The more I think about the new #Qatar v #UAE case at the #ICJ, the more I think #Qatar's submission of an inter-State communication to the #CERD Committee in May 2018 raises a serious obstacle to establishing the ICJ's jurisdiction pursuant to CERD article 22. 1/
Recall that #CERD art 22 provides for #ICJ jurisdiction only when the dispute "is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention". In its Application, #Qatar asserts that its effort to negotiate a settlement with #UAE has failed. 2/
#Qatar is probably right that the two preconditions in article 22 are alternative, not cumulative. A state likely does not need to show that bilateral negotiations AND the procedures laid out in CERD arts 11-13 have failed before it can unilaterally trigger #ICJ jurisdiction. 3/
Qatar cites the 2011 joint dissent by five judges in the Georgia v Russia case (another #CERD dispute) which argued persuasively that the art 22 preconditions are not cumulative (an issue not reached in the Court's judgment). See paras 39-47 here: icj-cij.org/files/case-rel…. 4/
But the fact that going through the detailed procedures provided for in CERD arts 11-13 is not compulsory is a different issue from what effect that procedure has--once it has been initiated by a State--on the requirements to establish ICJ jurisdiction under CERD art 22. 5/
For good background on the inter-State communication procedure under CERD arts 11-13, see this @ejiltalk post by David Keane from April 2018 (relating to Palestine's invocation of the procedure against Israel): ejiltalk.org/icerd-and-pale…. #Qatar#UAE 6/
It is entirely possible that the #ICJ will find that because #Qatar has voluntarily begun an inter-State communication procedure against #UAE under CERD art 11, the requirements to establish jurisdiction under art 22 remain unmet--meaning, the case cannot proceed at the ICJ. 7/
In essence, #Qatar's decision to invoke the #CERD art 11 procedure against #UAE could be seen by the Court to mean that, in substance, negotiations directed at a settlement have not yet gone "as far as possible", which is really what the preconditions in art 22 are all about. END
And thank you to @s_starrenburg for provoking me to think about this more carefully.
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There’s a lot of buzz about announced plans by Australia, Canada, Germany & Netherlands to jointly sue #Afghanistan at the International Court of Justice (@CIJ_ICJ) for alleged violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman (#CEDAW).
As far as I know, this would mark only the second time that a state has sought to base ICJ jurisdiction on CEDAW art 29. But the @guardian piece about the announcement appears to be a bit mixed up about how this will work. theguardian.com/world/2024/sep…
CEDAW art 29 requires the state bringing a case about a CEDAW dispute to first attempt to settle the dispute by negotiation. If negotiations fail, that state must request ad hoc arbitration (not by the ICJ). This triggers the six-month period referred to in the article.
This @BBCNews piece addresses recent confusion about the term ‘plausibility’ in ICJ decisions: . It mostly gets this right; the ICJ refers formally to plausibility of 'rights’ rather than ‘claims’. But there is some lingering confusion here. 1/8bbc.com/news/articles/…
The article discusses a debate within the UK about whether the ICJ's January order—in which the ICJ found the rights at issue to be plausible AND a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to those rights—meant it was incorrect to refer to a ‘plausible risk of genocide’. 2/8
The article describes this as a debate about whether the ICJ ‘was convinced there was a risk of that happening’. But is THAT really what the debate was about? The January order made it very clear that the ICJ saw a real risk of Genocide Convention violations *going forward*. 3/8
South Africa returns to the #ICJ once again seeking urgent provisional measures against #Israel. The request asks the ICJ to order Israel to immediately withdraw and cease the offensive in Rafah and relinquish control of the Rafah & Kerem Shalom crossings to allow in aid. 1/14
Very strong language: SA describes the #Rafah assault as ‘killing the Palestinian people of Gaza, while Israel is simultaneously starving them, and deliberately denying them humanitarian aid and the basic necessities of life’ (¶19). 2/14
The focus of the request is on how new facts (namely the Rafah assault & shutting down humanitarian aid entry points) amounts to a new urgent risk of irreparable prejudice harm to the rights at issue in the case. 3/14
Re Judge Donoghue's @BBCHARDtalk interview: I realize this won't satisfy many people, but there is a difference between saying (1) that the ICJ did not decide that claims of genocide are plausible (what she said) and (2) that the Court decided that such claims are NOT plausible.
The ICJ did NOT reject South Africa's genocide claims or declare than implausible (this is consistent with Judge Donoghue's remarks). One could instead think about this (i.e., plausibility of the *claim*) as a question the Court did not need to decide in granting interim relief.
What gets lost is that the ICJ found a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the plausible rights of Palestinians in Gaza. This is forward looking. This can be reasonably construed as a finding that S. Africa established a plausible risk of genocide *going forward*.
Having now had the chance to read the Day 2 transcript in #Nicaragua v #Germany, I think Nicaragua may come up empty at the #ICJ. Not because the law means that Nicaragua’s claims are fundamentally flawed or inadmissible, but because the facts, it appears, are on Germany’s side.
Germany’s argument on prima facie jurisdiction (plus Monetary Gold) was not wholly convincing. The key difference b/w claims based on existence of a serious risk of IHL violations/genocide versus claims requiring prior establishment of violations was too easily brushed aside.
That said, I would not discount Germany’s arguments about Nicaragua’s alleged failure to have established the existence of a dispute prior to bringing the case. This case may (unhelpfully?) demonstrate why the dispute requirement (which I strongly dislike) has some merit.
In response to #SouthAfrica’s request of 6 March 2024 & the deteriorating situation in #Gaza, the #ICJ has modified the provisional measures that it indicated against #Israel on 26 January. Here are some key points and observations on the decision and the separate opinions.🧵1/20
What has the ICJ ordered Israel to do? By unanimous vote, the Court directed Israel to take all necessary and effective measures to ensure unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed aid and basic services, including by increasing the number of land crossing points. 2/20
By 15-1, the Court ordered Israel to ensure that its military does not commit acts which violate the rights of Palestinians in Gaza as a protected group under the Genocide Convention, including by preventing delivery of humanitarian aid. 3/20