The Soviet Red Army anticipated NATO would down a lot of railway bridges, plus a HET were also useful for moving lots of artillery ammo tonnage as well as vehicles.
Henry Schlottman' Nov 2022 substack lays out a 300 km road march sees 60% to 70% of
...Russian tanks & AFV's fall out for maintenance casualties.
The Russians like to use trains to 100km from the front and HET's are used from there to just outside artillery range of the front lines.
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A major issue for the RuAF is that units like the 7th Guards Air Assault Division is moving from Kherson all the way to Kursk _BY_TRUCK_.
It is about 900 km by road, moving outside GMLRS range, to the Northern border of occupied Luhansk.
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From there to Kursk Oblast to the Northern border of Luhansk OBlast is - my guess - ~700 km.
That is a 1,600 km road march for between 1,500 and 2,000 vehicles.
The tracked vehicles would all be going by HET because of that 60%-to-70% break down ever 300 km travel...
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...that they experience.
The problem for the RuAF is their wheeled AFV's (BTR/MRAP/BRDM), tactical trucks & HETS simply aren't up to a sustained 1,600 km road march mostly on ill-maintained occupied Ukrainian roads.
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7th Guards Air Assault Division contract RuAF soldiers with three months experience driving manual stick shift transmission tactical trucks, HETS and wheeled AFV's are not going to be driven well.
There will have to be a major maintenance evolution arriving and shaking out... 8/
...before they can be ready to attack.
Think a minimum of 7 days before the logistical tail can fully recover and is ready to support artillery heavy combat operations.
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The problem is Putin has not allowed that level of professional logistics since RuAF withdrew across the Dnipro from Western Kherson.
Only the 7th Guards HET carried AFV's that were operational when they were loaded will be capable of attacking upon arrival.
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Putin will order those 7th Guards AFV's to attack immediately without logistical support.
The dodgy state of RuAF preventive maintenance on AFV in combat means 20%-to-30% will fail to cover 100km from the HET drop off point.
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Putin will demand attacks from the 7th Guards with whatever is immediately available, AKA speed not mass, and RuAF generals will obey.
So penny packet groups of 7th Guards AFV's will trickle into AFU positions with no logistical and inadequate fire support.😈
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It's almost as if the AFU General Staff had planned the Kursk Operation to cause RuAF to use up all its fuel in occupied Ukraine, destroy fuel depots en route, run down RuAF entire truck fleet enmass, & pull ground units as far as possible from Kherson
The statistical comparison in the FBI data from pre-1961 is invalid as the underlying medical systems have so changed as to utterly pollute the "murders per 100,000" data.
Violent crime data pre-1961 and post 1961 are apples to oranges comparisons.
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-Trauma care centers (1961),
-Standardized trauma procedures (1978),
-Adoption of military Korea/Vietnam medical emergency treatment & air transport procedures,
-Improved triage (1986)
-And (since 2011) widespread adoption and use of blood clotting bandages...
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Chairman Xi suffers from the traditional dictator's trap of believing his own sh*t because he has made it too dangerous for his cronies and underlings to tell him the truth.
Thanks to that, Chairman Xi's Regime has pretty much no resilience in adversity because it's so kleptocratic and it's all about what the guy in charge can do for his next set of corrupt cronies today.
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This 1970's comment about the Shah of Iran is so historically on point in 2026 because it shows how Xi's regime is failing "The dictator on the wall test."
This map of 124 Russian railway electric traction stations and the 40K OWA drone fired in 2025 demonstrates the political-military leadership failure of the Zelinskyy government.
Like Stalin's failed winter 1941-1942 counter offensives against Nazi Army Group Center,
...Ukraine is penny packing OWA drones everywhere to no great effect based on which military "Union" faction was last in the room with President Zelenskyy before a decision
Even Ukraine's vaunted oil offensive is a bare plurality of total drone strikes 2/
The latest @RyanO_ChosenCoy thread detailing the bureaucratic issues of Ukraine's military in targeting Russian logistics makes clear Ukraine's military has inter-service and intra-service union/factional disputes that are positively American in scale.
If the target of a US "rapid strike" was either the Kharg Island oil export facility or Iran's banking/financial system with a combination of explosives and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse munitions, the Mullahs will fall.
There are two real courses of action (COA) for an American air campaign if Regime Change is the goal.
The Schwerpunkt - political center of gravity - of the Mullah regime is its ability to pay for the use Regime Security Forces & foreign hired mercenaries.
This is one of the 3 major strategic mistakes of the Zelenskyy Government.⬇️
Putin has shown better, more consistent, and more effective leadership in the strategic bombing of Ukrainian electrical infrastructure than Zelinskyy has in striking Russia's railways.
Russia remains uniquely vulnerable to a focused drone strike campaign on it's electrical railway traction step down transformers.
Zelenskyy's leadership not only ignored hitting that unique Russian vulnerability since Feb. 2022.
See the figure below⬇️
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To give you an idea of the abject political-military failure of the Zelenskyy government in this regard one has to look at the industrial supply chain for those traction substations.
The Soviet Union had two major transformer factories: Tolyatti and Zaporozhye.
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