Pre-war Putin’s “perpetual winning” has been an illusion, a product of aggressive mythmaking, some luck (oil/gas prices), and a lot of real-world effort on the part of RU government’s technocrats. 1 Were it not for Putin's able civilian apparatus, we would have witnessed a succession of failures: he is bad at handling disasters, or terrorism, bad at reforms, including his military reform, bad at IR, at projecting power, hard or soft, bad at war. 2

Russia meets its history. As the Russian state is now trying to crank up one of its most archaic institutions, mass mobilization, the Russians are currently discovering that fascination with the “great past” is a surefire way to catastrophe. 1 Turning history into a matter of national pride was not Putin’s creation. Ever since regular polling began, in 1994, on the issue of national pride, “Russia’s history, its past” has been a consistent top pick. 2

After establishing himself as a strongman it's risky for Putin to display weakness. He seemed ten feet tall while fighting unarmed protesters at home. In Ukraine, he willingly subjected himself to the glare of truth. 1 By showing the world its lack of strategic wisdom and military prowess, Putin has opened a Pandora's box of regional adventurism and opportunism. He will face growing pressure at home too. 2

Putin seems to be successful in instilling the fear of a broken post-Putin Russia into the hearts of Western politicians. Those politicians’ calls to save Putin’s face and avoid humiliating Russia in Ukraine are testament to Putin’s success in pedaling his story. 1/ Those fears may have some merit but the main party concerned should be Russia’s aspiring leaders, not Macron or Scholz. Putin is working hard to ensure that his successor inherits a spate of crises, empty coffers, and endless sanctions. 2/

Time and again, Russia’s leaders would try to shortcut to “greatness” by way of a win on the battlefield. They would narrow down their modernization drive to highly selective and technical measures focused on the military. Putin has fallen into this trap too. Thread To ensure that Russia was accepted as an equal at the table with the world’s preeminent nations, Putin set about restoring and modernizing its armed forces. Just like many of his predecessors, Putin would drain his country’s resources to try and punch above Russia’s weight. 1/

Russia’s warmongers in chief are around 70. In Ukraine, people in charge of defense and key government functions are in their 40s and 30s. The average age of Russia’s key officials is 64. For Ukraine, the average is 44. It’s a war between generations. Short thread The elderly chekists are trying to destroy not only the new generation of the Ukrainian elite but also those relatively young Russians who could and should have replaced Putin’s generation. Putin is certain to fail at the first task, but he has already accomplished the second. 1/

Before February 24, 2022, one could have made the case that a victory in a just war—the Great Patriotic War—was one of the foundations of many Russians’ collective identity. It's hard to make this case now. Rethinking the V-Day. A 9-point thread on May 9 In the public imagination, the history of WWII outweighed other pages of Russian history. There is nothing unique in this. Every nation deals with the pain of history in its own way. Russian society has coped with shame thanks to the memory of May 9… 1/

This war is Russia’s ultimate reality check. Before this war, the Russians had certain beliefs about their country, identity. Before starting this war, Putin had certain assumptions about the Ukrainians, their country, and their army. All turned out wrong. #StopWarInUkraine 1 / Russian war planners assumed Ukraine would be brought to its knees in days; they are now confronted with the reality of Ukraine’s fierce resistance; the reality of their own inaptitude; corruption, of being organizationally and psychologically unprepared for this war 2 /