First two days of #Iran v US hearings at the #ICJ were very interesting. The case gives the Court an opportunity to address key questions about the "plausibility" standard for provisional measures and the nature of irreparable harm. I have a few more questions. #IranUS
1. Is it the US position that the exclusion under Art XX(1)(d) of the 1955 Treaty of Amity (which says the treaty does not preclude measures necessary to protect essential security interests) is entirely self-judging and beyond the scope of judicial review? #IranUS
2. The US argues #JCPOA has its own dispute settlement mechanism, thus precluding an #ICJ case. How does JCPOA do that? The JCPOA text describes a non-mandatory procedure that a party "could" invoke in the event of a disagreement. Nothing expressly precludes an ICJ case.
3. On that note, did the US go through the #JCPOA dispute settlement procedures before withdrawing & reimposing sanctions? If not, why is #Iran bound to use the JCPOA procedure rather than availing itself of the ICJ pursuant to the Treaty of Amity? Just some questions to ponder.
One final note: The US seems to have seen itself as vulnerable on the argument that sanctions could interfere with medical care, giving rise to a stronger basis for #Iran to claim irreparable harm. The US is wisely trying to nip that in the bud with a unilateral undertaking. END
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Re Judge Donoghue's @BBCHARDtalk interview: I realize this won't satisfy many people, but there is a difference between saying (1) that the ICJ did not decide that claims of genocide are plausible (what she said) and (2) that the Court decided that such claims are NOT plausible.
The ICJ did NOT reject South Africa's genocide claims or declare than implausible (this is consistent with Judge Donoghue's remarks). One could instead think about this (i.e., plausibility of the *claim*) as a question the Court did not need to decide in granting interim relief.
What gets lost is that the ICJ found a real & imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the plausible rights of Palestinians in Gaza. This is forward looking. This can be reasonably construed as a finding that S. Africa established a plausible risk of genocide *going forward*.
Having now had the chance to read the Day 2 transcript in #Nicaragua v #Germany, I think Nicaragua may come up empty at the #ICJ. Not because the law means that Nicaragua’s claims are fundamentally flawed or inadmissible, but because the facts, it appears, are on Germany’s side.
Germany’s argument on prima facie jurisdiction (plus Monetary Gold) was not wholly convincing. The key difference b/w claims based on existence of a serious risk of IHL violations/genocide versus claims requiring prior establishment of violations was too easily brushed aside.
That said, I would not discount Germany’s arguments about Nicaragua’s alleged failure to have established the existence of a dispute prior to bringing the case. This case may (unhelpfully?) demonstrate why the dispute requirement (which I strongly dislike) has some merit.
In response to #SouthAfrica’s request of 6 March 2024 & the deteriorating situation in #Gaza, the #ICJ has modified the provisional measures that it indicated against #Israel on 26 January. Here are some key points and observations on the decision and the separate opinions.🧵1/20
What has the ICJ ordered Israel to do? By unanimous vote, the Court directed Israel to take all necessary and effective measures to ensure unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed aid and basic services, including by increasing the number of land crossing points. 2/20
By 15-1, the Court ordered Israel to ensure that its military does not commit acts which violate the rights of Palestinians in Gaza as a protected group under the Genocide Convention, including by preventing delivery of humanitarian aid. 3/20
The #ICJ will issue its decision on #SouthAfrica’s request for provisional measures against #Israel starting at 1 pm today in The Hague. If you are watching the live feed at UN Web TV (), here are some key points to look out for. 🧵tinyurl.com/5n6m94px
Preliminary point: The ICJ will not make any determination today about whether Israel’s actions in #Gaza amount to genocide. This is a question for the merits phase. This decision is about protecting the rights at issue while the case is pending.
First, has SA met the threshold test for the ICJ to issue provisional measures (PMs)? Points of interest: 1. Has South Africa established that a bilateral dispute about the Genocide Convention existed between it and Israel prior to filing the case? This goes to jurisdiction.
From a legal perspective, this part of Vaughan Lowe's intervention on behalf of South Africa is absolutely essential to anticipating and addressing the core of the arguments we can expect to see from Israel tomorrow.
Making important points here about why South Africa cannot ask the ICJ to direct PMs at Hamas, and highlighting the fact that Israel's claim that it does everything it can to abide by IHL & spare civilians is undermined by Israel's actual actions, which tell a different story.
Lowe also makes the argument that the only way to ensure the necessary humanitarian response is a complete suspension of military operations that have the potential to violate the Genocide Convention.
The best way to answer this is by looking at the PMs that South Africa has requested (para 144 of the request). In many respects, these requests track the PMs requested in the case against #Myanmar. In that case, the #ICJ granted some of the requested PMs but rejected others. 1/9
SA seeks PMs directing Israel: to suspend military ops in #Gaza (1, 2, 3); abide by its obligations under the #GenocideConvention (4, 6); and prevent expulsion/forced displacement, deprivation of food/water/humanitarian aid, and ‘destruction of Palestinian life’ in Gaza (5). 2/9
SA also asks the ICJ to direct Israel: to prevent destruction of evidence, including by not denying access to fact-finding missions (7); to submit periodic reports on measures taken to implement the PMs (8); and to refrain from acts which might aggravate the dispute (9). 3/9