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PeckShield Inc. Profile picture
PeckShield Inc.
@peckshield
A blockchain security and data analytics company (telegram: https://t.co/x72dANZur3)
4 subscribers
Mar 13, 2023 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
1/ @eulerfinance was exploited in a flurry of txs on Ethereum (one hack tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xc310a0aff…), leading to the lost of ~$197m from the project. 2/ The hack is made possible due to the flawed logic its donation and liquidation. Specifically, the donateToReserves needs to ensure the donator is still over-collateralized. And liquidation needs to ensure the *correct* conversion rate from borrow to collateral asset.
Feb 16, 2023 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
1/ @Platypusdefi was exploited by a flash loan attack on Avalanche (tx: snowtrace.io/tx/0x1266a937c…), leading to the gain of ~$8.75m for the exploiter. Image 2/ The hack is made possible due to a flawed impl in its MasterPlatypusV4 contract. Specifically, the emergencyWithdraw func incorrectly evaluates the insolvency before the collateral removal, resulting in an insolvent debt position of ~41.7M after the emergency withdrawal. Image
Feb 10, 2023 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
1/ @dForcenet was exploited in a flurry of txs on Arbitrum & Optimism (one hack tx: arbiscan.io/tx/0x5db5c2400…), leading to the total gain of ~$3.65m for the exploiter. 2/ The hack is made possible due to the price manipulation of the @dForcenet wstETHCRV-gauge asset via reentrancy (via wstETHCRV.remove_liquidity), so that the exploiter can liquidate a number of positions w/ the wstETHCRV-guage as collateral. Image
Feb 3, 2023 • 4 tweets • 4 min read
1/ Again, a $3M lesson from the reentrancy bug! The @orion_protocol is hacked due to a reentrancy issue in its core contract: ExchangeWithOrionPool. Both eth/bsc deployment are hacked. Here are the two related hack txs: bscscan.com/tx/0xfb153c572…
etherscan.io/tx/0xa6f63fcb6… 2/ The hack is made possible due to incomplete reentrancy protection: swapThroughOrionPool func allows user-provided swap path w/ crafted tokens whose transfer can be hijacked into re-entering depositAsset func to increase user balance accounting w/o actually costing funds!
Feb 1, 2023 • 4 tweets • 4 min read
The @BonqDAO is exploited and its price oracle is manipulated to increase the #WALBT price. Here is the example hack tx: polygonscan.com/tx/0x31957ecc4… Using the above tx as an example, with the manipulated #WALBT price, the malicious actor is able to mint >100M #BEUR.
Oct 27, 2022 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
1/ @TeamFinance_ was exploited in etherscan.io/tx/0xb2e3ea72d…,
leading to the loss of ~$15.8M for the protocol: $11.5M (V2_USDC_CAW)+$1.7M(V2_USDC_TSUKA)+0.7M(V2_KNDX_WETH)+1.9M(V2_FEG_WETH). @trustswap 2/ The protocol has a flawed migrate() that is exploited to transfer real UniswapV2 liquidity to an attacker-controlled new V3 pair with skewed price, resulting in huge leftover as the refund for profit. Also, the authorized sender check is bypassed by locking any tokens.
Oct 21, 2022 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
It seems the related @OlympusDAO's BondFixedExpiryTeller contract has a redeem() function that does not properly validate the input, resulting in ~$292K loss. etherscan.io/tx/0x3ed75df83… Image Image
Sep 19, 2022 • 9 tweets • 7 min read
1/ We are thrilled to announce a self-service SaaS platform-#KillSwitch, which aims to detect exploitation TXs before their block inclusion and take contingency measures to block the attack or prevent assets from being stolen. It is in-essence a frontrunning-based DeFi protection Image 2/ #KillSwitch is proposed with the observation that DeFi exploits/hacks pose a significant, serious threat to the security of our ecosystem. In particular, this year’s DeFi hacks have so far resulted in a whopping $2.1B loss, 25% increase from 2021 and 8 times more than 2020. Image
Jun 16, 2022 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
1/ @InverseFinance was exploited in etherscan.io/tx/0x958236266…,
leading to the gain of ~$1.26M for the hacker (The protocol loss may be larger). 2/ To illustrate, we use the above tx etherscan.io/tx/0x958236266… and show the key steps below: Image
Apr 30, 2022 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
1/ @saddlefinance was exploited in a flurry of txs (etherscan.io/tx/0x2b023d654… and etherscan.io/tx/0xe7e047479…),
resulting in the protocol loss of >$10M. 2/ To illustrate, we use the hack tx 0x2b023d65485c4bb68d781960c2196588d03b871dc9eb1c054f596b7ca6f7da56 and show the key steps below:
Apr 28, 2022 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
The @DeusDao was exploited today in ftmscan.com/tx/0x39825ff84… with ~$13.4M gain for the hacker (The protocol loss may be larger). 2/ The hack is made possible due to the flashloan-assisted manipulation of price oracle that reads from the StableV1 AMM - USDC/DEI pair. The manipulated price of collateral DEI is then used to borrow and drain the pool. Sounds familiar? Image
Apr 17, 2022 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
1/ The @BeanstalkFarms was exploited in a flurry of txs (etherscan.io/tx/0xd09b72275… and etherscan.io/tx/0xcd314668a…),
leading to the gain of $80+M for the hacker (The protocol loss may be larger), including 24,830 ETH and 36M BEAN. 2/ The hack is made possible due to the flashloan-assisted (immediate) pass of BIP18, which was submitted one day ago (etherscan.io/tx/0x68cdec0ac…). The BIP18 leads to the crafted code execution with the governance privilege to drain the pool fund.
