Thread by @gbrew24

OTD in 1953, a coalition of #Iran groups toppled the govt of PM Mohammed Mosaddeq. The operation was planned, funded, & supported by the CIA and British intelligence.

This thread details the coup's stages, described in "The Struggle for Iran," out in Jan. 2023 from @UNC_Press 1/

NOTE: for the decision to remove Mosaddeq, see "The Collapse Narrative," published 2019 from @TXNatSecReview. 2/ tnsr.org/2019/11/the-co…

"In mid-March, CIA deputy director Frank Wisner reached out to British intelligence and suggested discussions on tactics. Clearance for 'psychological measures' and special political operations outlined earlier in NSC 136/1 were approved on 3 April." 3/

"An internal history by Donald Wilber suggests the initial budget was $1 million. By mid-April, Wilber and other CIA operatives were producing reports on how best to marshal assets, 'upon the premises that U.S. interest and policy requires the replacement of [Mosaddeq].'" 4/

"In Tehran the CIA relied on two assets, Ali Jalali and Faruq Keyvani, 'Nerren' and 'Cilley,' who had received training on covert operations...They received $600,000 out of a total budget of $1 million (about 1% of the CIA’s total budget for clandestine operations in 1952)." 5/

"British assets included the Rashidian family and its network of agents, who were well represented in the bazaar guilds, clergy, street gangs, and newspaper publishers. The British also possessed an informal network in the army, the Majlis and among the political elite." 6/

"The acknowledged leader of the opposition was retired Major General Fazlollah Zahedi...Following the fall of Qavam in July 1952, Zahedi became the favored British choice to succeed Mosaddeq." 7/

"Reports on his activities reached the U.S. embassy via Zahedi’s son Ardeshir, who worked for the U.S. Point Four technical cooperation mission and often met in secret with Commander Eric W. Pollard, the embassy’s naval attaché." 8/

"From the point of view of the British and Americans, Zahedi represented the best of limited options...US Amb. Loy Henderson accepted that risks were necessary “since [Mosaddeq] seems persistently to be leading Iran towards disaster.” 9/

"Most of the anti-Mosaddeq opposition had rallied around Zahedi, led by Majlis speaker Abdolqassem Kashani...Kashani and Zahedi drafted a firman, or royal decree, dismissing Mosaddeq from office. The shah refused to sign, however." 10/

"In late April, Wilber...met Norman Darbyshire, head of the Iran branch of MI6...he was "perfectly content" to follow the CIAs lead and agreed to pass control of the Rashidian network and other MI6 assets to the CIA." 11/

"Zahedi made contact with the U.S. embassy in mid-May...once he became prime minister, he would pursue an oil settlement with the British, crush the Tudeh, and pass social and economic reforms...he needed U.S. support, 'because Iranians cannot save themselves.'" 12/

"On 30 May Henderson met with the shah...he did not send [a record of the meeting] as a telegram...instead filing it as a confidential memorandum...he tried to determine what would be needed to secure the shah's cooperation." 13/

"Wilber’s discussions with Darbyshire in Nicosia produced an outline of an operational plan on 1 June... Henderson believed it would be very difficult to convince the shah to take part...planners should consider 'replacing…[him] with one of his brothers.'" 14/

"Wilber and [Kermit] Roosevelt...produced a 'London Draft' of the operation that outlined three stages. First, the CIA would distribute propaganda undermining Mosaddeq... Second, hired mobs would converge on the Majlis and force its members to vote Mosaddeq out of office." 15/

"Third, pro-shah military units would seize control should Mosaddeq, as was expected, refuse to step down. The shah would sign two firmans: one dismissing Mosaddeq and the second appointing Zahedi in his place." 16/

"Before the opposition could fully mobilize against him, Mosaddeq acted. On 14 July, all National Front deputies resigned...The move effectively dissolved the assembly. Mosaddeq planned to ask for the people’s support for the Majlis’ dissolution through a referendum." 17/

"George Carroll, a paramilitary expert... arrived in Iran on 21 July. After Carroll 'painfully confirmed' that Zahedi’s claims to influence within the military had been wildly exaggerated, he drew up a list of military figures who might be willing to take part [in a coup.]" 18/

"As soon as the firmans dismissing Mosaddeq and appointing Zahedi were delivered, military units would seize key points...'success might depend,' Wilber later noted, 'upon whether or not [Mosaddeq]...succeeded in arresting our friends before we arrested his.'" 19/

"The shah’s cooperation was essential. The shah’s signature would be needed to validate the firmans, which were necessary to give the operation a shred of legality, and military forces would probably not act without his support. The shah continued to move cautiously." 20/

"On 12 Aug. the shah left Tehran...According to Nassiri’s account, the shah did not sign the firmans but rather two blank sheets of paper, on which the firmans were later printed...signed docs were in Zahedi’s possession the following day. “Al Homdulillah,” cabled Roosevelt." 21/

"According to Roosevelt, he turned over control of the operation to Zahedi once the firmans were in hand. Zahedi and the coup’s military participants held clandestine meetings between 11 and 13 August." 22/

"The original plan was to deliver the firmans to Mosaddeq and seize control of the city on the night of 14 Aug, but Zahedi delayed a day, giving rumors [of the coup] time to circulate...Zahedi revealed details about the operation to General Daftari, who may have leaked." 23/

"When Nassiri led a heavily armed convoy to the PM's home, arriving there around 2:30 am on 16 August, he met a superior force and was arrested. A column of Zahedi’s allies arrived to take over the Army headquarters but found it too heavily defended...The attempt collapsed." 24/

"Radio Tehran reported at 5:45am that an attempted coup had taken place...govt arrested several of the mil officers involved in the coup attempt...Court Minister Amini, the shah’s personal secretary Ernest Perron, and dozens of others." 25/

