian invasion is defeated, Ukraine's territorial integrity restored, damage compensated, and Putin and Co are brought to justice. 1/ Every single moment, the best decision for the Russia government - if it cares about Russia's interests - is to stop bombing Ukrainian cities, withdraw troops from Ukraine, and open negotiations about reparations, hanging over the war criminals, and lifting sanction. 2/
Oct 14, 2022 6 tweets 2 min read
President @ZelenskyyUa correctly rejects negotiating with Putin. Still, the reason that Zelenskyy cites - Putin's a war criminal - is largely irrelevant. What is relevant is that Putin is unable to make any credible commitments, the necessary element of any negotiations. 1/ The problem with Putin's commitment is that there is no institution in Russia that can provide a guarantee for Putin's promises. Putin is the sole decision maker, which means that any promise he makes is conditional on his willingness to keep his promise. 2/
Sep 30, 2022 8 tweets 2 min read
Very briefly.

Putin's "recognition" does not change anything. The criminal, and increasingly unpopular domestically, war will continue, with Ukraine having an upper hand. 1/ Putin's assumption that the US support will cease or slow at some point is from the same "analysis" that promised taking Kyiv in 3 days and that Ukrainians will great him with flowers. Not surprisingly, the same people fed this garbage to him and to TV propagandists to spread. 2/
Sep 20, 2022 6 tweets 1 min read
Frankly, on the today's news on new mobilization laws and referenda on the occupied territories - this is much ado about nothing. For six months, Putin does whatever it takes to win the war, constantly seeking any ways to escalate. 1/ To inflict the maximum pain and win the war, Russian troops massively targeted civilians and employed all possible military means on the frontiers. On the home front, they have started a mass mobilization campaign months ago, offering 10 times the average wages to volunteers. 2/
Jul 13, 2022 6 tweets 2 min read
Everyone is fascinated by Nikolay Patrushev, brilliantly profiled by @CatherineBelton - who jumped in the spotlight after years as a Putin's chamber ideologist. I disagree. Patrushev is a live embodiment of institutional degradation, a man wildly unfit for his current office. 1/ For years, Patrushev's interviews were filled with conspiracies theories mixed up with aged or outright incorrect information. Whenever he spoke about economy or other civil matters, he sounded uneducated and misinformed. 2/
Jul 10, 2022 5 tweets 1 min read
Some great Ukrainian and Russian scholars are bewildered why John Mearsheimer gets so much traction with his "NATO expansion is a cause of the Russian invasion" theory. That's actually quite simple: the brilliance of the theory is that makes a foreign event a domestic issue. 1/ Mearsheimer is no specialist on Russia, or Ukraine, or the region. And neither his audience. So, what he offers is a theory that is barely plausible as an explanation, among many, yet "relevant". If the US role is marginal - as it is in most foreign conflicts, who'd care? 2/
May 25, 2022 5 tweets 2 min read
Per @meduzaproject - people around Putin are unhappy about how things are turned out - and even more so about where the country is heading. The problem is that in a regime like Putin's leaders might survive even when all magnates are unhappy - Hitler-1945 is a prime example. 1/ I would expect Putin to be replaced by a junta, a "collective leadership" in the Soviet parlance, a division of power between the magnates. This happened after Stalin's death in 1953 and after Khrushchev ouster in 1964. 2/