The conflict between the Gerasimov & anti-Gerasimov camps within the Russian military command is unfolding against the backdrop of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
A 🧵on 🇷🇺 Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky & his competition with Army General Valery Gerasimov for Putin's favor.
This is part 3 of the @TheStudyofWar's study into the Russian military command changes since the start of the full-scale invasion. Please check out my previous 🧵for a recap of Russian command changes in 2022.
Russian milbloggers published an interview on June 6 praising Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky for playing a decisive role in Russian forces' defense against Ukrainian localized counterattacks near Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast.
Teplinsky reportedly visited the frontlines in Donetsk Oblast & praised the commanders of the 5th Combined Arms Army and 36th CAA for their defensive efforts in the Velyka Novosilka area, claiming that not all of the Russian military command displayed similar bravery.
Milbloggers confirmed our APR 30 assessment that Teplinsky became an overall theater deputy commander responsible for southern 🇺🇦 as of APR 1 & praised him for his involvement in Russian defensive preparations west of Vuhledar and throughout the south.
The pro-Teplinsky interview is likely part of an information operation aimed at undermining the Russian MoD as Teplinsky's visit to the frontlines was a clear jab at Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu & Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov.
The interview was published after the MoD claimed that Gerasimov took command of 🇷🇺operations in the south on JUN 5 & after Shoigu characterized the defense as an MoD success on JUN 6. Shoigu notably also praised the 5th and 36th CAAs but failed to visit them on the frontlines.
The MoD did not report on Teplinsky's frontlines visit & has previously blocked anti-Gerasimov commanders from being featured on official platforms & @MassDara observed that Russia's senior military officials are no strangers to "wartime pettiness"
So how did the relationship between Teplinsky & Gerasimov get this publicly tense & petty?
Here is what happened in winter 2023.
Gerasimov & his affiliates - who had lost favor with Putin during the invasion - likely promised to Putin that they could successfully conduct Russia’s upcoming winter-spring offensive as the Ukrainian fall counteroffensive culminated in DEC 2022 & evidently had some success.
Gerasimov began to appear in high-profile meetings with Putin, Shoigu & Russian commanders in late DEC, where he likely attempted to shift Putin’s favor to his camp. Gerasimov’s camp also likely launched an information campaign to discredit Wagner affiliates like Teplinsky.
The highly attritional capture of Soledar in JAN likely prompted Putin to acquiesce to Gerasimov’s campaigning & appoint him as the theater commander for the winter-spring offensive operation on JAN 11. This decision reportedly upset Teplinsky.
Unconfirmed Russian sources claimed that Teplinsky resigned or took a leave of absence on JAN 12 after a personal conflict with Gerasimov about the use of VDV forces in human wave attacks – likely around Soledar.
Deputy Head of the Russian General Staff Academy Colonel General Oleg Makarevich reportedly replaced Teplinsky as the VDV commander despite having no previous VDV experience.
Russian military commanders within the anti-Gerasimov faction and select Kremlin officials increasingly began to call attention to Russian military failures during the winter-spring offensive but were unsuccessful in convincing Putin to make their desired changes in February.
Teplinsky confirmed his leave in a FEB 23 video in which he congratulated VDV troops & admitted that he had not fought on the frontlines since JAN but wished to return to combat. The video was likely part of a consolidated attack on the Gerasimov camp.
Teplinsky’s video likely confirmed his frustration with the use of his forces in Soledar & reports of his insubordination with Gerasimov. He also called on Russian commanders to “save [their] soldiers” and not to “pay for captured villages and heights with soldiers’ lives.”
Teplinsky, however, set conditions for the next set of command changes by expressing his dissatisfaction with the current military command directly to Putin in late FEB, ultimately assuming a leading military command position in APR 2023.
Teplinsky & his allies within the VDV veteran communities reportedly directly appealed to Putin on MAR 15 about the MoD’s supposed poor treatment of Wagner forces, lack of transparency, and disregard for the Russian war effort.
Teplinsky was successful in his efforts to discredit Gerasimov & regain command in 🇺🇦. 🇷🇺milbloggers claimed that the MoD recalled Teplinsky from leave on MAR 30 after which he deployed to the 🇷🇺 Joint Grouping Headquarters in Rostov-on-Don to assume command of the VDV on APR 1.
