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Trent Telenko Profile picture
Trent Telenko
@TrentTelenko
Divorced father of four great kids, Retired US DoD Civil Servant, Section 22 Special Interest Group list admin, Chicagoboyz-dot-net history blogger
Jul 11 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
I've been advocating that Ukraine strike Russian tugs as part of a larger campaign against Russian riverine and littoral maritime traffic since 2022.

Ukraine has delivered on all my expectations of what that would accomplish in the last five days.

Brown Water logistics🧵
1/ This is where I underscored the historical Russian use of barge logistics in WW2 as a basis for what they would be doing in occupied Ukraine

2/
Jul 10 • 12 tweets • 4 min read
Given the massive Ukrainian victory in the "Battle of the Azov Sea."

We can say Ukraine has achieved “Usable Drone Air Superiority" over the Sea of Azov in exactly the way the Chinese would in the waters around, & air over, Taiwan when it invades.
🧵

1/
 united24media.com/war-in-ukraine… The "Battle of the Azov Sea" shares a lot of historical elements of both the WW2 "Battle of the Bismarck Sea" and the slaughter of Allied oil tankers in 1942 during Operation Drumbeat (Paukenschlag) and Operation Neuland.

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Jul 2 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Just...no. Russia HAS BEEN "Battle of the Cities" from the very beginning...targeting hospitals as a means of destroying ethnic minorities.

This has been Russian policy for DECADES.

Ukraine retaliating for atrocity is _RECIPROCITY_ per the Laws of War, not degeneracy.
1/2 I asked @grok to document this Russian policy of atrocity at the link, excerpt:

"February 24, 2022–present (Full-scale Russian invasion): The scale escalated dramatically. As of May 2026, the WHO had verified more than 3,000 attacks on healthcare via its Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). A coalition of organizations (including PHR, eyeWitness, Truth Hounds, etc.) documented ~3,095 attacks, with 1,632 damaging or destroying hospitals and clinics"

x.com/i/grok?convers…
2/
Jun 30 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
When I've talked about the legacy of Soviet industrial gigantism (one big factory) making Putin era Russia far more vulnerable to a drone strategic bombing campaign.

This is a very good example. ⬇️

Strategic Drone Airpower🧵
1/3 I've talked about this vulnerability in a couple of previous threads. Here is a shorter one:



Putin's decades long "Russian exceptionalism" propaganda campaign, that says WW2 was won on the Eastern Front, has made Russians incapable of seeing this.

2/3
Jun 28 • 17 tweets • 7 min read
There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.

FP-5 🧵
1/ 1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).

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Jun 23 • 14 tweets • 6 min read
It's time to revisit how 992 Ukrainian drones and 10 small cruise missiles were used to saturate Russia's Moscow air defenses.

There was a lot of technology, technique & tactics involved.

Drone War 🧵
1/ The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that in 2026 Ukraine has not only replicated, but likely exceeded, the 2018 capabilities of the USAF's Stand-off Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at at Barksdale AFB.

I've mentioned this before ⬇️
2/
Jun 19 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
The BLUF of every missile based integrated air defense is the number of missiles and launcher reload times are known.

Winning a saturation attack against one is simple arithmetic, total all the defending missiles, then +10 more drones above that number.
1/2 Electronic warfare is always a "saving throw" with an expiration date for the defense.

Plus no one in the world, since 1989, has invested in enough mobile guns for robust AA-combined arms to screw up the simple arithmetic of a saturation drone/missile attacks.

2/
Jun 18 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
We have just seen over Moscow today - with Ukrainian drones - the Russo-Ukrainian War's version of the RAF’s first 1,000-bomber raid of World War II, codenamed Operation Millennium, which took place on the night of May 30–31, 1942.

1/3 Image Operation Millennium, marked the first tactical deployment of the RAF "bomber stream".

That is, the tactic of flying a dense, tightly timed formation along a narrow corridor to overwhelm German radar networks and anti-aircraft defenses of the Kammhuber line.
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Jun 18 • 12 tweets • 5 min read
Since you asked...we need to talk about Russian truck logistics in the age of destroyed at will by Ukrainian drones Russian refineries.

Russian industrial infrastructure reflects the Soviet WW2 "one big vertically integrated factory" experience.

Soviet industrial legacy🧵
1/ The Soviets built their industrial plants to minimize transportation impact on its railway system, and later, it's trucking.

This 2013 time stamped Jon Parshall presentation on WW2 US vs German Vs Soviet tank industries underlines this Soviet reality

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Jun 18 • 14 tweets • 6 min read
The negative air defense reality of a 2,700km range one-way attack drone cannot be overstated for Russia or the USA.

Let us consider for a moment a Cuban "OWA-Drone Crisis" akin to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Drone threat 🧵
1/ Via a question to @grok of Cities of 500K(+) in OWA Drone range:

"Distances are approximate great-circle (straight-line/air) from Havana or central Cuba; actual drone paths could vary due to routing, wind, altitude, & launch site (e.g., closer to Florida from western Cuba)
2/
Jun 14 • 19 tweets • 6 min read
Fearless prediction: N. Ireland will be 90%(+) migrant free in 3 months.