"[US Embassy] felt the operation had failed due to 'Iranian incapacity for large-scale organized effort[s].' Wilber later blamed leaks from within the coup’s 'inept' military contingent.' 26/

"Roosevelt later admitted he only learned of the failure at 5:50 am on 16 August when he heard the announcement over the radio. He then drove to Shimran in north Tehran to meet with Zahedi. They agreed the situation could be salvaged." 27/

"The shah did not share their confidence. Upon learning of the operation’s failure, he flew his wife on a private plane to Baghdad...arriving at 10 am the morning of 16 August. His departure was not planned: “he just took off,” Roosevelt later reported." 28/

"[US Amb to Iraq] found the shah tired from three sleepless nights, 'utterly at a loss to understand why the plan failed'... told the shah never to reveal that 'any foreigner had had a part in recent events,' and the shah agreed"...he then left for Rome." 29/

"Roosevelt...proposed a new narrative, that of a royalist countercoup which claimed that by rejecting the firmans and remaining in office, Mosaddeq had carried out a coup against the shah. This would force Iranians to choose between Mosaddeq...and Iran’s monarchy." 30/

"To disseminate this version of events, Ardeshir Zahedi met with Kennett Love of the NYT...on 16 Aug and passed them copies of the firmans, complete with the shah’s signature. The NYT published the firmans... argued Mosaddeq was no longer the legal prime minister." 31/

"On the morning of Aug 18, the CIA cabled Roosevelt: 'all operations against Mosaddeq should be discontinued.' It is not clear if Roosevelt ignored this instruction or if new orders were sent later." 32/

"He later admitted during his debriefing that he declined to communicate further with CIA HQ, focusing instead on continuing the operation...Roosevelt, Zahedi, and others within the opposition had already set in motion a second coup attempt scheduled for 19 August." 33/

"After meeting in a 'council of war' on 18 Aug, Zahedi, Roosevelt, Carroll, and the Rashidians agreed that a 2nd attempt would be made...According to Wilber, the plan would be for 'soldiers and the people to rally in support of their religion and their throne."'34/

"The Rashidians and CIA assets Jalali and Keyvani would assemble crowds...mobs would march on the city center chanting pro-shah and pro-Islamic slogans. They would be joined by pro-shah military units which would then move against govt forces, using the crowds as cover." 35/

"In an hour-long meeting with Mosaddeq the evening of 18 August, Henderson complained about reports of violence against Americans in Tehran...the PM ordered the streets of Tehran cleared that night." 36/

"Henderson reported that police and military units fanned out across the city, using brutal methods against anyone chanting pro-Tudeh, pro-republic, or anti-shah slogans...Mosaddeq’s decision to crack down on the Tudeh...helped seal his fate and allow the coup to succeed." 37/

"On the morning of 19 August, the center of Tehran was quiet. Neither the Tudeh nor the National Front were present, both having suffered from the previous night’s crackdown. The opposition, meanwhile, mobilized its streets assets." 38/

"In the south of the city, crowds gathered under the direction of thugs hired by the coup planners...The crowds numbered between 1,000 and 2,000 individuals." 39/

"Meeting no police or military resistance, the crowds marched on the center of Tehran. They were joined by units that distributed weapons...Trucks and jeeps brought reinforcements from South Tehran, and by 10:00 am police and soldiers joined the crowds." 40/

"By noon the crowds and military units moved toward more heavily guarded targets...Intense fighting ensued as royalist forces clashed with government troops. Tehran Radio, a crucial prize necessary to solidify the coup’s success outside of Tehran, fell at 2:12pm." 41/

"Roosevelt traveled from the embassy to Zahedi’s safehouse. He assisted the general in finding a suitable escort to the radio station...At 5:25 pm, Zahedi delivered an address which included a message to pro-shah units outside the capital." 42/

"Roosevelt sent a cable to the CIA: 'overthrow of Mossadeq appears on verge of success'...heavy fire from Sherman tanks forced the troops guarding Mosaddeq’s residence to surrender'...By the evening all the major govtinstitutions were the hands of the coup’s participants." 43/

"US contributed significantly to the coup before, during, and after the operation...including the production and distribution of propaganda designed to undermine Mosaddeq and exaggerate the Tudeh threat...organizing the crowds that contributed to the violence of 17-18 Aug." 44/

"The United States used its contacts within the Iranian military and information provided by the British to establish a military secretariat for Zahedi, enlisting officers believed to have pro-shah or anti-Mosaddeq positions." 45/

"Roosevelt ensured that copies of the shah’s firmans were delivered to press correspondents... Zahedi and others were given sanctuary at American residences. Had Zahedi been discovered and captured, the coup probably would have fallen apart." 46/

"The shah would not have participated in the coup had the US not been involved...it is unlikely either Zahedi or Kashani would have succeeded in removing Mosaddeq, as neither possessed sufficient popular backing...without the shah’s support." 47/

"[UK] network in Iran, which they passed to the CIA in spring 1953, was broad and included elements of from the clergy, the bazaar, the Majlis, and the [army]. The precise extent of this network is difficult to determine since the British govt has refused to declassify docs." 48/

"The US moved immediately to support Zahedi...received $5 million in cash from the CIA and $45 million in emergency aid in Sept...To not count this expense as part of the total cost of the operation ignores the significance American policymakers placed on such aid." 49/

"Regardless of whether the U.S. or UK involvement in the coup determined its outcome, that outcome was precisely what [they] intended. Mosaddeq was gone, replaced by a military regime tied to the shah." 50/End

Thanks for reading!
uncpress.org/book/978146967…