Who has Xi purged from the CCP Central Committee?

Attendance at next week's Fourth Plenum will reveal the extent of his recent "purge surge"

If all rumors are true, only 168/205 members (82%) and 159/171 alternates (93%) will be there

And only 17/44 of PLA members (39%)!

1/ Would be the sparsest plenum in recent memory

Main cause is spate of disappearances and disciplinary campaigns in the People's Liberation Army

Closest comparison I can find is the 2017 Seventh Plenum at the end of Xi's first-term crackdown (191 members and 145 alternates)

2/

"As Xi [Jinping] steps back, Li [Qiang] could emerge as an important interlocutor for governments and companies that want to engage with China, said Neil Thomas, a Chinese politics fellow at @AsiaPolicy."

Great @AP report by @kmorit

1/ "Li has held talks at the U.N. this week with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Austrian Chancellor Christian Stocker."

2/

Told @nytimes the Beijing military parade "underscores China’s pull with autocrats as the world’s leading authoritarian power" and illustrated how "China is already a regional superpower."

But we shouldn't get too carried away about a new China-led world order...

1/ As I told @business "this week is a diplomatic triumph for Beijing but China is still years or decades away from neutralizing US power in global finance, security and technology."

2/

What are the best Chinese-language podcasts about politics and policymaking in China?

Podcasts from inside and outside the mainland are must-listens for analysis, insight, and debate

For @AsiaPolicy, @shuizaiping2 recommends 5 podcasts worth your time

🗂️Alphabetical order🧵 1. Bumingbai 不明白 @bumingbaipod

Hosted by @nytimes journalist @LiYuan6

Candid conversations with academics, analysts, and activists on elite politics, economic policy, civil society, and China's relations with the world

Expert insights with excellent hosting

Xi Jinping is often called the "Chairman of Everything."

But of course Xi can't actually do everything. So what does he focus on?

New @AsiaSociety research by Lobsang Tsering & I analyzes which policies Xi handles "personally"—and which he avoids.

Some intriguing results🧵 The most precious resource for any leader? Time.

Xi allocates his time carefully—and state media often signal when he’s personally involved.

One phrase stands out: 亲自谋划、亲自部署、亲自推动

"Personally planned, personally arranged, personally promoted"

It's used a lot…

Xi is traveling abroad less than before Covid. Why?

"Physical stamina is a precious political resource, and Xi knows it. As Xi grows older, he is carefully managing his travel to preserve his strength.."

Happy to share some thoughts in a great @WSJ story by @ByChunHan

1/6 But foreign leaders are still coming to China, like for the EU Summit this week

"[Xi] has also hosted visiting world leaders more frequently than previous Chinese heads of state or recent U.S. presidents, according to data collated by Neil Thomas, a fellow at @AsiaPolicy."

2/6

Li Qiang chaired a study session today on sci-tech commercialization

Beijing should "use market forces more," "attract social [private] capital" and "encourage financial institutions to innovate financial products and services"

Bit of a vibe shift from the COVID era..

1/ The rising political priority of tech self-reliance is now creating opportunities for firms and financiers

Li said Beijing should "support qualified firms to take the lead or participate in national science and technology innovation projects"

More policy support...

2/

Is Chinese politics a one-man show under Xi Jinping? Not quite

Xi is in charge but is delegating more day-to-day policymaking to top allies

Li Qiang is a major beneficiary; China's premier matters again for business and diplomacy

My latest in @ChinaFile + @ForeignPolicy

1/10 This marks a counter-intuitive turn

Xi centralized power after 2012 by sidelining former Premier Li Keqiang and marginalizing the State Council

He created several Party-led commissions to control economic policy and advance his reform agenda—most chaired by himself

2/10

Tols @selinawangtv at @ABC that:

"At the moment, Xi seems to be calculating that China can withstand the damage and that ultimately it's the United States who will blink first"

1/9

https://twitter.com/selinawangtv/status/1910440077425074183

Xi's view is that countries will want to do business less with the U.S. because of the uncertainty created by tariffs, which will drive them toward China, said Thomas, who added that China has been preparing for this possibility for years by growing trade relations with the rest of the world.

2/9

"Xi knows that without economic growth, he cannot achieve his dream of China’s national rejuvenation"

That's one of my key takeaways from this year's Two Sessions, which just ended in Beijing

New piece w/@AsiaSociety experts @wstv_lizzi @LyleJMorris @LiShuo_GP GA Donovan

1/7 "The more intense the [U.S.-China] trade war, the more aggressively Beijing will add stimulus. Nonetheless, debt concerns will likely deter a stimulus 'bazooka,' and direct consumer stimulus remains unlikely due to ideological opposition and implementation hurdles."

2/7

🚨NEW: Xi Jinping just reinforced support for the private sector at China's annual parliament

Xi told delegates from Jiangsu to "comprehensively implement the spirit of the symposium on private enterprises" [that he held on Feb 17]

This "spirit" is new. What does it mean?

