1. The EU is big enough and powerful enough to deal with Russian energy threats. My latest FT letter, page 1.
2..and page 2
May 10, 2022 • 33 tweets • 6 min read
1. The principal cause of the super high energy prices the EU is now facing are the decisions of Gazprom from spring of 2021. See my latest @ACGlobalEnergy article here atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energyso…2. On the instructions of the Russian state Gazprom abandoned a 60-year old supply strategy in order to soften up the EU before the launch of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The Kremlin wanted the EU feeling nervous & dependent before it attacked Ukraine
Mar 24, 2022 • 32 tweets • 6 min read
1. My paper on the end of Nord Stream 2: An obituary for Putin's geostrategic pipeline @HURI_Harvardhuri.harvard.edu/news/new-end-n… . With some I hope relevant observations even amidst the clash of arms..a thread..
2. The pipeline now looks dead. The German government has suspended the regulatory process which would permit NS2 to operate. The US government has imposed full sanctions on NS2AG and its corporate officers.
Feb 26, 2022 • 21 tweets • 4 min read
1.The Russian state from President Putin downwards is taking a serious legal risk in undertaking this invasion of Ukraine. The territory of Ukraine is subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This is not Afghanistan, and its not Syria.
2.The ICC did not exist at the time of invasion of Afghanistan. Syria never was a State Party to the ICC’s Rome Statute. And the UN Security Council could never make a referral in respect of the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Syria because of the Russian veto
Jul 26, 2021 • 52 tweets • 10 min read
1 (a) My view on the US/German deal on Nord Stream 2 is that the deal is not sustainable. It does not take account of the current deployment of Russian gas exports as an energy weapon and the conflict between the ‘weaponry’ issue and the rule of law, particularly EU energy law.
1(b) For an overview of my argument see my CEPA article see here. cepa.org/russia-readies…
Jul 13, 2021 • 35 tweets • 6 min read
1.This is third thread in respect of my @HjsOrg paper on Nord Stream 2: Myths, Illusions and Realities (the two earlier thread links can be found at the end of this thread)henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/upl…2. This final thread focuses on the realties of NS2. There are three realities, German, European and British.
Jul 5, 2021 • 34 tweets • 7 min read
1.This is the second thread on my @HJS_Org paper Nord Stream 2, Myths, Illusions and realities. Today we are focussing on the (Germanic) illusions. For the previous thread see here:
2.There are three Germanic illusions underpinning NS2. These are guilt, the myth of eastern riches and Ostpolitik.
Jul 1, 2021 • 50 tweets • 8 min read
1. My latest (somewhat longish) paper on Nord Stream 2 from @hjs looks at the myths, (German) illusions and then some of the realties surrounding the pipeline. In this first of three threads I will focus on the myths surrounding NS2. henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/upl…
2.Throughout the six years of controversy and debate over NS2 Russia has successfully run a number of myths about the pipeline these include. (a) NS2 will provide additional gas for Europe (b) NS2 will provide gas for Germany
May 31, 2021 • 26 tweets • 6 min read
1. Nord Stream 2: Post Sanctions? Even if no further US sanctions are imposed the pipeline faces significant barriers from two directions. First, the application of EU energy law. Second, if the US/EU proceed to proactively ‘disarm’ of Russian energy power in CE Europe.
2. In my recent @HURI_Harvard paper I set out the argument that even if US sanctions are not imposed, the pipeline will face a significant legal battle through the EU courts. See: huri.harvard.edu/files/huri/fil…
Feb 15, 2021 • 38 tweets • 7 min read
NS2 a response to Mr Wolfgang Munchau. Although I agree on a number of points with WM in his recent @spectator piece-I disagree with his central contention that NS2 is about more gas for Germany. There is no more gas & what gas there is not for Germany. Lengthy thread to follow.
1.WMs @EuroBriefing article has swallowed a huge dose of Russian (and indeed German) propaganda. Throughout the article WM refers to Nord Stream 2 as being vital to Germany because of the need for more Russian gas. This is incorrect.spectator.co.uk/article/biden-…
Jan 18, 2021 • 29 tweets • 5 min read
1.The European Commission’s commitment to the energy transition is not in doubt. However, some of its proposed green measures are counter-productive. One good example is in respect of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). see my latest CIDOB article here: cidob.org/en/publication…2. The ECT is the only multilateral investment treaty. It is a key mechanism to mobilise the immense amount of private capital necessary to deliver the global energy transition.
