Pay attention to the RuAF heavy equipment transporters (HET) in this video - 13 - carrying tracked vehicles and one front end loader backhoe.
RuAF tracked vehicles can't make long road marches w/o 60%(+) breakdowns & track wear.
Russo-Ukrainian War operational level🧵
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HET's & Flatbed train cars rolling stock are how the RuAF moves tracked vehicles to operational and strategic distances.
Soviet practice was to have a large HET fleet in Western Russia to move the 2nd strategic echelon of ground forces to invade NATO.
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The Soviet Red Army anticipated NATO would down a lot of railway bridges, plus a HET were also useful for moving lots of artillery ammo tonnage as well as vehicles.
Henry Schlottman' Nov 2022 substack lays out a 300 km road march sees 60% to 70% of
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web.archive.org/web/2023012605…
...Russian tanks & AFV's fall out for maintenance casualties.
The Russians like to use trains to 100km from the front and HET's are used from there to just outside artillery range of the front lines.
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A major issue for the RuAF is that units like the 7th Guards Air Assault Division is moving from Kherson all the way to Kursk _BY_TRUCK_.
It is about 900 km by road, moving outside GMLRS range, to the Northern border of occupied Luhansk.
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From there to Kursk Oblast to the Northern border of Luhansk OBlast is - my guess - ~700 km.
That is a 1,600 km road march for between 1,500 and 2,000 vehicles.
The tracked vehicles would all be going by HET because of that 60%-to-70% break down ever 300 km travel...
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...that they experience.
The problem for the RuAF is their wheeled AFV's (BTR/MRAP/BRDM), tactical trucks & HETS simply aren't up to a sustained 1,600 km road march mostly on ill-maintained occupied Ukrainian roads.
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7th Guards Air Assault Division contract RuAF soldiers with three months experience driving manual stick shift transmission tactical trucks, HETS and wheeled AFV's are not going to be driven well.
There will have to be a major maintenance evolution arriving and shaking out...
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...before they can be ready to attack.
Think a minimum of 7 days before the logistical tail can fully recover and is ready to support artillery heavy combat operations.
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The problem is Putin has not allowed that level of professional logistics since RuAF withdrew across the Dnipro from Western Kherson.
Only the 7th Guards HET carried AFV's that were operational when they were loaded will be capable of attacking upon arrival.
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Putin will order those 7th Guards AFV's to attack immediately without logistical support.
The dodgy state of RuAF preventive maintenance on AFV in combat means 20%-to-30% will fail to cover 100km from the HET drop off point.
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Putin will demand attacks from the 7th Guards with whatever is immediately available, AKA speed not mass, and RuAF generals will obey.
So penny packet groups of 7th Guards AFV's will trickle into AFU positions with no logistical and inadequate fire support.😈
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It's almost as if the AFU General Staff had planned the Kursk Operation to cause RuAF to use up all its fuel in occupied Ukraine, destroy fuel depots en route, run down RuAF entire truck fleet enmass, & pull ground units as far as possible from Kherson
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...& Zaporizhzhia.🤔
Just like AFU General Staff seems to have planned out the logistical collapse of the Russian railway system in Kursk we are seeing now.
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My take on all of this is we are looking at a planned sequence of operational level military-logistical shaping operations for further AFU offensives.
I've got some popcorn laid in for what I think is coming next.
15/15 End
@threadreaderapp unroll please
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