Thread by @ArturRehi

The story of internet shutdowns in Russia is not an accident and not a “temporary measure.” It is a system that has been built for years and has now simply begun to operate at full capacity. What many people saw in Moscow in March 2026 - the inability to pay a bill,
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open a map, or simply send a message - has long been the norm for other regions; Moscow has simply been the last to enter this reality. The timeline is important here: back in 2019, the law on the “sovereign internet” was adopted - formally to protect against external threats,

but in reality to create an infrastructure for centralized traffic control, forcing operators to install equipment under state supervision. This was followed by annual drills in which the network was tested for isolation and autonomous operation - no longer theory, but

preparation for real use. By 2025, the system began to be used on a mass scale: first in border regions such as Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk under the pretext of protection from drones, then the geography expanded, and by mid-year shutdowns were recorded in dozens of regions,

and by the end of the year there were already thousands of such cases. In the fall, “white lists” appeared - lists of services that continue to function even when the internet is shut down, while everything else becomes inaccessible. In October, centralized network control was

introduced, and in February 2026 a law was passed allowing the FSB to demand communication shutdowns, while operators were exempted from liability to customers. In March 2026, this practice reached the capital - a full shutdown occurred in central Moscow. This is no longer

a reaction to isolated events, but the consistent application of a previously constructed mechanism. The official explanation is security, drones, war - and this is partly true, but only partly. In border regions, shutdowns have indeed become part of everyday life, and people

have adapted: switching to wired internet, keeping cash, changing habits - and this is largely the intended outcome, that over time it becomes accepted as normal. But there are other examples - Nizhny Novgorod region, Omsk - where the scale and duration of shutdowns can no longer

be explained by proximity to combat zones, shifting the focus from security to control. When the internet disappears, it is not only convenience that is lost, but also the ability to coordinate: it becomes impossible to quickly gather people, difficult to spread information, and

hard even to understand what is happening around. In such conditions, any potential protests are weakened from the outset - without communication they are harder to organize, and then the usual scenario follows: dispersal, detentions, and demonstrative criminal cases as a signal

to others. At the same time, “white lists” are introduced: government services, some banks, and selected platforms continue to operate, while the rest of the network space is effectively shut down. As a result, people find themselves in a highly restricted information

environment where access to services and communication depends on decisions from above. A separate blow is dealt to the economy, primarily to small businesses. Large companies usually have backup channels and infrastructure that allow them to survive such disruptions, whereas

small businesses are entirely dependent on mobile internet. When the network disappears, their operations stop: they cannot accept payments, contact customers, process orders, or even determine where employees are. At the same time, no one compensates for losses because the state

has removed responsibility from operators in advance. Ordinary people face the same issues: it becomes impossible to pay for purchases, transport and navigation stop working, taxis cannot be called, medicines cannot be bought, and it becomes impossible to contact relatives.

Moscow has long positioned itself as an advanced digital capital - with convenient services, total digitalization, and one of the most developed online banking systems in the world. But this system has always had one key feature: all of this infrastructure has been under constant

control by the FSB. And during shutdowns, this becomes especially visible - everything that seemed like convenience stops working instantly. People are forced to return to cash, look for alternatives, even resorting to paper maps for navigation. The Kremlin’s goal is not comfort,

but controllability. The fewer opportunities there are for communication and coordination, the easier it is to control the situation. War in this logic becomes a universal explanation, but if one looks at the timeline, it becomes clear that the system itself was created long

before these events, and what is happening today is its full implementation. None of this is a surprise, but a logical continuation of the system that Vladimir Putin has been building for years. Internet shutdowns are not a bug, but a feature: the infrastructure of control was

created in advance, systematically, through laws, equipment, and the expansion of powers of the security services. The authorities need total control over society - over communication, information, and the ability to coordinate - and they have been moving toward this long before

the war. The war has only accelerated the process and provided a convenient justification for any new restrictions. At the same time, many people, especially in Moscow, continue to perceive what is happening as a temporary anomaly, although in reality it is a gradual tightening

of control. Going forward, this control will only increase. Yes, there will be bursts of discontent, local protests, emotional messages in those rare moments when communication becomes available, but overall society will adapt and accept the new rules - not for the first time.

And the main conclusion is quite simple: the internet in its previous form will not return to Russia. It is no longer seen as a regular service - it is a tool that can be switched on and off depending on the needs and objectives of the authorities.