Senior Fellow @StimsonCenter. Adjunct @GeorgetownCSS. Foreign/defense policy, alliances, airpower, and mil ops. Proud Bostonian
Mar 23 • 12 tweets • 2 min read
The "Iran is losing" narrative is tracking the wrong number. Yes, missile and drone launch rates are down 90%+.
But hit rate (or confirmed impacts per projectile fired) has been climbing steadily since Day 1.
A 🧵 on what the data actually shows.
2/ Raw impact counts drop sharply after Feb 28. But most of that drop is just fewer launches. That's at least partly the result of U.S./Israeli strikes destroying launchers and stockpiles.
The real question: Of the missiles/drones Iran does fire, how many are getting through?
Mar 10 • 13 tweets • 2 min read
Is Iran really losing its drone capacity? A closer look at how the US is measuring "degradation," and why the Shahed question deserves more scrutiny. A 🧵.
2/ At today's briefing, Hegseth cited "83% drone degradation" and "90% missile degradation." Impressive numbers. But how are they actually being measured? The answer should make you pause.
Mar 8 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Both sides are now running a risk strategy. The coming week could get worse. A short 🧵.
2/ Iran's logic: fire 1,500 drones at Gulf airports, oil ports, and US bases until the cost of continuing becomes greater than the cost of stopping. Make it too costly for everyone and wait for Gulf states to pressure Washington to end it.
Mar 5 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Iran fired 538 ballistic missiles at four Gulf states in the first four days of war.Gulf air defenses intercepted 521 of them = a 97% success rate. That number looks impressive. The math behind it is the problem. 🧵.
2/ The intercept ratio isn't 1:1: Usually firing 2-2.5 interceptors per missile.
Mar 1 • 12 tweets • 2 min read
UAE is shooting down ~92% of everything Iran throws at it. That's extraordinary. Yet the financial toll of sustaining that defense is enormous, raising the prospect that tactical ‘victory’ masks a costly strategic drain. A 🧵👇
2/ Since Feb 28, Iran has fired at the UAE:
I’m excited to share my latest @stimsoncenter report w/ @HunterSlingbaum and Jonathan Walker on why Chinese missile threats U.S. air bases in I-P.
BLUF: USAF could be grounded in theater in the first days and even weeks of a war. No easy answers
A 🧵 stimson.org/2024/cratering…1/ Our report models repeated Chinese missile attacks on U.S. air bases in Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Pacific Freely Associated States to determine for how long China could keep the runways and taxiways closed to U.S. air operations.
May 23, 2023 • 26 tweets • 5 min read
What does the F-16 decision mean for Ukraine? BLUF: The F-16s are unlikely to be the “game changer” so many seem to believe, and it leaves important questions about strategy and goals unanswered. A 🧵 politico.com/news/2023/05/2…1/ The F-16 is an upgrade from Ukraine’s Soviet-era fighter jets (MiG-29s. Zelensky welcome the decision, saying, “this will greatly enhance our army in the sky.”But F-16s are unlikely to be the “game changer” so many seem to believe.
Mar 22, 2022 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
This article nicely documents the bravery of Ukrainian pilots, but its conception of the fight for air control strikes me as dated. Thrread below nytimes.com/2022/03/22/wor…2/ It seems to depict Top-Gun style aerial dogfights as the locus of the fight for air control. They are not. As the article acknowledges, the Russians are flying about 200 sorties per day, and the Ukrainians five to 10.
