Thread by @AndyKimNJ

Many told me they struggle with decision to end Afghan war. Don’t want war forever, but feel uncertain. That is normal. Ending war does not end pain from 9/11. I took this GroundZero photo. Had with me working in Kabul and now in my Congressional office. Never forget.(THREAD)

Ending a war should never be easy, especially when it carries out collective trauma. Despite working in Afghanistan in 2011, visiting in 2019, and being on Armed Services/Foreign Affairs Committees, I still struggle too on what to do next. Here are some ways to think through.2/20

ORIGINAL MISSION: When Congress authorized the war, the sole objective identified in authorization (2001 AUMF) states: “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” Stop future attacks. 3/20

THE EFFECT: Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is currently decimated. Estimates are only a few hundred left with no safe haven. Bin Laden killed a decade ago. AQ status has been at this low ineffectual level for years. So why then is there this big debate about ending the war? 4/20

The war effort and mission expanded over years like this: To prevent rise of Al Qaeda, we needed to stop rise of Taliban. To stop rise of Taliban, we need to shore up Afghan military. To do that, we need to shore up Afghan gov. To do that, we need to...(fill in the blank). 5/20

FILL IN THE BLANK: Congress appropriated more than $143B for Afghan reconstruction/support. There was only 50miles of paved road in Afghanistan on 9/11. We built more than 10k miles. hospitals, power grids, etc. We cover more than half of all expenses for entire Afghan gov. 6/20

$88.3B of funds spent to train/equip/sustain Afghan forces. There are over 305,000 Afghan forces. Every year, we pay 75% of their salaries and of total costs of Afghan forces. Afghan gov pays about 10-14%. This will likely continue for years to come. 7/20

WHEN IS ENOUGH? For 20 years, we undertook a conditions-based approach to exiting Afghanistan. The achilles heel of this approach is seen in three harsh realities (1) We can never expect to see an Afghanistan without Taliban. No amount of effort will destroy them entirely. 8/20

(2) Afghan forces will never be able to completely deter threat from potential Taliban assault. (3) No one can or should ever fully trust the word of the Taliban, even if Taliban is part of an intra-Afghan gov agreement. There will always be a risk they will seek power grab. 9/20

If we accept these 3 realities, then the options for US forces fall under two broad categories. (1) We would be prepared to stay in Afghanistan permanently, or (2) We will endure significant risk no matter when we pull troops out. 10/20

Main arguments I’ve heard for staying in Afghanistan permanently (or protracted) is Taliban gains jeopardize gains against terrorists. And costs are lower—we haven’t suffered large US fatalities in recent years. 3k troops not overly burdensome relative to past commitments 11/20

TWO UNKNOWNS: With US forces out, Will the Taliban try to seize control over Afghanistan? If Taliban is successful or if protracted conflict occurs, will that give Al Qaeda or other terrorist group safe haven? No one, not Biden nor any critics, know the answers to these. 12/20

RECONSTITUTION: Some argue Al Qaeda can reconstitute quickly as did ISIS in Syria/Iraq. ISIS’ growth was facilitated by large flows of foreign fighters into Syria funded because of oil fields controlled by ISIS. Conditions are different than what we see in Afghanistan. 13/20

ISIS KHORASAN: Known as ISIS-K, this offshoot of ISIS in Iraq/Syria and competitor to Al Qaeda was the main threat I worried about when I visited Afghanistan in late 2019. Their position in eastern AFG was deeply damaged over the last year, including by the Taliban. 14/20

WOMEN AND CHILDREN: There was a weekend market in Kabul for women owned businesses that I would visit. Would Taliban bring about a return to serious repression against women and children? We are seeing this concern in areas the Taliban controls. 15/20 washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pac…

WHAT I’M LOOKING OUT FOR: As details emerge, I’m paying close attention to whether we can maintain any overflight capabilities(surveillance from unmanned drones) and structure of intel operations. Essentially: how do we maintain eyes on potential terrorist growth? 16/20

MULTIPLE TOOLS: Our ability to shape the future of Afghanistan doesn’t just exist in drones and guns. We still have capable diplomats on the ground and economic tools that can help provide the kind of stability needed for long term success. 17/20

NO GUARANTEES: One time in the Situation Room I remember hearing Obama say “The one thing in this room I never ask for is a guarantee.” That line lingers with me. Our nation has significant power, but we cannot conflate power with control. 18/20

There is sometimes an illusion of control with work at White House. Hubris can make us think we will be greeted as liberators in Iraq or that war would end in months. I believe it’s time to end this war, but we are embarking on a new direction that carries inherent risks. 19/20

END OF CHAPTER: As the last soldier leaves this year, we’ll turn a page on this conflict and era. But what comes next? What will define this new era in the way Afghanistan did? Next week, I’ll give you my thoughts on the new chapter of global politics about to begin. (END)