1 | The best open source information about PLAN carrier operation comes from the Japanese MoD.

From data published by 🇯🇵's Joint Staff Office we can establish some baselines for PLAN carriers' sortie rate.

Note: daily sortie rate is averaged across observation window.

2 | By just looking at the data, it seems PLAN's carrier sortie rate has seen gradual improvement.

When Liaoning was deployed in Dec.2022, its daily fighter sortie rate peaked at 20 per day and can be as low as 5 per day at the end of the deployment.

1 | Blockading the Malacca Strait is thought to be the trump card India holds against China by many.
My 2 cents about the theoretical maximum strength the IN and IAF can commit to sustain a blockade & defend against China’s attempt to break through (assumptions, caveats apply). 2 | The main objective for the Indian Deployment is to protect 2 major air bases:
->Veer Savarkar International Airport
->Car Nicobar AFS
So IAF Su-30MKI with Brahmos & IN P8I can continuously project air power & carry out sea denial operations against PLAN.

1 | 🇨🇳Flankers vs 🇮🇳Flankers
Beyond geopolitical tensions, the rivalry can also be traced to the roots of their lineage.
->🇨🇳Flankers originated from KnAAPO on the Amur River.
->🇮🇳Flankers started from IRKUTSK by Lake Baikal. 2 | Both countries adopted a from import to license production strategy.
->India started later
->Its Su-30MKI enjoyed tech superiority for almost a decade with PESA radar, TVC, French/Israeli avionics & weapons

Left Su-30MKI cockpit vs Su-27SK/J-11 cockpit

1 | A simple comparison of SSKs of 🇨🇳 PLAN & 🇮🇳 IN throughout history.

->China started its SSK force 14 years ahead of India
->India has access to a wider source of suppliers but it does not achieve self sufficiency due to lack of scale and commitment 2 | The Beginning

China received full technical details to license-produce at home during the height of Sino-Soviet cooperation.

Only 3 years after receiving its 1st sub from USSR, in 1957, PLAN commissioned its first domestically produced W-class SSK (Type 6603).

1 | This result is rather odd with many questions unanswered.

Did the strike package know the general location of the S-400 battery?

If so, why didn’t they stay below radar horizon and launch stand-off anti-radiation missiles beyond the range of 9M96E2 (120 km)

https://twitter.com/ajitkdubey/status/1816849885779345679

2 | The longer range interceptors used by S-400 (48N6E2/3, 40N6E) are all semi-active radar homing. As long as the aircraft fly below the radar horizon, they are safe from being illuminated.

If the strike package does not know the general location of the S-400,

Sister ships between 🇨🇳 PLAN and 🇮🇳 Indian Navy.

->PLAN and IN each operate a replenishment ship based on the Soviet Komandarm Fedko-class oiler
->🇨🇳 ship was built in 🇺🇦 and further constructed in 🇨🇳
->🇮🇳 ship was fully built and delivered by 🇷🇺
->Both commissioned in 1996 Here, for the PLAN ship, the hull of the former USSR ship Vladimir Peregudov was on its way from Kherson, Ukraine, to Dalian China, spotted in Singapore in 1993.

Credit: Malcolm Cranfield

1/n | Though not covered in 1999's FARP, the Indian Army's rocket artillery fleet suffered under the same inaction and piecemeal procurement up until 2016. In contrast, the PLAGF has made strides in inducting/improving long-range MRLS in large numbers with a significant lead. 2/n | The Indian Pinaka MRLS was leading in many areas in the early 2000s compared to Russian and Chinese systems.
-Modularized rocket pods for quick reloading and munition flexibility
-Saw combat during 1999 Kargil War even before finishing trials in 2002

Both the PLAGF and Indian Army are in the process of replacing their towed anti-air guns. The PLAGF is full-on replacing the PG-99 fleet with another self-propelled system. While the IA still keeps a significant place for L70 and other towed-L70-derived system(s). A long 🧵: 1/n | To achieve a high level of mechanization, towed AAGs will have little place going forward in PLAGF’s service. By end of this decade or latest by 2035, to meet the milestone laid out in PLA's modernization plan, the towed PG-99 would likely be phased out from the PLAGF.

1/n | The Bofors L70 and PG-99 are the most prevalent radar-guided towed AA guns in the Indian Army and PLAGF respectively. Here we would compare their effectiveness considering various factors. A long 🧵: 2/n | Here we can compare the structure and equipment of a PG-99 gun crew from the PLAGF and an L70 gun crew from the IA. On the surface, they are very similar, with 9-10 crew members, 1 gun, 1 generator trailer and 2 trucks.

1/n | The Bofors L70 40mm anti-aircraft gun is the most prevalent medium caliber AAG in service with the Indian Army. Combined with the Flycatcher fire control unit, it has been the backbone of the terminal air defense for the Indian Army for 4 decades and counting. A long 🧵: 2/n | The L70 gun works in tandem with the Flycatcher FCU to provide radar-guided, short-ranged air defence for the Indian Army (IA)’s armored, mechanized and infantry brigades and divisions. They are tasked with engaging low-flying fixed-wing aircraft, rotary aviation and PGMs.

Tor M1 is a SHORAD SAM system developed by the USSR. China purchased 6 to 9 batteries from Russia and subsequently fully copied & optimized the Russian system to create its own designs. These systems formed the backbone of accompanying field air defense for the PLAGF. A long 🧵: The core of the Tor M1 system is the 9A331 combat vehicle. It was designed in the 1980s to be fully capable of countering PGMs such as cruise missiles, laser-guided bombs, etc. (usually with much smaller radar signatures compared to a typical combat aircraft).

The PG-99 is a gun-based short-range air defense (SHORAD) system equipped by the PLAGF. It mostly serves as a terminal air defense weapon for various formations. For about a decade, it was one of the most modern gun-based SHORAD systems for the PLAGF. A long 🧵: 1/n | The system has 3 major components. The PG-99 towed twin 35mm anti-aircraft gun (AAG), a separate generator trailer vehicle to power the gun, and a fire control unit (FCU) vehicle (with its own power generation). Here, the PG-99 systems are organized into a company.

1/n | The PLAN has seen a dramatic increase in both the number of hulls and tonnage. Its naval buildup is among the most impressive ones in naval history. But the question is, are they going to promptly and effectively maintain/upgrade the newly acquired large fleet? 2/n | A peak into this issue can start with the MLU programs for the DDGs commissioned in the first half of the 2000s. Though modest compared to the later building spray, the PLAN did commission 9 DDGs into service. And they are due for MLU 13-16 years in service.

1/n | A very important aspect of PLAGF's modernization is its effort to pursue mechanization. It was a very late starter compared to major armies. Only in 2020 did it consider itself to have "generally achieved mechanization". Here let's look at the current PLAGF inventory. A 🧵: 2/n | For PLAGF (960,000 men), serviceability is one of the major factors to consider when fielding vehicles to achieve mechanization. It would achieve a significant economy of scale, and reduce development & maintenance costs to have a very versatile/modular base platform.

1/Many | The war in Ukraine highlights again that artillery is the key to dominate battlefield on the ground. The PLAGF is a firm believer of the supremacy of artillery. Its firepower could easily dominate against any possible regional adversary. A 🧵: 2/Many | The most powerful artillery unit in the PLAGF would be an artillery brigade under a Group Army. Typically an artillery brigade has 6 battalions. 2 for PLZ-05(A) 155mm/52 tracked SPG, 2 for PCL-181 155mm/52 truck-mounted SPG, and 2 for PHL-03 300mm or PCL-191 370mm MLRS.