𝙍𝙚𝙨𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙖𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙃𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙢𝙖𝙧𝙠 𝙤𝙛 𝙎𝙮𝙧𝙞𝙖: 𝙊𝙣𝙚-𝙤𝙣-𝙊𝙣𝙚 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙋𝙚𝙩𝙚𝙧 𝙁𝙤𝙧𝙙, 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙁𝙤𝙧𝙢𝙚𝙧 𝘽𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙨𝙝 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙖𝙨𝙨𝙖𝙙𝙤𝙧 𝙩𝙤 𝙎𝙮𝙧𝙞𝙖

We discuss Biden, the war, sanctions and British-Syrian relations.

syria.law/index.php/resi… Ambassador Peter Ford: "Sadly, I have to be honest and say I expect no improvement under Biden. His administration could even be worse than Trump’s..."

syria.law/index.php/resi…

The Caesar Act establishes the first formal mechanisms for deterring non-US persons from dealing with the Syrian government and the Syrian public sector. Up until now, the sanctions have officially prevented US persons - citizens, residents and companies - from Syria dealings. The entire framework of the US sanctions program against Syria dates back to 1979 when US arms sales were prohibited. The Syria Accountability Act followed in 2003 and was implemented through various executive orders starting in May 2004, which were ramped up in 2011 and beyond.

President Bashar Al-Assad's government came to power in 2000 with a plan to begin liberalizing the Syrian economy. In September 2003, Naji Otri was appointed Prime Minister with a mandate to undertake economic reform after setbacks in Mustapha Miro's preceding government. The economic reform program appeared to be in full swing in 2005 when non-Baathist Abdullah Dardari joined the government as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. Economic liberalization was underway when the social market economy was launched that same year.

HERE IS THE SYRIAN WAR IN A NUTSHELL DATING BACK FROM 2011 UNTIL THE PRESENT DAY (PART 1):

The security situation in Syria began to gradually deteriorate before it became a major issue in September 2011 with the first Battle of Rastan in Homs province. Attacks around Damascus began to intensify in November 2011 before the first terrorist attacks hit the capital on December 23, 2011. One month later, the Al-Qaeda linked Jabhat Al-Nusra terrorist group announced its formation on January 23rd.

1) Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria would be well advised to strike a deal with the authorities in Damascus while they can still get one. Neither Syria nor Turkey has any interest in seeing an autonomous Kurdish-led administration emerge in the region. 2) Syrian & Turkish interests will eventually converge on this issue after Idlib. The US will in the end leave Syria when they realize the price isn't worth the fight. History has borne witness to this fact several times, such as in Lebanon in the 1980s & in Iraq more recently.

As the Eastern Ghouta region comes back under government control for the first time in six years, it will eventually take up its previous position of supplying the capital Damascus with its agricultural produce, which will reduce prices given the short transport routes. With supplies from Eastern Ghouta greatly affected over the last six years, agricultural produce had to be transported from other regions of Syria including the coastal provinces. The longer distance travelled meant agricultural produce cost more when it reached Damascus.