🚨 New Working Paper 🚨
We show that applicants manipulate their address to get access to their preferred school and thereby push out non-strategic students.
Friday, so I am giving you 3 options. A gif, a 🧵, and the full paper!
#EconTwitter @ChrisANeilson @Woessmann
1/N
Do you remember Andrea?
- she used her grandmother's address to secure a place at West Beverly High!
2/N
Does this also happen in real life?
- We looked at real data from Danmark (of course )
- We observe a lot of address changes around the high school application deadline
3/N
And it didn't use to be like that
- Before school priority was based on distance to school, we didn't observe any changes around the deadline!
4/N
The number of address changes doubled!
5/N
And this was NOT poor Andrea, but kids from more affluent households
6/N
Interestingly, the response is driven purely by 15y old changing the address without any other member of the family changing address!
- There is no response in family moves
7/N
And this affected non-strategic applicants!
- More than 1/4 who did not enroll in their preferred school would have been offered a place in absence of manipulation by their peers
8/N
But is this cheating?
- Well when a municipality started to ask for additional proof that the 15y really lives at the new address, the effect was reduced significantly !
9/N
What if we suddenly removed all strategic address changes?
- The non-strategic peers who got pushed out of schools would get better peers!
10/N
Summary
- Applicants manipulate their eligibility at schools.
- Manipulation pushes other students out → who get worse peers.
- See paper for theory, proofs, placebo tests, decomposition of response, and much more.
11/N
Read our paper here arxiv.org/abs/2305.18949
With @mikhoga @andbjn and Lykke Sterll Christensen
12/12
Share this Scrolly Tale with your friends.
A Scrolly Tale is a new way to read Twitter threads with a more visually immersive experience.
Discover more beautiful Scrolly Tales like this.