Thread by @danhind

A couple of thoughts on the Leverhulme/Cambridge research on 'conspiracy theories' reported in the Guardian today. It has already attracted hoots of derision on Twitter, for good reason.
theguardian.com/society/2018/n…

This is not a conspiracy theory. It is an accurate description of social reality, albeit given a depressive twist (note the "always" and the "anyway").

It is possible to agree with the idea that "the few" dominate public business while holding onto the hope that it might be possible to empower "the many" somehow. Indeed, there is a political party that promotes exactly this idea.

The statement is almost identical to one used by researchers at the University of Miami, whose work as written up in the Washington Post in early 2017. nytimes.com/2017/02/15/ups…

The Washington Post glossed this research as showing that Democratis were becoming more conspiracy-minded. Here's where I think it gets interesting in a #mediademocracy kind of way.

It is a truism of the rationalist-atheist fraternity that humans are wired to over-detect threats, to impute sinister significance to random events and so on. The savannah, evolved psychology, you know the drill.

We also know that generalised moods make particular, related events more likely. Happy people are more likely to feel joy, for example. It seems likely that people who feel anxious and insecure are more willing to identify causation behind events on their own initiative.

(We are told all sorts of stories about secret machinations by authoritative voices - these, it is important to remember, are rarely described as conspiracy theories even when they are formally identical and entirely untrue.)

What matters is not the accuracy of the claim, but the mental state and social status of the person who believes it. People who are marginalised and anxious are more likely to infer that events conform to some kind of hidden rationale, denied in the main circuits of publicity.

(How many times have you heard some complacent dimbulb announce that they subscribe to the 'cock up theory of history', like it isn't the least surprising thing they could possibly say, along with, 'people who can't be friends with ideological opponents are narrow-minded')

The prevailing function of the conspiracy theory is to give high status people a handy, scientific-sounding way to punch down. It is social sadism under the cover of social science.

The ludicrous question we started with is useful, because it shows that a 'conspiracy theory' is not necessarily untrue. Rather, it is something that belongs to the category 'beliefs of people who don't matter'.

After the 2016 election US Democrats doubtless felt less at-home, less at ease, and so somewhat more willing to entertain disreputable ideas about social reality. Framing this as a conspiratorial has a disciplining effect: stop believing this obviously true claim or lose status.