🪡1/4 How Göring Almost Derailed the Nuremberg Trials:

A Critical Examination
The commonly held image of Hermann Göring as the corpulent, drug-addled, and bumbling Nazi leader near the end of World War II bears little resemblance to the sharp, calculating defendant who took the stand at Nuremberg in March 1946. According to recently released documents from the Kilmuir Papers at the Churchill Archives, Göring came remarkably close to fundamentally undermining the entire Nuremberg judicial process through an extraordinary display of courtroom mastery that nearly succeeded in exonerating Nazi leadership for waging aggressive and genocidal warfare. This near-crisis in international justice reveals the precarious position of the trial’s legitimacy and the pivotal role of skillful prosecution in salvaging its credibility.

The Threat Posed by Göring’s Strategic Brilliance

Upon arrival at Nuremberg, Göring presented a starkly different figure than observers expected. Having been housed in Luxembourg’s Camp Ashcan after his capture, Göring had been systematically weaned from his long-standing morphine addiction—he had been consuming the equivalent of three or four grains (260 to 320 mg) of morphine daily—and placed on a strict diet, losing approximately 60 pounds (27 kg). This physical transformation coincided with a mental clarity that caught Allied prosecutors off-guard. Rather than the elderly, defeated villain history suggested, Göring emerged as utterly focused and determined to construct a compelling legal narrative that would shield Nazi leaders from personal culpability for aggressive war and genocide.

The stakes for this single defendant were extraordinarily high. Allied prosecutors had invested enormous effort in establishing the legal principle that individual Nazi leaders bore criminal responsibility for initiating aggressive warfare and orchestrating systematic genocide. If Göring—the second-highest-ranking Nazi official tried at Nuremberg—could successfully establish alternative narratives that absolved Nazi leadership of these charges, the entire purpose of the trials would be compromised. The prosecution feared that a legal victory for Göring would set a precedent that effectively rendered the trial a symbolic exercise in victors’ justice rather than a rigorous application of international law.

The Allied Judicial Response and Jackson’s Struggle

Recognising the magnitude of this threat, each of the major Allied powers dispatched its most senior legal talent to Nuremberg. The Americans fielded Justice Robert H. Jackson, an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court who had served as both United States Solicitor General and Attorney General. Jackson had established a formidable legal reputation, though it is notable that he had never attended law school and had risen through practice and governmental service. The British sent Sir Hartley Shawcross, Labour’s Attorney General and Member of Parliament, alongside Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, a Conservative Member of Parliament and former Solicitor General, both considered among the most brilliant legal minds of their generation. The Soviet Union sent Andrei Vyshinsky, Stalin’s former chief prosecutor during the Moscow Show Trials of 1936-38, whose very presence embodied the trial’s geopolitical dimensions. Vyshinsky’s renowned black humor was captured at the prosecutors’ first formal dinner when he proposed a toast to the defendants: “May their paths lead straight from the courthouse to the grave!” 🪡2/4
Jackson’s cross-examination of Göring, which began in mid-March 1946, began catastrophically and deteriorated further over the course of three days. The American prosecutor adopted an approach that allowed Göring extensive latitude to expound on Nazi philosophy and justify Nazi actions in their most favorable light. Multiple observers noted Jackson’s inability to control the witness or maintain the initiative. When Jackson attempted to interrupt Göring’s lengthy answers, the presiding judge, Sir Norman Birkett (serving as the British alternate judge), repeatedly overruled him and permitted Göring to continue speaking.

The consequences were immediately apparent to courtroom observers. British diplomat Patrick Dean reported after the first day of Jackson’s cross-examination: “It was very disappointing and unimpressive and has been severely criticised here. He never pressed Göring on any of the numerous matters on which the cross-examination touched even though Göring was frequently lying.” Even more damning was Birkett’s private assessment: “The cross-examination had not proceeded more than ten minutes before it was seen that Göring was the complete master of Mr Justice Jackson, who despite his great abilities and charm and his great powers of exposition had never learnt the very first elements of cross-examination as it is understood in the English courts. He was overwhelmed by his documents, and there was no chance of lightning questions following upon some careless or damaging answer, no quick parry and thrust, no leading the witness on to a prepared pitfall.”

The second day of Jackson’s examination proved even more problematic. Jackson attempted to confront Göring with a document from 1939, believing he had caught the defendant in an incriminating admission. However, Jackson made a fundamental error: he mistook the River Rhine for the Rhineland, and misinterpreted the German word “Befreiung” (liberation) as referring to the “clearing” of civilian river traffic prior to German mobilisation. When a flustered Jackson attempted to recover by claiming that Germany had kept its war preparations “entirely secret from foreign powers,” Göring delivered a withering response: “I do not think that I can recall reading beforehand the publication of the mobilisation plans of the United States.” At this point, Jackson lost his temper, and the tribunal adjourned for the remainder of the day.

By the conclusion of his three-day cross-examination, Jackson himself acknowledged defeat, characterizing the exchange as a “bickering contest.” More significantly, by the end of his exchange with Göring, it had become clear that the prosecution had failed to establish its case in the watertight manner necessary to justify the imposition of capital punishment. Göring had effectively turned the courtroom into an arena where his rhetorical talents and mastery of documentary evidence allowed him to shape the narrative of Nazi motivations and actions in ways that suggested alternative explanations for Germany’s aggression and atrocities.

Maxwell Fyfe’s Intervention and the Reversal

At this critical juncture, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe stepped forward for the British cross-examination. Maxwell Fyfe’s approach differed fundamentally from Jackson’s strategy. Rather than permitting Göring extensive opportunity for philosophical exposition, Maxwell Fyfe adopted a forensic methodology grounded in meticulous preparation and knowledge of documentary evidence. Having been trained at the criminal bar in Liverpool and having become, in 1934, the youngest person appointed King’s Counsel in 250 years, Maxwell Fyfe possessed formidable courtroom skills honed through years of demanding criminal practice.