Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore; Global Fellow at Wilson Center; Formerly at CISAC, Stanford University.
Feb 27, 2022 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Brilliant piece by @SushantSin on Balakot in the Deccan Herald. Points out: 1) Brinksmanship may lead to electoral political gains (particularly by populist leaders) but also help hide governance failures and ride corruption charges. 2) Physical effects of the strikes miniscule
@SushantSin My issues with the analysis: 1) Assumption 1: brinksmanship never pays. 2) Assump. 2: since no physical effects, there were no strategic rewards? Corolllary: India failed in the engagement. 2) Assump. 3: A self-deterred India is better than one asking for escalation.
New Delhi should not confuse cause and effect. Russian actions are independent of what New Delhi may wish. Their effects on Indian security are real. Russia-West antagonism is at its peak; it will also inevitably force Moscow into Beijing’s orbit.
Much of statecraft is about reading the tea leafs of international politics correctly and to adjust ones policies accordingly to serve ones interests and build requisite capabilities. It also means, especially for the less powerful, to choose, compromise and even sacrifice.
Oct 12, 2021 • 15 tweets • 3 min read
A lot has been said about AQ Khan. However, as a country which was most directly threatened by his illegal procurement, the Indian state failed miserably in correctly identifying the Pakistan's nuclear trajectory in the late 1970s. Its miscalculations were enormously costly.
Until mid-1970s, one of the major arguments within the Indian establishment against going nuclear was the security dilemma it would create for Pakistan. Report after report at the highest level made this argument against going nuclear. This was true even after the 1971 war.
Sep 20, 2021 • 16 tweets • 3 min read
I have always admired Sandeep Unnithan work but I have some major issues with this article: indiatoday.in/india-today-in…1) The central argument is that US will never part with sophisticated nuclear sub tech (NST), because they have never done so in the past. They just decided otherwise. confirmation bias?
Sep 18, 2021 • 7 tweets • 1 min read
Why is Paris so angry about AUKUS?
Yes, losing the Australian deal and few billion dollar sucks but there are bigger worries:
1) US has not opened up the sub market 2) it may also translate to arms transfer across military technologies. 3) signaled to the rest of the world that it is not bound by yesteryears commitments to norms and vague notions of regional stability.
Sep 18, 2021 • 15 tweets • 3 min read
Few thoughts on AUCUS:
1) For the 1st time since the US helped the Brits in nuclear sub tech beginning in late 1950s, US has made a decision to share it's nuc propulsion tech with any other state.
2) Rickover agreed to help Brits bcz of his cultural affinities; but declined to help Even other NATO members such as Italy and Netherlands. Nonproliferation norms did the rest.
