Some quick thoughts on the Meng Wanzhou deal, Kovrig / Spavor release that I think are being overlooked. Chinese state media is framing this as a success for Xi— that the hostage taking worked. For example.

https://twitter.com/huxijin_gt/status/1441773503733063689

But China has paid a big price for this strategy. It has lost Canada. Before this incident Canadians were much more open to the notion of engagement with China. Now they are not and favor a tougher approach. That’s a significant strategic setback for China.

Here’s my understanding of what happened on the sub deal. There were problems between Australia and France on their 2016 deal. It was over budget and late. Part of this is in the nature of such projects. France thought it was mainly haggling over cost but for Australia it was… …more existential. They worried they would end up paying more for a submarine that would appear late and be less capable and more expensive than an SSN. Such a submarine might have no survivability in the 2030 and 2040s in their view.

One of the most imp emerging debates in US foreign policy at the moment is whether the US is in a competition of government systems w/ China, (or as Jake Sullivan put it on Monday, "a competition of models w/ autocracies"). I wrote about this on Wednesday. theatlantic.com/international/… @jessicacweiss & @TomPepinsky have an important critique of President Biden's approach today, arguing that the administration should reverse itself on the competition of systems concept. foreignaffairs.com/articles/unite…

A lot of the same commentators who said nothing when President Trump directly and repeatedly criticized or undermined the UK government in office now seem horrified that President Biden reiterates long standing US policy about Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement. 1/6 Biden is not intervening on behalf of the EU. He is simply making the point that the US supports the various agreements reached pertaining to NI, including the GFA and the protocol. 2/6

I have a new piece for @TheAtlantic on how Joe Biden has a personal foreign policy doctrine a mere few months into his presidency: the United States is in a competition of government systems with China that it is at risk of losing. 1/6 theatlantic.com/international/… Biden speaks about this all the time, in formal remarks and off the cuff. It is a marked departure from his statement in the campaign that China is not competition for us. 2/6

I might have missed it but it seems at @MunSecConf Biden did not address Macron’s top priority of strategic autonomy and Macron did not address Biden’s priority of competition with China. Some other reactions. All the speeches were solid but unsurprising. All missed an opportunity too. Biden elaborating on what being back means but tbh that's a surprise to no one (support NATO, etc). He was strong on democracy and China.

I think it was very smart of Biden to call Boris Johnson so early today. Anxieties in Brexit circles about Biden have been unreasonably high. This is an easy way of signalling a commitment to work together, will be valued by No 10, & deprives Farage et al of a talking point. As No 10 knows, it in no way signals a softening of Biden's position on the Good Friday Agreement. But that won't be an issue if the UK reaches a deal w/ the EU, which I expect it will. With that out of the way, there's lots of opportunity for cooperation on COP26, covid, G7 etc

In talking with European officials over the past week, I have not found them to be particularly impressed with China's role. Of course they will issue thanks for shipments of aid but they know the CCP is at least partly responsible for letting this get out of control...1/4 ...and they know that its refusal to be transparent will prohibit deep cooperation in the future. I have not found anyone in the EU or NATO who has said China is supplanting the US. Perhaps public opinion will weigh in behind China but there is no data on that yet. 2/4

Since everyone is playing pundit about the Democratic primary, here's my best guess if Bernie Sanders has an unassailable lead to win a plurality of delegates but is well short of a majority. This shld be clear on March 17, when 61% of pledged delegates will have been chosen. 1/4 There are 4 months between March 17 & the Dem convention on July 13-16. During this time Sanders will be subjected to intense scrutiny (from media, GOP), as Obama was in 2008. Obama weathered this, was seen to have responded effectively, & his poll numbers stayed strong. 2/4

Like anyone who watched, I thought Warren was ferocious and impressive last night but I also thought she fundamentally failed to do what she needed to do. She has been struggling in the polls because Sanders has taken more of the progressive market share of the vote. 1/8 Warren never had a plan for dealing with Sanders. She assumed he would eventually fall in the polls and she would scoop up his supporters. She had toyed with drawing contrasts in the summer of 2018 (when she said she was a capitalist, not a socialist). 2/8

