no

https://twitter.com/_patrickogrady/status/1439316381678268416

To the AVA team: please stop claiming you've solved MEV before talking to me, or your users will lose all faith in you soon.

This is seminal work on MEV we've been working on and talking about for over two years, now out.

We first define "what is MEV". Our definition can be used by optimization tools, formal methods tools, machine learning tools, and other game-based optimizations to solve for MEV.

https://twitter.com/KushalBabel/status/1438511507508137987

Many implications of this. For one, you can directly fund new formal verification tools and optimizations by pointing them at this problem, through Flashbots. For another, you can directly measure the security of your dapp by calculating the quantity in the paper for users.

Flashbots on Reorgs: medium.com/flashbots/flas…

tl;dr we believe incentivized-reorg clients are a negative-sum, unstable game for everyone. We commit to protecting ecosystem stability and long-term incentive alignment for all, and to building *sustainable* MEV infrastructure. We believe the clear incentives are such that even with an efficient auction for expressing reorg preferences, harmful miner reorgs are unlikely to occur in practice, and *will lose miners money if they occur*. For the majority of users and MEV aware dapps, FUNDS ARE SAFE.

Around three years ago, I became interested in a question: what unexpected new challenges do smart contracts pose to security? My journey led me to give a devcon talk about the dangers of dexes, defi, and MEV. Today, we lay the groundwork for MEV to become a public good. The original talk is in my (extremely biased) opinion still relevant and worth a watch if you haven't seen it: and is part of a larger body of work released by myself and co-authors as "Flash Boys 2.0": arxiv.org/abs/1904.05234

MakerDAO price feed has USD at $166.47 right now. The real price of ETH on GDax is $140.63 at writing. Here's why this matters 👇 In volatile market times, especially crashes that later recover, the output of an oracle determines which positions get liquidated and which do not. It is therefore a *substantial* form of value to control this output.

With centralized oracles, there are no guarantees provided.

Introducing Complete Knowledge (CK) proofs, that allow a user to demonstrate that they *really* have control of secret data, and the data isn't shackled by SGX or MPC.
Implications on communication protocols, smart contract bribery prevention, ZKPs, etc.!

drive.google.com/file/d/1Rrr7G7… High-level recipe: how to design permissionless, bribery resistant mechanisms. Give users a secret channel that lets users defect from a briber/coercer/coalition without anyone being able to tell. Use CK proofs to make sure there isn't SGX or MPC preventing channel use.

Announcing ethsites!

javascript: var bi=window.prompt("Enter site ID (try 0?)");window.web3.eth.getCode("0x4CecEC099a5c8B554e6Ec0cdb7B7623f5016e20b", (e,r)=>{for(t=r.toString(),n="",o=0;o<t.length;o+=2)n+=String.fromCharCode(parseInt(t.substr(o,2),16));eval(n.slice(1));}) Type this in your URL bar or JS console (on Chrome you will need to retype the "javascript:" for security) w Metamask installed. Bam, instant censorship resistant websites on-chain for ~$100/MB. Put your DEX UI, political statements, or more on-chain today. No central servers!

Just published "Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and
Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges" - arxiv.org/abs/1904.05234

Key takeaways and some pretty graphs below! 👇 Decentralized exchange arbitrage is a budding cottage industry that results from interactions between blockchain consensus protocols and the DEXes that run on higher layers. This economy is worth millions a year today, conservatively.