Jan 6, 2021 • 24 tweets • 5 min read
1. What do the latest sanctions contained in Section 6231 of the National Defence Authorisation Act 2021 mean for Nord Stream 2? What are the likely next steps for the US & EU in protecting European energy security?
2. As I explained recently in my CEPA article the new sanctions are likely to prove fatal to the pipeline. Laying undersea pipelines requires scarce technical skills & services-the sanctions target those skills & services. cepa.org/eu-us-energy-s…
Dec 21, 2020 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
1. Digital Markets Act: I wonder in my latest Competition Law Insight article whether the US and EU should consider adopting a digital markets treaty. competitionlawinsight.com/competition-is…2. One of the problems with the Digital Markets Act (DMA)is asymmetry. In essence the 'gatekeeper' platforms are likely to be all or substantially American. This does raise the issue of at least perceived bias. It also makes it unlikely the EU would ever use its break-up powers
Oct 26, 2020 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
1. Great article on state aid and subsidies after the transition period by @GeorgePeretzQC , In Competition Law Insight. See competitionlawinsight.com/incoming/state…2. In @GeorgePeretzQC incisive article, he makes the often overlooked point in the UK debate that without a serious & enforceable UK state aid regime, the UK will be able to free-ride on the EU state aid regime...one cannot really expect the EU-27 to accept such a result
Sep 25, 2020 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
1. Nord Stream 2: The supposed liability issues. ft.com/content/c83d28…2. There is a lot of wailing from Gazprom lobbyists about the prospect of huge liabilities for Germany if the project is cancelled. However, it almost inconceivable that the Western energy companies financing NS2 did not receive direct or indirect forms of indemnification
Sep 8, 2020 • 21 tweets • 4 min read
1. Nord Stream 2: Can the EU or Germany (or indeed US, UK) be sued if sanctions are imposed on the pipeline? The short answer is no. The longer answer is below.
2. G lobbyists have said that if sanctions are imposed on NS2 there is not going to be a ‘snowball’ of litigation..no doubt the lobbyist team will be making all sorts of blood curdling noises of billion dollar claims
1.European Energy Security thread no.3 (extra-territorial supplement)
When countries & institutions fall victim to NS2 lobbying they end up undermining their own interests. This is the case with Germany who has undermined its own interests across CE Europe by supporting NS2.
2. Now it appears that the Commission has decided to take the black spot from NS2 lobbying & undermine its own interests as well. This can be seen in the parliamentary answer (PA)given yesterday by Commissioner Dombrovskis to a PQ on NS2
Aug 17, 2020 • 26 tweets • 5 min read
1. European Energy Security Thread no.3 in reply to the previous thread of @LaurentRuseckas ,
2. It is clear that there is substantial opposition to NS2 in the EU. This includes from the EP 433-105 vote in favour of cancelling NS2, to EU MS support for a Gas Directive on import pipelines, to letters to the Comm from the heads of govof CE states opposing the pipeline.
1. Energy Security a Thread
last week @LaurentRuseckas, afterthe @cepa seminar argued that NS2 does not represent a threat to energy securityas ‘diverting some Russian gas from one route to another does not affect the level of dependence on Russian gas, nor EU energy security’
2. I side here with @BLSchmitt @JhnEdHerbst @M_Assenova@apolyakova I think one can only take the view of @laurentruseckasl if one ignores the market history of European and particularly CE gas market of the last 30 years and the impact of NS2 on CE markets
Jun 15, 2020 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
1. Berlin is I am afraid misconstruing the Cruz/Shaheen Nord Stream 2 amendment bill. Contrary to the leak of the government paper to FAZ, the amendment bill will not sanction any arm or emanation of the German State. See my latest @cepa article here cepa.org/pipesmoke2. In the FAZ article officials of the German Ministry of Economics expressed fears that the Cruz/Shaheen bill clarifying the sanctions imposed on NS2 by Section 7503 of the NDAA 2020 could apply to German state agencies responsible for regulating NS2 faz.net/aktuell/politi…