Reading through the transcripts of the NYT editorial board interviews w/ the presidential candidates. Made it through the top five. Some thoughts. The questioning of Buttigieg is much tougher and more hostile than the others. Almost an obsessive focus on McKinsey. 1/6 The foreign policy sections are disappointing. Weird questions-- most candidates are asked about nuclear missiles in Turkey which is important but as one of only 3 Qs? Follow up weak -- should have pressed Sanders on how to reconcile his impulses on China. 2/6

A thread on John Bolton. This was inevitable. For many months Trump wanted to pivot to striking deals w/ America's enemies-- Taliban, Iran, DPRK, even Russia-- in the run up to the election. Pompeo was willing to accept this to shape it. Bolton was not & sought to sabotage it 1/9 Bolton survived the summer b/c it was the summer-- not much happening. But he was unlikely to survive long into the fall. We did not know how he wld leave-- some thought he wld cling on to run interference & Trump dislikes personal confrontation-- but it was unsustainable 2/9

War with Iran is worryingly possible but I think Trump firing Bolton is more probable.

https://twitter.com/lrozen/status/1129029568285814784

Trump has always distrusted Bolton on military intervention. Him behaving was a condition of his hire. Bolton overstepped early on w/ his Libya model comment on North Korea and was almost pushed out then. After a spell in the cold he was allowed back. 2/7

Some thoughts on Theresa May's latest Brexit defeat. There are now two more major votes this week-- one on whether parliament approves of no deal and the second on whether to request an extension. Of these two, the first is only indicative. If parliament rejects no deal...1/8 ...it still happens automatically on March 29 unless something else changes. That something else is the extension. So, if parliament rejects no deal they also have to accept the extension to make it count. It is possible that they could reject no deal & reject an extension 2/8

A few thoughts on Wess Mitchell's sudden resignation as Assistant Secretary of State (A/S) for Europe. For the past 18 months, there has been a debate about which matters most-- policy v tweets. I've rejected this framing but the basic gist of the policy was that...1/5 at the A/S level normal things were happening. The biggest example was that the US was bolstering its presence in Europe. These initiatives occured under the radar- they didn't need Trump's approval and they didn't seek it. But now, most of the officials responsible have left 2/5

A thread on Trump's trip to France because it is very odd. He decided to go to Paris in August when he cancelled his military parade out of a fury with how much DC authorities said it would cost. See

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1030423480725118976

&

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1030426536871116801

1/n He thought he would just be attending another French military parade which he loved the first time he attended (it gave him the idea to hold his own). What he did not know was that Macron was also planning something called the Paris Peace Forum 2/n

A thread on Trump's Europe visit. The big story so far is not the NATO theatrics which he orchestrated. It is the real time unraveling of the special relationship w/ the UK, illustrated by this bombshell interview in @TheSun thesun.co.uk/news/6766531/t… 1/7 In the interview Trump says the US will abandon trade talks w/ the UK if it pursues a soft Brexit. This isn't an offhand remark. It is the result of a v deliberate administration policy designed to exploit Brexit to get the UK to sign a trade deal that gives the US everything 2/7

A short thread on why Trump likes Russia more than NATO. Since 1987, Trump's worldview has been motivated much more by anger toward allies and partners than enemies. This is because he sees alliance security commitments & free trade as existential threats to US interests 1/4 He has never really been bothered about geopolitical stability, etc. so when he looks at Russia/ Soviet Union, he sees a country that the US has no security commitments to and no trade with. So no problem! By contrast, Japan, S Korea, Germany, etc all tick the threat box 2/4

Some thoughts on this @dandrezner piece on Trump and North Korea. I have been, and am, a strong critic of the Trump admin's FP but I do think their view is somewhat misinterpreted here & elsewhere 1/10 washingtonpost.com/news/postevery… Dan says, accurately, that the Trump admin believes Kim Jong Un cannot be deterred & his goal is to use his nuclear capability to reunify the peninsula on his terms. This sounds crazy b/c Kim is not irrational & terrifying b/c it cld excuse preventive war 2/10