1/7 Having a "spirit" 精神 suggests the symposium will influence policy going forward

Beijing will increasingly involve private firms in pursuing key goals like innovation and consumption

But Xi's aim is not to unleash market forces but to align them with national objectives

2/7

Next week premier Li Qiang will announce China's economic targets in his annual government work report

The day after Donald Trump delivers what is effectively the first State of the Union address of his second term

What is Beijing's plan? Jing Qian & I for @AsiaPolicy

1/25 Li Qiang will speak on March 5 to the annual parliamentary session of the National People's Congress

It goes for about a week, concurrently with the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

These meetings are known as the Two Sessions

What will Li announce?

2/25

What to watch in China in 2025?

The @AsiaPolicy Center for China Analysis released a report last month on the political, economic, social, and diplomatic forecast for China this year

Here's what my colleague and I wrote about the year ahead in Chinese elite politics...

1/25 What We Are Watching

"What is good for Xi Jinping is not always good for China. Since ... the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, the country has endured a difficult post-COVID recovery marked by economic pessimism, weak consumption, and an enduring property crisis."

2/25

New Year's resolution: read more books!

There were so many great China-related titles published last year

Honored to contribute to the @chinabksreview list of "Best China Books of 2024"

Here's their full Top 10 of nonfiction China books (listed in no particular order)

1/ At the Edge of Empire: A Family’s Reckoning with China by @ewong

"Wong marries that inspiring family tale with his own deep experiences as a @nytimes reporter in China, five decades later, reporting from the same regions that his father saw as a soldier."
— @JanePerlez

2/

NEW @AsiaSociety volume on China in 2025

"The coming year will prove pivotal in testing Beijing’s resilience and adaptability"

—Is Xi's position secure?
—Can China's economy recover?
—How will Trump affect foreign policy?
—Much more!

Highlights of each chapter...

1/14 Pressure Will Grow Between Xi’s Political Power and His Ability to Deliver Results

"However, Xi’s own decision-making remains a key variable, as he has shown a degree of ideological flexibility when it serves his own political interests."

By myself and Lobsang Tsering

2/14

Honored to review "On Xi Jinping" by @MrKRudd in this month's edition of the @AustBookReview

"Kevin Rudd adds a worthy new chapter to his life of public service, digesting thousands of pages of 'Xi Jinping Thought' so that you do not have to."

Key points below 👇

1/12 "Xi’s ideology is described as 'Marxist-Leninist Nationalism,' or 'Marxist Nationalism' for short. He has thus moved Chinese politics to the 'Leninist left,' Chinese economic policy to the 'Marxist left,' and Chinese foreign policy to the 'nationalist right.'"

2/12

Who briefs Xi Jinping?

For @AsiaPolicy me and @HungChingFei analyze a new dataset of Politburo study sessions and speakers from 12/2002–6/2024 (h/t @BrianTHart)

Shows trends like Xi's rising focus on Party control and national security relative to economic development

1/8 Politburo briefers are also becoming somewhat more red and less expert under Xi

Briefers invited by Xi are less likely to be experts in national academies like CASS or State Council research institutes (from 2017 onwards)

But Xi does prioritize scholars for tech topics

2/8

Who are the most important people in China you've never heard of?

Probably the cadres who help Xi Jinping to manage the day-to-day business of CCP politics and policy

We map the Party Center in a new part of our interactive @AsiaPolicy product Decoding Chinese Politics

1/22 Xi is the ultimate decision-maker

Top lieutenants fill the 24-man Politburo and its 7-man Standing Committee

Central commissions and leading groups take charge of specific policy areas

But the behind-the-scenes operators who help run the CCP are rarely considered

2/22

Who are the rising stars of Chinese politics?

Many are leaders of mainland China's 31 provincial-level local governments

We mapped provincial leaders and their connections in a new section of our interactive @AsiaPolicy product Decoding Chinese Politics

Who's on the up?

1/18 Politics is local, and China is no exception

Beijing decides on policy directions but local cadres must interpret and implement these directives

Provincial leadership has become a testing ground for promotion to the 24-person Politburo and its top Standing Committee

2/18

Told @SCMPNews that Wang Huning "is a political survivor who loyally served Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao but found his greatest supporter in Xi Jinping. Wang’s neo-authoritarian intellectual project is a perfect complement to Xi’s centralizing political project."

1/4 Wang has gained Xi’s trust because he "is a believer in centralizing power, fighting corruption, and prioritizing hi-tech growth and has helped to make these issues central to Xi’s political agenda."

2/4

Xi Jinping accepted 12% of internal comments on the draft Third Plenum decision compared to 21% in 2013

There is less internal policy discussion; cadres sent 25% fewer comments

For @AsiaPolicy I go beyond the economic "what" of the plenum to analyze the political "why"..

1/12 The plenum decision included positive reform pledges in areas like central-local finances, hukou reform, and SOE policy

But Xi largely doubled down on his existing policies and ignored calls to address low confidence, weak consumption, and rising trade frictions

Why?

2/12