It is now clear to me that what we are seeing in N. Ireland is a sectarian pogrom.

One which will in 3 months be utterly successful in driving out 90%(+)...

N.I. "Troubles Pogrom"🧵
1/ ...of the migrants the UK government has placed there. Then Liverpool will be next.

The UK government utterly failed to stop mutual Catholic/Protestant pogroms in the late 1960's early 1970's troubles.  When half N. Irish population was nominally...

2/
Jun 13 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
The problem with this analysis is it leaves out the drone & power projection capabilities of the PLA and Taiwan's highly vulnerable off shore islands.

PLA & PLAN parachute, heliborne & marine landing forces can take all of those small islands as a coup de main for drone, SAM & MLRS bases.
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Image The ability of Taiwan to operate it's HIMARS is tied directly to it's ability to deny China drone air superiority inside Taiwanese air space.

China can throw 1 million OWA drones to suppress Taiwanese air defenses to take those off shore islands.

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Jun 11 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Russia faces a logistical dilemma in occupied Ukraine for which it has no good solutions.

Crimea is a de facto island fed by road and rail bridges Ukraine can now destroy at will, and Russia cannot stop.

And Ukraine is destroying those bridges.

1/ Image Russia's air defense has suffered a nearly complete "Lanchester Square Collapse" proximate with the Ukrainian mass deployment of both 150 km range AI truck hunting drones and bridge busting FP-2 OWA drones.

Map H/T United24media
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Jun 10 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
Saving Space Access From Kessler Syndrome

Elon Musk’s plan for XAI satellite data centers, and all use of space for any purpose, faces inevitable collapse until a solution emerges for the problem of Kessler Syndrome (see Wikipedia). 🧵

1/ This will occur when enough collisions of small orbital debris pieces from old dead satellites hits the steadily increasing number of new satellites until the whole thing spirals into mass collisions.

Kessler Syndrome computes that this will destroy all existing

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Jun 9 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Do you remember all the 2023 US Navalist accounts o X that screamed at @johnkonrad and I about pointing out the containerized anti-ship OWA drone threat to the US fleet.

Welcome to 2026 Ukrainian anti-ship OWA drone threat, you US Navalist yo-yo's. ⬇️

1/2 "Operation Spiderweb with Chinese characteristics" is coming for you all, and we have the receipts.

We need a whole lot of air defense guns everywhere to stop drones that you guys still refuse to fund.

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Jun 3 • 12 tweets • 5 min read
Just...no. The 8th AF fudged its accuracy numbers.

It excluded "gross error" bombing runs beyond 3,000 feet from the target. Which were above 10% of all 1944 bombing runs.

Below, the inner circle is what a 1944 1,000 foot (304m) CEP in WW2 looked like when dropped from 400(+) four engine heavy bombers.
1/Image Using this document:

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO
MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION
First Edition 3 November 1945
Second Edition January 1947

You find both mission failures & gross errors were "excluded data"
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Jun 3 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
There are sound photographic reasons I'm talking about Russia's domestic fuel tanker supply distribution chain breaking down.

Dead tanker trucks can't move fuel.

Plus additional tanker trucks diverted & moving from 🇷🇺 to 🇺🇦 can't deliver fuel domestically either.

Fuel🧵
1/ For additional photographic proof of 🇷🇺 tanker truck supply distribution breaking down, see here in Belgorod:


2/
Jun 2 • 8 tweets • 4 min read
This manpower sweep problem is actually a lot worse for the Russians than Western military intelligence is capable of giving credit.

It takes a Russian labor gang about 3 hours to load 16 tons of wooden boxes w/o a convenient box car to truck line up. (below upper right)

🧵
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Image Because the Russian Army doesn't use pallets, forklifts, telehandlers nor D-rings anywhere in their supply chain to strap down pallet loads.

You need massive numbers of conscripts to load and unload from train cars to trucks & vice versa.

See⬇️
2/
Jun 2 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
This:

>>This is essentially a complete tactical bomber cell in a box, sized for a small mobile drone team operating at brigade level or below. It is not a strategic deep-strike weapon, and it is not pretending to be one.

...is "Federalized airpower." Here are two key concepts for you --

1. Federalized Airpower - local ground unit as opposed to theater air commander asset

2. Kill Chains.

#1 has to do with every ground unit from platoon up owning a bit of airpower (a small UAV) outside central air command.
2/
Jun 2 • 12 tweets • 5 min read
I've spent the last few hours reposting my 2022 to date take down's of Alex Vershinin's "Truck beer math" (from the Nov. 2021 War on the Rocks article "Feeding the Bear") which I used to review this Tochnyi article⬇️

TLDR: Tochnyi screwed up & used Vershinin's disproven work.
1/ Image Specifically this bit stating Russian trucks did three trips a day because they spent one hour loading and one hour unloading trucks.

That is, like Alex Vershinin, they assumed mechanized logistics loading times with pallets & forklifts⬇️

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May 29 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Oh My!

The electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) of these jammer mountings has got to suck.

How many "nulls" this jammer throws (AKA where no jamming energy transmits) will be substantial.

1/ I did a thread on this in 2024 when the first turtle tank jammers appeared.

2/