1. Levada’s latest publication of its polling on Russian-Ukrainian war indicates that
In January a record-largest share of Russians favored initiation peace negotiations (61%) while a record-smaller share of Russians favored continuation of military actions (31%) 2. In January 40% of Russians thought the war will last less than a year while 32% think it will last more than a year:

1. Vladimir Putin signed a decree on the creation of the Scientific-Expert Council at the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) that is replacing the previously existing Expert Council under the SCRF. 2. The list of the reestablished council members includes Andrei Kokoshin, Russia’s most thoughtful thinker when it comes to strategic stability, ex-secretary of SCRF and former deputy head of RF MoD.

Please find below key points that I have pulled from chief of Russia’s strategic missile forces Sergei’s Karakaev interview to Krasnaya Zvezda and machine-translated. These include his reminder that Russia and US do not just notify each other of dates and locations of pending launches of ballistic missiles 24 hours prior, but also of areas where warheads land.

Russia’s leading scholar of nuclear arms Alexey Arbatov has crossed swords with one of the most renowned of the pro-Kremlin experts on geopolitics, Dmitri Trenin, on whether and how nuclear arms control can be revived. The two also appear to have diverging views on whether and how tenets of Russia’s nuclear deterrence should evolve in the period of Moscow’s renewed confrontation with the West.

A must read: One of Russia's most thoughtful experts on nuclear arms, Alexey Arbatov, has weighed in on scenarios for use of such arms and red lines, criticizing 'ignorant' RF pundits for improvising on such deadly serious issues. My rough translation of key points below: Link to the full text of Arbatov's interview to AiF in Russian language russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-…

NYT: "In the call with Milley last October, Gerasimov outlined a use of nuclear weapons consistent with Washington's understanding of Russia's nuclear doctrine." This is also consistent with the latest public statement on nukes by Gerasimov I could find. As far as I can recall, Gerasimov last publicly commented on use of nukes in June 2021. In doing so stuck to the strategic-document script.

Kommersant's GRU sources detail Turkey's allegedly direct involvement in planning and executing Azerbaijan's attack on Karabakh, including MoD chief Akar exercising general command of the combat operations against Karabakh kommersant.ru/doc/4537733#id… If confirmed, Turkish defense minister Akar's decision to personally exercising general command of Azerbaijan's offensives against Karabakh, would be unprecedented, at least in 21st century.

When Bakiyev asked RF/CSTO to intervene to nip 2010 color rev against him in 2010, Putin ignored. Hwvr, when Lukashenko made a similar plea, P promised “comprehensive security assistance” according to L. If L’s claim true, then why P’d intervene in RB in 2020, but not KR in 2010? I have tried answer the question of what necessary and sufficient conditions, under which Putin's Russia intervenes militarily, are here themoscowtimes.com/2018/04/25/why… and here russiamatters.org/analysis/when-…