Mao said China would eclipse the US by 2030

In 1955: "Our goal is to catch up with and surpass the US ... it will take at least 50 years, perhaps 75, which is 15 five-year plans"

Xi just outlined China's 15th five-year plan. Can he prove Mao right?

Latest for @AsiaPolicy

1/ Probably not by the numbers—China's nominal GDP was only 64% of the US last year

But perhaps yes in substance—industrial might, tech self-reliance, and export controls helped Xi stare down US pressure this year

Chinese scholars are praising Mao's "strategic foresight"...

2/

Everyone talks about Cai Qi. Don't forget Wang Huning.

Xi Jinping just made extra space for Wang on the drafting team for his five-year plan proposals

Wang is China's most powerful United Front boss since Deng Xiaoping left the role in 1983

Could stay past retirement age? 1/ This table shows the evolution of drafting teams for plenums about five-year plans

Wang Huning is the first CPPCC Chairman (United Front boss) on such a team

He was also the first CCP Secretariat Head involved when he held that role in 2020

Becoming a constant presence.. 2/

China's Fourth Plenum ends:

1. Super-low attendance suggests record purge of Central Committee

2. Near-record discipline of 10 members & 4 alternates

3. Xi affirms PLA purges by promoting discipline boss Zhang Shengmin to replace He Weidong as CMC Vice-Chair

Thoughts..

1/ Communique suggests huge purge of Central Committee members beyond current rumors

Attendance was only 168/205 members and 147/171 alternates for a total of 315/376 (84%)

I believe that's a record low in the post-Mao era

"Empty chairs at empty tables" (h/t @shuizaiping2)

2/

Big update! China just confirmed it has fired number-two general He Weidong

9 generals, inc 8 Central Committee members, expelled from the CCP

1 Politburo vacancy, 3 Central Military Commission vacancies, 11 CC vacancies

Will Xi fill them at the Fourth Plenum next week?

1/

https://twitter.com/neilthomas123/status/1978499540836552864

Xi may leave the Politburo and CMC depleted

No one replaced Sun Zhengcai when he was purged from the Politburo in 2017

And Xi has repeatedly declined to promote Li Shangfu's successor Dong Jun to the CMC

Absences make it easier for him to dominate and help punish the PLA

2/

Who has Xi purged from the CCP Central Committee?

Attendance at next week's Fourth Plenum will reveal the extent of his recent "purge surge"

If all rumors are true, only 168/205 members (82%) and 159/171 alternates (93%) will be there

And only 17/44 of PLA members (39%)!

1/ Would be the sparsest plenum in recent memory

Main cause is spate of disappearances and disciplinary campaigns in the People's Liberation Army

Closest comparison I can find is the 2017 Seventh Plenum at the end of Xi's first-term crackdown (191 members and 145 alternates)

2/

"As Xi [Jinping] steps back, Li [Qiang] could emerge as an important interlocutor for governments and companies that want to engage with China, said Neil Thomas, a Chinese politics fellow at @AsiaPolicy."

Great @AP report by @kmorit

1/ "Li has held talks at the U.N. this week with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Austrian Chancellor Christian Stocker."

2/

Told @nytimes the Beijing military parade "underscores China’s pull with autocrats as the world’s leading authoritarian power" and illustrated how "China is already a regional superpower."

But we shouldn't get too carried away about a new China-led world order...

1/ As I told @business "this week is a diplomatic triumph for Beijing but China is still years or decades away from neutralizing US power in global finance, security and technology."

2/

What are the best Chinese-language podcasts about politics and policymaking in China?

Podcasts from inside and outside the mainland are must-listens for analysis, insight, and debate

For @AsiaPolicy, @shuizaiping2 recommends 5 podcasts worth your time

🗂️Alphabetical order🧵 1. Bumingbai 不明白 @bumingbaipod

Hosted by @nytimes journalist @LiYuan6

Candid conversations with academics, analysts, and activists on elite politics, economic policy, civil society, and China's relations with the world

Expert insights with excellent hosting

Xi Jinping is often called the "Chairman of Everything."

But of course Xi can't actually do everything. So what does he focus on?

New @AsiaSociety research by Lobsang Tsering & I analyzes which policies Xi handles "personally"—and which he avoids.

Some intriguing results🧵 The most precious resource for any leader? Time.

Xi allocates his time carefully—and state media often signal when he’s personally involved.

One phrase stands out: 亲自谋划、亲自部署、亲自推动

"Personally planned, personally arranged, personally promoted"

It's used a lot…

Xi is traveling abroad less than before Covid. Why?

"Physical stamina is a precious political resource, and Xi knows it. As Xi grows older, he is carefully managing his travel to preserve his strength.."

Happy to share some thoughts in a great @WSJ story by @ByChunHan

1/6 But foreign leaders are still coming to China, like for the EU Summit this week

"[Xi] has also hosted visiting world leaders more frequently than previous Chinese heads of state or recent U.S. presidents, according to data collated by Neil Thomas, a fellow at @AsiaPolicy."

2/6

Li Qiang chaired a study session today on sci-tech commercialization

Beijing should "use market forces more," "attract social [private] capital" and "encourage financial institutions to innovate financial products and services"

Bit of a vibe shift from the COVID era..

