Thread by @nktpnd

STRATCOM commander Adm. Richard’s 4/20 testimony, as prepared: armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/…

Apparently, this line is punchy enough to merit bold & italics.

I may have missed it, but this seems like a notable elucidation of the “operational requirements” behind the W93 (lower mass for ease of handling, apparently).

On conventional hypersonic weapons and how STRATCOM views its role.

An interesting description of the “opportunity” presented by the FTM-44 test in November 2020.

Comment on PLAAF’s nuclear ALBM program.

(Aside: I guess we’re now in an era where STRATCOM testimonies place the paragraphs on Chinese capabilities ahead of the paragraphs on Russian capabilities.)

On Russia. Not so different from post-2018 NPR STRATCOM testimony on these issues; continued focus on NSNW capabilities as evidence of “readiness to rely on these weapons in a conventional overmatch situation.” (Also, “overmatch”? Really?)

A curiously short section on North Korea (which is not described as a strategic deterrence challenge, FWIW).

This is a whopper. (And assumes no change in SSBN upload, among other unstated assumptions.)

In case anyone was wondering, no, we still don’t have a name for GBSD. (Spongey McSpongeface is still up for grabs!)

This is not in the prepared testimony, but seems to be a way to communicate to ICBM opponents that scrapping the ground leg could result in scary/bad practices returning. (And a new talking point in this debate, I think?)

Back to China: Adm. Richard says “increasing evidence
suggests China has moved a portion of its nuclear force to a Launch on Warning (LOW) posture.”