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For @BrookingsInst's #TechSTream, @vwirtschafter and I document the spread of the Kremlin's preferred narrative of the NordStream sabotage (the US did it) spread across popular political podcasts in the US
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brookings.edu/techstream/u-s…
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brookings.edu/techstream/u-s…
Upshot:
Following the explosions, 12 popular political podcasts have devoted 18 episodes to the theory.
Less than one quarter of these episodes refuted the baseless theory.
Nearly 40% fully blamed the United States.
Following the explosions, 12 popular political podcasts have devoted 18 episodes to the theory.
Less than one quarter of these episodes refuted the baseless theory.
Nearly 40% fully blamed the United States.
That is to say, over the past week:
14 episodes in our dataset shared content about the explosions that was conspiratorial in nature
Of them, 7 wholly endorsed that idea that United States is the most likely culprit
Only 4 episodes sought to refute the claim
14 episodes in our dataset shared content about the explosions that was conspiratorial in nature
Of them, 7 wholly endorsed that idea that United States is the most likely culprit
Only 4 episodes sought to refute the claim
For much of the last two years, I've been the @BrookingsInst contributing cybersecurity editor. As I move on from this role with gratitude, I want to take a moment to celebrate some of what I and my intrepid #TechStream editors @EliasGroll & @chrismeserole have published.
This mattered. The first piece I wrote called out the dangers in hyperbolic overstatement in what constituted cyberwar. Protip: if not a single human is harmed as a direct result of the attack, it's not cyberwar. brookings.edu/techstream/the…
Here's one Bruce Schneier @schneierblog and I wrote that explains cyberwar, including damaging weapons of mass destruction and denying food, water, healthcare, and logistical support. We were dead-on about what the Russian attacks on Ukraine meant. brookings.edu/techstream/hac…
As Twitter, Meta, and Microsoft take steps to limit the reach of Russian state media, in some cases at the request of Western governments, the Kremlin's propaganda apparatus is predictably pushing back with claims of Big Tech and government censorship.
Also predictably, Kremlin media are also using this opportunity to push traffic to their Telegram channel, where they argue users can find "censorship-free" information about Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine.
Earlier this year, I wrote for @BrookingsInst's #TechStream about ways Moscow uses censorship claims to, among other things, diminish the appeal of a democratic internet and drive traffic from major social-media platforms to darker corners of the web.
brookings.edu/techstream/how…
brookings.edu/techstream/how…
I have a new essay – “How disinformation evolved in 2020” – out in @BrookingsInst #TechStream with @shelbygrossman. We created a dataset of 147 publicly announced info ops by Facebook and Twitter since 2018, and highlight 5 trends from 2020🧵:
brookings.edu/techstream/how…
brookings.edu/techstream/how…
In 2020: (1) Platforms were increasingly specific in their attributions – more often naming a govt, firm, or actor behind an operation. Based on our coding, approximately 76% of takedowns were attributed to a specific actor in 2020, compared to 62% in 2019 and 47% in 2018.
There are costs to the platforms for making specific attributions. For example, when Twitter suspended a network linked to the youth branch of Turkey’s ruling party, the office of the presidency responded...
