Thread by @SamuelJsdv

This week’s violence & protests in East #Tajikistan is happening because of existing & new social-economic, geo-political & historical dynamics.

[18-points🧵]

⏩ Historical context
⏩ Protest
⏩ Remittences & COVID
⏩ Geo-Afghanistan
⏩ Local expert & voices to follow

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Historical context: Tajikistan’s 🇹🇯 civil war lasted from 1992 until 1997. The Lali Badakhshan party (part of United Tajik Opposition) represented an important element of the East Tajikistan faction from the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region(GBOA) located in the Pamir area . . .

The GBOA in Eastern Tajikistan borders Afghanistan to the South, China to the East and Kyrgyzstan to the North and has long been supporting the rights and representation of ethnic minorities (Pamiris) in the country . . .

. . . At the time of the civil war, the United Tajik Opposition was a merger of convenience between secular, Islamic & democratic post-Soviet Tajiks, regional leaders, Taliban factions and ethnic minority groups seeking genuine rights and change (incl. Lali Badakhshan). . .

. . .The civil war ended in a truce coord. by Russia 🇷🇺. In 2000s, the balance of this ceasefire broke, as Tajik President cemented absolute power across country, in part due to strong US and (later) Russian support in Afghanistan invasion (logistics military, bases & funds) . .

Protests: During the past two decades, GBOA/East Tajikistan witnessed regular protests & eruptions of violence, notably in capital Khorog. These tensions are a complex mixture of opportunistic warlord interest mixed with Taliban-infused narco-trade & genuine civilian protest . .

. . .Tensions are also result of Pamir desire for political rights, as well as rapidly deteriorating socio-economic conditions & Russian-supported authoritarian repression from the centralised Dushanbe-government both in term of economic ownership/freedom of expression/media . .

In 2010 tensions in East flared up after multiple attacks, a prison escape & violent escalation between government and militants. These outbursts culminated in assassination of Tajikistan’s head of intelligence agency in 2012 followed by clashes with warlords linked to drugs . .

. . . In 2021 clashes also took place in Badakhshan when Tajik security forces fatally wounded Gulbiddin Ziyobekov, while locals protested the attack and demanded an investigation into his “arbitrary execution” caught on video (Guardian source) . . .

. . . The context of Tajikistan’s strategic geography & worsening economy are factors of importance when explaining protests/clashes. For an extended period of time, 25%+ of Afghanistan’s drug trade passed through Tajikistan while average income is 80€ a day in some region . . .

This weeks protests started around May 16 and now claim dozens of lives. Reports include serious clamp-down on Pamiris, including violent attacks on local & international media (RFE/Asia-Plus were closed/attacked in Khorog). GBOA is setting up an inquiry into 25+ deaths . . .

In Tajikistan, and particularly in GBOA, the Internet is regularly shut down, media censorship is high and families are reliant on development aid and remittances (labour migrants going to Russia) . . .

Remittances are the key since they have accounted for up to 33% of Tajikistan’s entire GDP, most of which comes from Russia. Since COVID the drop in remittances is estimated at 23%, while sanctions in Russia is worsening the situation . . .

According to @ENC_Europe 2021 study on labour migrants and vulnerable communities in Central Asia, including stateless people and ethnic minorities specially, the quantitative socio-economic worsening situation is affecting ethnic minorities the most . . .

According to our large scale quantitative and qualitative study on this issue: 74% of ethnic minorities in Tajikistan were reported as unemployed, which is nearly double compared to any other Central Asia Republics (internews.org/wp-content/upl…)

. . . The proximity of Afghanistan could also lead to spillover in terms of arms/drugs/foreign influence/Taliban. The nearby location of the Wakhan Corridor in South Tajikistan, which links Afghanistan and China, is a ticking time bomb that can further escalate violence . . .

. . . The protests are an extension of these social-economic realities, amplified by COVID & remittance decreases from Russia. The likelihood of continued unrest is high due to mixed demography, brutal clamp-down by the government and regional spillover (Afghanistan) . . .

Important local voices and qualified experts to follow for more details and views: @subhiya2 @nigorafazliddin @safarov1976 @Brucepannier @edwardlemon3 @ladyputz @lorenzo_tondo @eurasianet @ENC_Europe @OxusSociety @sher_khashimov @snazaramonov @syinatS @Peter_Leonard @FarangisN

⏩ EU Statement eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ta…
⏩ RFE article: rferl.org/a/tajikistan-g…
[END]

And @susile 👍🏼📚