Thread by @WajSKhan

Lets talk about this clearly:

Imran Khan & Gen QJ Bajwa find themselves in a very different power equation versus the last two civilian administrations & the last two #COAS's

'08-'11, Gen Kayani & the Zardari regime were clearly cat-&-mousing for most of Kayani's 1st tenure.

Compulsions: The Lawyers' Movement, NRO, Musharraf's uniform, Memogate (some of Kayani's productions or co-productions, backed by foreign supporters). Then, post-Osama/Raymond Davis, Kayani was deployed to stabilize rudder by an atrophied Zardari. Not much of a choice for PPP.

That Kayani's personal interests & connections compromised his standing within & without the institution he was once revered by was clear by the middle of his 2nd term.

Soon after he was done, even junior officers weren't refraining for calling him 'agent' & 'mixed up'

Still, in the interest of tradition, the Army gave him a heck of a send off.

Enter Raheel Sharif, not the sharpest tool in the shed at the time of his appointment, but smart enough to be well advised by what was called the 'Core Group': Ashfaq Nadeem, Amir Riaz, Asim Bajwa & Co.

Unlike the Musharraf & Kayani eras, Raheel's reinvented the office of #COAS, & not only optically: deep within, senior officers were clearly more empowered. RS wasn't a 'first among equals', but #PakArmy's never been closer to running like a junta than during the Raheel tenure.

Optically, politically & militarily, a lot happened under RS: The Dharna. DPC. Zarb-e-Azab. APS. The #ThankYouRaheelSharif revolution. Perhaps a bit much.

When the extension was litmus-tested on media, RS (& Panama which PakMil's machine loved) were rubbing Nawaz the wrong way.

NS felt entitled - rightly so - that he was in a very different position, mandate-wise, vs his predecessor AAZ. Yet, his pro-India leanings & turf war for CPEC caused the machine to create a chafing, parallel office of power. There was Nawaz. And then here was Raheel. Everywhere.

Thus, RS's extension - even though there was a clear play for it - didn't happen because by '16, as NS was at a zero-sum-game standing w/ the Army & RS.Post-Panama, his loss was the Army's gain (& vice versa).

Maryam - who'd always rubbed the brass the wrong way - didn't help.

Now, we've got a whole other dynamic

Pindi loves Khan - not his Cabinet, not the parliamentary system he runs - but Khan.

e.g: IK's push for replacing DG-I out of turn was responded to w/ no-questions-asked rapidity; his initial push for aggressive NSC meetings was lauded.

In Khan, Pindi has a politically & ideologically aligned co-fellow. Internationally presentable, locally combative, speaks their language, walks their talk, has ingress in the youth bulge. And yes, the myth (or reality) about his 'financial honesty' does have rank & file appeal.

But what does IK get from Pindi? Simply, the backing that every elected official in Pak needs. To rule with conviction & confidence, you've must have the ability to make things go away. Because they like him, for now, Pindi, with its media & political magic tricks, delivers.

In retrospect, with AAZ & Kayani, it was PPP's weakness that allowed for a #COAS extension.

With NS & RS, it was political & personal tensions that disallowed it.

Now, 'regional security developments', are 'compelling' (though the IK-QBJ tag-team works well, yes, eg. US visit).

But what we really have with IK & QBJ (plus a little action on the side by LTG Faiz as DG-I) is nice little 'triad of convenience'.

The country's 1st, 2nd & 3rd most powerful men (let your imagination figure out that hierarchy) tend to gain from each other's presence. For now.

If you believe the 'regional security compulsions' argument (you should question it, btw), be aware the Bajwa's 'lead from behind' optical / political strategy has appeal in the military. Unlike RS, he's opted not to become the legend of truck art. His brass like understatement.

Bajwa has been getting along with Khan, famously. Right from that first tour of GHQ last summer, when most of the top brass presented arms & salutes to IK, their relationship has helped bridge the Islamabad-Rawalpindi divide - aka the 'civil military gap'.

But with LTG Faiz DG-I (famous for his politicking), we are faced with is the possibility of Khan's strongman complex - an honest appraisal of his last year in office clearly shows he has a streak - become a political inevitability. Plus, Faiz is in pole position for #COAS '22.

Thus, 'consistency in leadership' - perhaps important for Pak's current foreign policy/national security predicament (delivering on Afghan peace, wrestling Kashmir out of the Article 370 debacle etc from India ) - may / can / will lead to further deterioration of civil liberties.

For now, they have my backing: but what our 'Three Leaders' should really, truly be honest about is their personal / political intentions, the security roadmap for the way forward, and their tolerance for well-meaning dissent - in parliament, in the press, and on the street.

PS: Nobody does well in extensions that defy the system. The brass get jittery. Commanders get way too junior to advise well & bottlenecked out of incentive. Institutional reverence expires past the three year mark because after that, it’s all political. Mush&Kayani are examples.