Finally out: Our long read on Russia’s large scale war in 2024. The paper is the result of a scenario workshop from September this year with colleagues from Ukraine, EU, UK and Russia. We are entering a difficult year: dgap.org/en/research/pu… Russia is preparing for a longer war, it is shifting towards a war economy, spending and distribution of resources takes place in the logic of the war, and the war has become a key legitimization source for the Putin system. Stopping the war now is too costly for the regime.

Some lessons learned on the take over of Azerbaijan of Nagorno Karabakh: This take over came not by a suprise, Azerbaijan was following since it won the 2nd Karabakh war in autumn 2020 the goal to take over the disputed region. It followed a Salami tactic since one year. In December there was the blockade of so called environmental activists, then border check points where installed and a total blockade of goods since June. Azerbaijan was preparing a military take over, buying weapons in Israel and deploying troops on the border to NK and Armenia

This is a game changer in new Georgian politics. Georgia as the most free and open country in the South Caucasus, one of the best performer in reforms in its EU integration has a government who decided for a foreign agent based on the Russian example oc-media.org/georgian-forei… This is not just happening by accident but was long prepared by the ruling party Georgian Dream and its owner Billionaire Bidzina Ivanishivli. Then premier minister Ivanishvili critized already in 2020 foreign funding and interference in Georgia.

Mein ausführliches Interview für Spiegel-Online zur Aufarbeitung der deutschen Russland- und Osteuropapolitik. Diese Aufarbeitung fehlt bisher: Debatte über neuen Russlandkurs: »Regime Change muss Ziel deutscher Politik sein« spiegel.de/politik/deutsc… via @derspiegel Deutschland trägt Verantwortung für die Signale, die es an den Kreml gesendet hat. Darauf fußten die Einschätzungen Moskaus, dass Deutschland als führende Macht in Europa im Kern opportunistisch agiert vor allem an seine eigenen wirtschaftlichen Interessen denkt, wie billiges Gas

Too much has been said about the German Zeitwende as a reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Scholz has raised with his speech in the Bundestag in the end of Februar expectations, which he is not able to fulfill. Zeitenwende was never a strategic concept but a reaction. It was a clearance kick (Befreiungsschlag) against external and internal pressure after the assessment for the first time since the end of the cold war, that German security is questioned by Russia and the Bundeswehr is not ready for this huge challenge to European security.

Some thoughs on President Zelenskiy in the German Bundestag yesterday and the German Zeitenwende. We all understand, that Zelenskiy is a brilliant speaker who can perfectly emotionalize his audience. We also understand, that in Ukraine Germany has a negative image. We should be fair with the traffic light coaltion in Germany that they are only 100 days in power and not responsible for all failures of the past governement. At the same time I would agree with Zelenskiys critizism, that Germany played a major role in appeasing Putin.

Everybody is now writing about, how Putin got Ukraine wrong, he did not expect, that Ukrainian people will defend their country, Zelenski is a proxy of the US and he needs to just get rid of him. Yes, socities are no actors for Putin, thats why I he got Ukraine and Russia wrong. But should we not write more about how we got everything wrong, how we as Germany, Europe, the so called West did not want to see the reality neither in 2008 nor in 2014 nor just a couple of weeks ago before the war started? We got Russia and Ukraine wrong.

On Foreign Minister Baerbocks visit toMoscow: The new governing coaltion in Germany has no common approach on how to deal with Russia in the context of its agression towards Ukraine and also not on Nord Stream 2. This weakens Germany as the key player on Russia in the EU. Germany is not leading the EU on Russia and Ukraine, but weakening a common Western approach. The leftits in the SPD want to decouple Nord Stream 2 from Russian military build up in Ukraine. Friedrich Merz (CDU) is against Swift sanctions but supports weapons supply for Ukraine.

Conclusions from this week negotiations with Russia: First, Moscow has a maximalist approach, Lavrov today made again clear, that the US cannot pick of the menu what they like to discuss with Russia, but they have to accept the whole package. That means, either yes or no! Second, while the collective West wants to start a negotiation process on arms control, security gurantees and trust building, Russia exactly wants no process at all anymore but by the US confirmed security gurantees plus the acceptance of its sphere of influence in Europe.