Cybery bits from the 2024 NDAA:

🧵
congress.gov/bill/118th-con… Office of Strategic Capital being spun up.

A body to pump money into CETs.

Like cybery stuff (the list is like our list of critical technologies in the national interest:
and what the WH already put out in May: ). industry.gov.au/publications/l…
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…

A thread on what caught my eye from the @WhiteHouse's Fact Sheet on 'Ongoing Public U.S. Efforts to Counter #Ransomware'.

#InThaCybers #CyberDiplomacy The second paras describe the national security threat posed by ransomware and the global nature of that threat. No surprises here.

Okay so I've had a chance to go through the Cth government's Ransomware Action Plan.

Here's a thread comprising some of my thoughts thereon.

#InThaCybers #Ransomware I applaud the Cth for finally delivering this document, given the severity of the national security threat posed by the ransomware ecosystem.

A threat which the Minister for Home Affairs, @karenandrewsmp, highlights in her foreword.

Today, @karenandrewsmp, the federal Minister for Home Affairs, released the Cth's Ransomware Action Plan.

While I go through the latter, here's a collection of my thoughts hitherto on counter-ransomware policy. Part 1 of 4 in my series for the @anujolt_law on counter-ransomware policy, here looking at the national security risk posed by ransomware.

https://twitter.com/anujolt_law/status/1419578586755854338?s=20

A few nuggets from the following readout:

#InThaCybers #CyberDiplomacy #DefenceDiplomacy

defense.gov/News/Releases/… Hmm, USA sharing intel with the Indians to help the latter's COIN and CT efforts in Kashmir and ops along the LAC? I dig.

'Enhanced cooperation with like-minded partners' = Wait, they're not going for a clique like others suggest?

The @USDISA is planning on looking at alternatives to the common access card, which US service personnel use to identify themselves to gate and chow hall staff, and when using computers.

defense.gov/News/News-Stor… DISA Director, @usairforce Lt. Gen. Robert Skinner, considers identity management an 'one area where the department can look to industry for a way ahead.'

'We want to leverage that technology to be able to provide greater options, so it's... truly multi-factor [auth]'.

This piece goes through the August judgement of the High Court, which granted the USA leave to appeal Assange’s discharge on two key grounds.

Additional to three key grounds that the USA wanted and got leave to appeal on in July.

—> If I were @TheJusticeDept, I’d be optimistic.

https://twitter.com/techlegalupdate/status/1447544404558766080

Of course, usual caveats:
1) I am neither an admitted lawyer nor an expert on UK law;
2) I have zero tickets in extradition matters, rather I am an Australian law nerd doing my PhD in critical software and infrastructure regulation; and

Per the PM's speech, 4 pillars of Indian #SpacePolicy:
1) allowing the private sector to innovate;
2) government acting as an enabler;
3) preparing the youth for the future; and
4) seeing the space sector as fuel for India's development.

#CriticalInfrastructure

https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1447443874931097602

English summary of the PM's remarks.

cc: @Dr_M_Davis
pmindia.gov.in/en/news_update…

Okay, so I have just read the August 2021 judgement of the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division ('the August EWHC judgement'), giving the USA the green light to appeal the discharge of Julian Assange by District Judge Baraitser ('the DJ') on 2 further grounds. Extradition Act 2003 (UK) s 105 (screenshot 1) is relied on by the US for their appeal because the DJ ordered Assange's discharge under s 91 of the same Act (screenshot 2).