1/ The rising political priority of tech self-reliance is now creating opportunities for firms and financiers

Li said Beijing should "support qualified firms to take the lead or participate in national science and technology innovation projects"

More policy support...

2/

Is Chinese politics a one-man show under Xi Jinping? Not quite

Xi is in charge but is delegating more day-to-day policymaking to top allies

Li Qiang is a major beneficiary; China's premier matters again for business and diplomacy

My latest in @ChinaFile + @ForeignPolicy

1/10 This marks a counter-intuitive turn

Xi centralized power after 2012 by sidelining former Premier Li Keqiang and marginalizing the State Council

He created several Party-led commissions to control economic policy and advance his reform agenda—most chaired by himself

2/10

Tols @selinawangtv at @ABC that:

"At the moment, Xi seems to be calculating that China can withstand the damage and that ultimately it's the United States who will blink first"

1/9

https://twitter.com/selinawangtv/status/1910440077425074183

Xi's view is that countries will want to do business less with the U.S. because of the uncertainty created by tariffs, which will drive them toward China, said Thomas, who added that China has been preparing for this possibility for years by growing trade relations with the rest of the world.

2/9

"Xi knows that without economic growth, he cannot achieve his dream of China’s national rejuvenation"

That's one of my key takeaways from this year's Two Sessions, which just ended in Beijing

New piece w/@AsiaSociety experts @wstv_lizzi @LyleJMorris @LiShuo_GP GA Donovan

1/7 "The more intense the [U.S.-China] trade war, the more aggressively Beijing will add stimulus. Nonetheless, debt concerns will likely deter a stimulus 'bazooka,' and direct consumer stimulus remains unlikely due to ideological opposition and implementation hurdles."

2/7

🚨NEW: Xi Jinping just reinforced support for the private sector at China's annual parliament

Xi told delegates from Jiangsu to "comprehensively implement the spirit of the symposium on private enterprises" [that he held on Feb 17]

This "spirit" is new. What does it mean?

1/7 Having a "spirit" 精神 suggests the symposium will influence policy going forward

Beijing will increasingly involve private firms in pursuing key goals like innovation and consumption

But Xi's aim is not to unleash market forces but to align them with national objectives

2/7

Next week premier Li Qiang will announce China's economic targets in his annual government work report

The day after Donald Trump delivers what is effectively the first State of the Union address of his second term

What is Beijing's plan? Jing Qian & I for @AsiaPolicy

1/25 Li Qiang will speak on March 5 to the annual parliamentary session of the National People's Congress

It goes for about a week, concurrently with the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

These meetings are known as the Two Sessions

What will Li announce?

2/25

What to watch in China in 2025?

The @AsiaPolicy Center for China Analysis released a report last month on the political, economic, social, and diplomatic forecast for China this year

Here's what my colleague and I wrote about the year ahead in Chinese elite politics...

1/25 What We Are Watching

"What is good for Xi Jinping is not always good for China. Since ... the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, the country has endured a difficult post-COVID recovery marked by economic pessimism, weak consumption, and an enduring property crisis."

2/25

New Year's resolution: read more books!

There were so many great China-related titles published last year

Honored to contribute to the @chinabksreview list of "Best China Books of 2024"

Here's their full Top 10 of nonfiction China books (listed in no particular order)

1/ At the Edge of Empire: A Family’s Reckoning with China by @ewong

"Wong marries that inspiring family tale with his own deep experiences as a @nytimes reporter in China, five decades later, reporting from the same regions that his father saw as a soldier."
— @JanePerlez

2/

NEW @AsiaSociety volume on China in 2025

"The coming year will prove pivotal in testing Beijing’s resilience and adaptability"

—Is Xi's position secure?
—Can China's economy recover?
—How will Trump affect foreign policy?
—Much more!

Highlights of each chapter...

1/14 Pressure Will Grow Between Xi’s Political Power and His Ability to Deliver Results

"However, Xi’s own decision-making remains a key variable, as he has shown a degree of ideological flexibility when it serves his own political interests."

By myself and Lobsang Tsering

2/14

Honored to review "On Xi Jinping" by @MrKRudd in this month's edition of the @AustBookReview

"Kevin Rudd adds a worthy new chapter to his life of public service, digesting thousands of pages of 'Xi Jinping Thought' so that you do not have to."

Key points below 👇

1/12 "Xi’s ideology is described as 'Marxist-Leninist Nationalism,' or 'Marxist Nationalism' for short. He has thus moved Chinese politics to the 'Leninist left,' Chinese economic policy to the 'Marxist left,' and Chinese foreign policy to the 'nationalist right.'"

2/12

Who briefs Xi Jinping?

For @AsiaPolicy me and @HungChingFei analyze a new dataset of Politburo study sessions and speakers from 12/2002–6/2024 (h/t @BrianTHart)

Shows trends like Xi's rising focus on Party control and national security relative to economic development

1/8 Politburo briefers are also becoming somewhat more red and less expert under Xi

Briefers invited by Xi are less likely to be experts in national academies like CASS or State Council research institutes (from 2017 onwards)

But Xi does prioritize scholars for tech topics

2/8