Thread by @KatStepanenko

The conflict between the Gerasimov & anti-Gerasimov camps within the Russian military command is unfolding against the backdrop of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

A 🧵on 🇷🇺 Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky & his competition with Army General Valery Gerasimov for Putin's favor.

This is part 3 of the @TheStudyofWar's study into the Russian military command changes since the start of the full-scale invasion. Please check out my previous 🧵for a recap of Russian command changes in 2022.

Part 1:
Part 2:

Russian milbloggers published an interview on June 6 praising Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky for playing a decisive role in Russian forces' defense against Ukrainian localized counterattacks near Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast.

Teplinsky reportedly visited the frontlines in Donetsk Oblast & praised the commanders of the 5th Combined Arms Army and 36th CAA for their defensive efforts in the Velyka Novosilka area, claiming that not all of the Russian military command displayed similar bravery.

Milbloggers confirmed our APR 30 assessment that Teplinsky became an overall theater deputy commander responsible for southern 🇺🇦 as of APR 1 & praised him for his involvement in Russian defensive preparations west of Vuhledar and throughout the south.

The pro-Teplinsky interview is likely part of an information operation aimed at undermining the Russian MoD as Teplinsky's visit to the frontlines was a clear jab at Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu & Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov.

The interview was published after the MoD claimed that Gerasimov took command of 🇷🇺operations in the south on JUN 5 & after Shoigu characterized the defense as an MoD success on JUN 6. Shoigu notably also praised the 5th and 36th CAAs but failed to visit them on the frontlines.

The MoD did not report on Teplinsky's frontlines visit & has previously blocked anti-Gerasimov commanders from being featured on official platforms & @MassDara observed that Russia's senior military officials are no strangers to "wartime pettiness"

So how did the relationship between Teplinsky & Gerasimov get this publicly tense & petty?

Here is what happened in winter 2023.

Gerasimov & his affiliates - who had lost favor with Putin during the invasion - likely promised to Putin that they could successfully conduct Russia’s upcoming winter-spring offensive as the Ukrainian fall counteroffensive culminated in DEC 2022 & evidently had some success.

Gerasimov began to appear in high-profile meetings with Putin, Shoigu & Russian commanders in late DEC, where he likely attempted to shift Putin’s favor to his camp. Gerasimov’s camp also likely launched an information campaign to discredit Wagner affiliates like Teplinsky.

The highly attritional capture of Soledar in JAN likely prompted Putin to acquiesce to Gerasimov’s campaigning & appoint him as the theater commander for the winter-spring offensive operation on JAN 11. This decision reportedly upset Teplinsky.

Unconfirmed Russian sources claimed that Teplinsky resigned or took a leave of absence on JAN 12 after a personal conflict with Gerasimov about the use of VDV forces in human wave attacks – likely around Soledar.

Deputy Head of the Russian General Staff Academy Colonel General Oleg Makarevich reportedly replaced Teplinsky as the VDV commander despite having no previous VDV experience.

Russian military commanders within the anti-Gerasimov faction and select Kremlin officials increasingly began to call attention to Russian military failures during the winter-spring offensive but were unsuccessful in convincing Putin to make their desired changes in February.

Teplinsky confirmed his leave in a FEB 23 video in which he congratulated VDV troops & admitted that he had not fought on the frontlines since JAN but wished to return to combat. The video was likely part of a consolidated attack on the Gerasimov camp.

Teplinsky’s video likely confirmed his frustration with the use of his forces in Soledar & reports of his insubordination with Gerasimov. He also called on Russian commanders to “save [their] soldiers” and not to “pay for captured villages and heights with soldiers’ lives.”

Teplinsky, however, set conditions for the next set of command changes by expressing his dissatisfaction with the current military command directly to Putin in late FEB, ultimately assuming a leading military command position in APR 2023.

Teplinsky & his allies within the VDV veteran communities reportedly directly appealed to Putin on MAR 15 about the MoD’s supposed poor treatment of Wagner forces, lack of transparency, and disregard for the Russian war effort.

Teplinsky was successful in his efforts to discredit Gerasimov & regain command in 🇺🇦. 🇷🇺milbloggers claimed that the MoD recalled Teplinsky from leave on MAR 30 after which he deployed to the 🇷🇺 Joint Grouping Headquarters in Rostov-on-Don to assume command of the VDV on APR 1.

Teplinsky was shortly appointed as the deputy theater commander in southern Ukraine & Putin met with Teplinsky & Makarevich (new commander of the Dnepr Grouping of Forces subordinated to Teplinsky) in Kherson Oblast prior to Orthodox Easter on April 16 to signal a command change.

Russian sources claimed that Putin also presented Teplinsky with an icon that had previously belonged to a Ukrainian-born Russian imperial defense minister – a symbolic nod to Teplinsky who is a Ukrainian native.

It is noteworthy that Russian commanders & senior military leaders appear to prioritize public posing in the midst of ongoing significant military operations and major catastrophes.

The Gerasimov vs. anti-Gerasimov camps' competition for Putin's favor & authority over the Russian military command will likely develop further as both will try to show off basic defensive operations in Ukraine (that should not be so unusual as to deserve wide praise) to Putin.