Apr 2, 2022 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
1/ The @InverseFinance is exploited in a flurry of txs (one representative hack: etherscan.io/tx/0x600373f67…), leading to the gain of at least 11.7M for the hacker (The protocol loss is much larger). 2/ The hack is made possible due to the price oracle manipulation bug so that when the INV (with highly manipulated price) is used as collateral to drain assets from @InverseFinance.
Mar 31, 2022 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
1/ The @ola_finance is exploited in a flurry of txs, leading to the gain of ~$3.6M for the hacker (the protocol loss is larger). Here is an example hack tx: explorer.fuse.io/tx/0x1b3e06b6b… 2/ To illustrate, we use the above example hack tx and show the key steps below
Mar 28, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
1/ The @RevestFinance was exploited in a flurry of txs (one representative hack: etherscan.io/tx/0x613b2de3b…), leading to the gain of ～2M for the hacker, including 7,699,999 ECO, 579 LYXe, 714,999,999 BLOCKS, and 352,835 RENA. 2/ The hack is made possible due to missed reentrancy protection for the key functions of Revest. Moreover, the update of the next fnftId is not timely and then exploited to make profit in the reentrancy attack by modifying an existing NFT’s depositAmount. Image
Mar 13, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
1/ The @paraluni was exploited in a series of txs (one hack tx:
bscscan.com/tx/0x70f367b94…), leading to the gain of ~$1.7M for the hacker. 2/ The hack is made possible due to a reentrancy bug (introduced by the use of a crafted token contract) in the depositByAddLiquidity() function, which somehow doubles the credits the hacker is able to claim. Image
Jan 18, 2022 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
1/4 @crosswisefi was exploited in bscscan.com/tx/0xd02e444d0…, leading to the loss of ~$879K for the protocol. 2/4 The hack is made possible due to the public exposure of a privileged function, which is then exploited to set the trustedForwarder and further hijack the owner privilege of @crosswisefi MasterChef
Oct 29, 2021 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
1/4 @autosharkfin was exploited in a flurry of txs (one hack tx: bscscan.com/tx/0x8769f7ee2…), leading to the gain of ~$2M for the hacker (The protocol loss may be larger). 2/4 The hack is made possible due to a profit inflation bug, which was exploited to donate a large amount of $NOVAs so that a huge amount of $JAWS tokens can be minted as reward!
Oct 27, 2021 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
1/4 @CreamdotFinance was exploited in etherscan.io/tx/0x0fe254207…), leading to the gain of ~$117M for the hacker. 2/4 The hack is made possible due to a price manipulation bug in CREAM price oracle. And this bug allows a directly transferred yDAI+yUSDC+yUSDT+yTUSD tokens to significantly increase yUSD pricePerShare, which allows for basically borrowing all funds in current lending pools. Image
Oct 2, 2021 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
1/x @AutoSharkFin The swap mining feature was exploited in a flurry of txs to gain the reward of 3.18M FINS tokens, which are then immediately swapped to 1,388 BNB (with roughly $581K). Image 2/x The hack is made possible due to the relatively low pool liquidity so that the hacker can use flashloans to occupy the majority of pool share (to recover swap loss/fee) while still enjoy the sizable "swap fee reward” (increased from each huge swap). Image
Aug 30, 2021 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
1/4 @CreamFinance was exploited in (one hack tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xa9a1b8ea2…), leading to the gain of ~$18.8M for the hacker. 2/4 The hack is made possible due to a reentrancy bug introduced by $AMP, which is an ERC777-like token and exploited to re-borrow assets during its transfer before updating the first borrow.