Apparently, this line is punchy enough to merit bold & italics.
I may have missed it, but this seems like a notable elucidation of the “operational requirements” behind the W93 (lower mass for ease of handling, apparently).
On conventional hypersonic weapons and how STRATCOM views its role.
An interesting description of the “opportunity” presented by the FTM-44 test in November 2020.
Comment on PLAAF’s nuclear ALBM program.
(Aside: I guess we’re now in an era where STRATCOM testimonies place the paragraphs on Chinese capabilities ahead of the paragraphs on Russian capabilities.)
On Russia. Not so different from post-2018 NPR STRATCOM testimony on these issues; continued focus on NSNW capabilities as evidence of “readiness to rely on these weapons in a conventional overmatch situation.” (Also, “overmatch”? Really?)
A curiously short section on North Korea (which is not described as a strategic deterrence challenge, FWIW).
This is a whopper. (And assumes no change in SSBN upload, among other unstated assumptions.)
In case anyone was wondering, no, we still don’t have a name for GBSD. (Spongey McSpongeface is still up for grabs!)
This is not in the prepared testimony, but seems to be a way to communicate to ICBM opponents that scrapping the ground leg could result in scary/bad practices returning. (And a new talking point in this debate, I think?)
"At 8:44 am on September 25, the Rocket Force of the People's Liberation Army of China successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a training simulated warhead into the relevant high seas waters of the Pacific Ocean"
1. Pacific Ocean ICBM testing is not the SOP for the PLARF these days. Most testing takes place over PRC territory.
2. Interesting timing following PRC takeover of the P5 process, but doubt there's a direct link given how their bureaucracy does things.
A thought on this: large solid-fuel missiles are *operationally* advantageous to their liquid counterparts in nearly every way, but have certain downsides relating to their maintenance/storage/handling that deserve to be noted. 1/n
Solid propellant grain, once cast, is sensitive to humidity/temperature/physical stress (during transport, for instance). That's why large, valuable solid-fuel missiles are canisterized. Over years in storage, solid fuel missiles can degrade. 2/n
India, for instance, has seen some of its older Agni-II MRBMs encounter failures after years in storage; to statistically evaluate its older inventories of solid fuel missiles, India randomly test-fires missiles. 3/n armscontrolwonk.com/archive/120615…
NEW: North Korea claims first successful flight-test of a new, solid-fuel ICBM, dubbed the 'Hwasong-18'. This was a major objective set forth by Kim Jong Un for 2023 at the start of this year.
One more image. Per North Korean state media, the test was meant to demonstrate a “nuclear counterattack” capability and to “make the enemies suffer from fear and anxiety.”
Looks like a towed, mobile erector mechanism. Probably sensible for an inaugural launch; don't want to lose an integrated TEL if things go wrong.
Beginning in 2009, North Korea began to comply with internationally accepted satellite prenotification practices (ICAO, IMO, etc.). Unclear if that practice will resume for a satellite with an ostensible "military" role. voanews.com/a/a-13-2009-03…
Here's an example of a North Korean SLV NOTAM (from the April 2012 launch that blew up the Leap Day Understanding).
Interesting tidbit underscoring command and control practices (negative controls) in new KCNA on latest Hwasal-1/2 cruise missile tests for "tactical" nuclear strikes.
Emphasizing negative control is important as KPA moves toward deploying TNWs to "frontline" units (as was decided at last June's WPK CMC meeting): "...adopting important military measures to enhance the operational capabilities of the frontline units" kcnawatch.org/newstream/1656…
Kim maintains assertive control of all nuclear weapons in peacetime, crisis, and war unless and until he is incapacitated/killed/severed from his NC3 system; per updated 2022 nuclear law, that would then result in authority to release nuclear weapons becoming delegated.