Over the past few years, the Kremlin has invested heavily in preparing for this contingency. That is why I remain pessimistic about a change of power in Russia without more delicate work. A thread about RU domestic developments:

https://twitter.com/kirlant/status/2066112344300695836

Digital: gradual transition to full control over the internet. The state can now shut down the internet across RU, and businesses and individuals're adapting. Its goal is to be able to isolate the Russian comms completely without causing significant damage to the economy. 1/10

As one who is often asked about RU domestic politics, I remained sceptical about the recent "intel report". There are several factual anomalies / obvious facts masqueraded as secrets that stand out. A short thread: 1/16 istories.media/en/stories/202… Putin "fears the use of drones for a possible assassination attempt". This is a well-know fact. FSO operatives have been carrying portable drone interceptors for a while. 2/16

Fascinating research about slave trade in Eastern Europe. Do you know that at least 5 million people from Lviv to Moscow were captured and sold from Crimea overseas in 15-18 centuries? After West Africa, the region was the largest source of slaves in the early modern world. 1/6 Most captives were marched to Crimea and shipped to Ottoman markets in Constantinople, Cairo, Damascus via a merchant network. Survivors not ransomed were sold locally. The Crimean Khanate built its entire economy around the raids. 2/6

Good discussion on RU elites with @amenka and Ekaterina Schulmann, 2 leading analysts of Russia. The provocative Q "why RU elites do not overthrow Putin" sounds simplistic, but the complexity hides behind risk calculus, rents, fear, and coordination. 1/10 Prokopenko’s point: there is no single “Russian elite.” There are patronal pyramids tied to Putin, each fighting for rents and access. Regime stability depends less on loyalty than on whether the system can still distribute enough resources to keep them aligned 2/10

Gen (R) Baluevsky (RU CGS 2004-08) and Ruslan Pukhov (head of @CentreAST) published an interesting article on the future of war saturated with digital technologies. A thread. 1/20 Miniaturization and cheaper components plus true networking are producing mass participation of drones of many types, forms, sizes, and roles. The bulk of drones are ever smaller and cheaper yet longer-range and more autonomous 2/20

Returning to my notes. The trip was illuminating, as it helped me to reconnect with people there and test some of my assumptions about the country, its society, the war, and the potential for negotiations. A thread with general and not scientific observations. 1/10

https://twitter.com/kirlant/status/1927828863049990472

I have three immediate observations. 1: UA was barely mentioned in conversations about the war and West-RU relations. It felt like UA was seen either a tool or an obstacle to achieving RU FP goals. RU has a broader view of the conflict than how Europeans discuss it. 2/10

Sad news about Viacheslav Morozov. A lot has been said about it, but I've noticed two worrying patterns of reaction that I think need to be highlighted 1/10

https://twitter.com/kuldkeppmart/status/1803039149236056302

When the arrest happened a lot of academics were in disbelief. They claimed he had anti-Putin beliefs, was nice and smart. Allegedly that is why he could not be an agent. In my chats, even now some people say “but he was vocally anti-Putin!” 2/10

Yesterday Lithuania commemorated the January events in Vilnius when 14 people were killed by the Soviet army and the KGB in an attempt to thwart Lithuanian independence. This story is relevant today and offers some lessons about Moscow's playbook and how to stop it. A thread 1/12 In response to LT declaration of independence on March 11, 1990, Gorbachev demanded its revocation. The USSR's reaction was to tighten its grip on the country, deploying troops, seizing archives, and targeting young Lithuanians avoiding conscription. 2/12

Russian regions will soon have the authority to establish their own private military companies and arm them, according to the proposed amendments being rushed through the State Duma. 1/5 The amendment allows governors to create state-owned enterprises during “mobilization, military emergencies, or wartime to aid security forces in safeguarding the national borders, combating sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and illegal armed formations.” 2/5