Thread by @JJSchroden

Interesting proposal by ⁦@DavidMaxwell161⁩ for a Dept of Special Ops. Though if #SOF were to be their own service, it’d make more sense to consolidate the Service components under the new Dept as well (Dave proposes leaving them as is). 1/n militarytimes.com/opinion/commen…

If the underlying problem to be solved is lack of effective oversight, creation of a whole new Dept/Service for #SOF doesn’t solve that if a bifurcated chain of command remains. 2/n

Plus, if #SOF are to be their own service, they can’t have their cake & eat it too—they’d likely have to forego the vast majority of the “Service common” support they currently get from the Services (MFP-2) & pay for that stuff themselves (MFP-11). 3/n

This would require significant increases in manpower for the #SOF enterprise, as they’d now have to manage their own MILPAY and personnel systems, etc. And you know they wouldn’t get a 1:1 increase in budget to account for the loss of MFP-2 support. 4/n

Other Qs I’d have about this proposal include:
- What happens to JSOC’s acquisition authority if it’s a COCOM?
- Where do all the 3* billets come from for the TSOCs? (Not to mention all the 1* deputy billets) And what are the feeder paths to create all these SOF 3*s? 5/n

- If you consolidated today’s service components under the new Dept/Service (as it would make sense to do), you’d have redundancy in HQs, ground unit capabilities, etc. Would you then create a single Ground Unit, Air Unit, & Maritime Unit? & maybe an “Influence Unit?” 6/n

In short, I applaud @DavidMaxwell161’s radical thinking—such proposals are helpful thought exercises—but it seems to me that such a proposal would need to be taken to its logical conclusion. 7/n

If #SOF were their own service, an optimally designed Dept of Special Operations would look little like the SOF enterprise does today. I wonder if even SOF would be ready for that radical a set of changes. 8/8