Teplinsky was shortly appointed as the deputy theater commander in southern Ukraine & Putin met with Teplinsky & Makarevich (new commander of the Dnepr Grouping of Forces subordinated to Teplinsky) in Kherson Oblast prior to Orthodox Easter on April 16 to signal a command change.
Russian sources claimed that Putin also presented Teplinsky with an icon that had previously belonged to a Ukrainian-born Russian imperial defense minister – a symbolic nod to Teplinsky who is a Ukrainian native.
It is noteworthy that Russian commanders & senior military leaders appear to prioritize public posing in the midst of ongoing significant military operations and major catastrophes.
The Gerasimov vs. anti-Gerasimov camps' competition for Putin's favor & authority over the Russian military command will likely develop further as both will try to show off basic defensive operations in Ukraine (that should not be so unusual as to deserve wide praise) to Putin.
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The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had once again decided to attack the vast milblogger community regarding their responses to Russian efforts to repel Ukrainian landings near Antonivsky Bridge.
This is not MoD’s first unsuccessful attempt at censoring milbloggers🧵🪡.
A Russian milblogger amplified a post from an unspecified Telegram channel, which criticized several prominent Kremlin & Wagner-affiliated milbloggers for contradicting the 🇷🇺MoD’s narrative regarding a successful defeat of a 🇺🇦 landing on the left bank. t.me/dva_majors/199…
The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces successfully repelled Ukrainian landings near the Antonivsky Bridge & disproportionally celebrated defeating a small 🇺🇦 landing on the left bank of the Dnipro River. Some milbloggers, however, claimed that fighting was ongoing.
The Kremlin may be attempting to reintroduce Kadyrovites as the main offensive force following the culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the frontlines.🧵
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on May 31 that Chechen forces received a new order and assumed responsibility over the Donetsk Oblast frontline & that Chechen units need to start “active combat activities” and “liberate a series of settlements.”
Kadyrov added that Chechen “Akhmat” Special Forces (Spetsnaz) and the “Sever-Akhmat” Special Purpose Regiment transferred to the Marinka direction southwest of Donetsk City.
Why did Russians fight so relentlessly for Bakhmut since May 2022?
Sharing my latest assessment with @TheStudyofWar on how the Russian offensive on Bakhmut lost its limited operational significance throughout the year.🧵
Major thanks to @georgewbarros for the accompanying maps and gifs that best illustrate this overly-ambitious Russian operational effort.
The seizure of Bakhmut was originally intended to facilitate Russian offensives to encircle large Ukrainian forces in the east and specifically to take the large and fortified city of Slovyansk from multiple directions.
Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces control an “insignificant” part of southwestern Bakhmut City around the T0504 highway — a tacit acknowledgement that Russian forces have secured the rest of western and northwestern Bakhmut, if not all of it.
These officials’ statements indicate that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the remaining areas in Bakhmut except those adjacent to the two highways into the city.
Select Russian strongmen (siloviki) are likely attempting to signal to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin that he must cease his political ambitions in Russia.🧵
Prigozhin responded to a media inquiry on May 17 about several allegations from Russian Telegram channels — which are reportedly affiliated with the Russian Presidential Administration and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) — about Prigozhin’s political aspirations in Russia.
These channels claimed that Prigozhin is using the battle for Bakhmut & war in Ukraine to become a political figure in Russia rather than actually fighting for 🇷🇺’s interests. The journalist directly asked Prigozhin if he thinks that Russian siloviki are trying to signal to him.
Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s reported cooperation with Ukrainian intelligence is likely a component of his feud with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) rather than an attack on Russian President Vladimir Putin. 🧵
@washingtonpost reported that Prigozhin offered the Ukrainian intelligence information about Russian troop positions in exchange for a Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut & two Ukrainian unnamed officials confirmed that Prigozhin had spoken to GUR officials on numerous occasions.
GUR officials reportedly rejected Prigozhin’s offer because they did not trust Prigozhin & some documents indicate that Kyiv suspects that the Kremlin is aware of Prigozhin’s communication with Ukrainian intelligence.