1/9 This by @JesseLReynolds got the interpretation ball rolling, and sees the collapse of negotiations at #UNEA4 on #geoengineering as primarily a result of under-informed states, green advocacy groups and limited political capital. I disagree on some points:
2/9 Firstly the knowledge-gap thesis is doubtful as the main protagonist countries were not, imo, at beginning of a steep learning curve. They knew their stuff. They did, however, have very different interpretations of the epistemic politics of geoengineering.
3/9 Secondly, it did also not seem the case that the key actors lacked incentives to spend political capital on this. Both sides spent a lot of capital on it, one side blocking, another promoting. Key conflict: a UNEA study with a view to future governance - or no study.
(Indifference was not the problem!). 4/9 Third, the balance of feeling of supporters was that the resolution would be a step towards future governance, so even if they were under green influence, they would not want to administer 'poison pills' to kill deal, risking free-for-all
5/9 How much influence did anti-geo groups have on events? The original wording was none of their work. Others far more central. The Precautionary Principle is a longstanding peg in EU environmental policy. They weren't at the table.
6/9 The US argument rested on a central claim: that the IPCC was planning a thorough assessment. This does not stack up to scrutiny. Only 8 of roughly 500 bullets in the AR6 remit are geo-related (=25pages?). In any case US/Saudi questioned IPCCs work in Katowice.
7/9 Supporters wanted more systematic and earlier study, and not just climate-science. UNEA provides a broader environmental view and can aid countries without large research capacity. Opponents preferred narrower, later and less systematic study.
8/9 Did it flounder because states lacked incentives? Or because states incentives and interests clashed? Did it flounder because of green groups - or grey governments? Make up your mind, but I know where I think the balance of evidence points.
9/9 .@mclaren_erc lists the important factors dividing opinion here:
Man skal være en meget stor retoriker - og det er Krasnik bestemt normalt - for a slippe afsted med denne leder om Gaza og retssagen. Men det mislykkes. En tråd 🧵
Vi skal forstå: at anklage Israel for folkemord skubber freden længere væk fordi det "vækker historiske traumer og stærke følelser" - hos Israelere. Det er deres følelser Krasnik kærere sig om, forstås. De skal ikke konfronteres i retten, det er bare 'spektakulært' - et stunt.
Vi i vesten har de sidste 3 måneder ellers forsøgt med den søde tilgang - gået med at sende dem flere våben, penge og holdt hånden over dem i FN, imens de har ifølge Krasnik dræbt "for alt for mange civile" og nok sikkert begået krigsforbydelser og forbrydelser mod menneskeden.
By coincidence, I read this piece on #geoengineering as 'the only solution' to climate injustice, just after picking up James C. Scott's 'Seeing Like a State' which analyses why some well-intentioned megaprojects have turned really effing lethal. /Thread. wired.com/story/geoengin…
Scott's classic asks why some well-intentioned schemes to improve the human condition have historically failed badly, killing or ruining countless lives ("fiasco" is too lighthearted a word he says). He identifies 4 necessary elements for worthy-but-deadly megaprojects. Here goes
1. Simplificatory schemas to render nature & society 'legible' for bureaucratic & commercial operations. 'Seeing' like this doesn't and isn't supposed to reveal the actual object, "only that slice of [it] that interested the official observer". The rest (most) becomes 'invisible'
What do 'pandemic politics' suggest about the political environment solar geoengineering might face?
A new comment in Communications Earth and Environment by @hollyjeanbuck@Oliver_Geden Masa Sugayama and myself offers 5 lessons. See Holly's thread 👇
+ here's my summary: /1
We posit "If the concept of stratospheric aerosol injection leaves the realm of modeling, it will be thrust into a multi-societal science–media-policy interface that operates in ways not currently anticipated—at least not in idealized model simulations/ governance scenarios". /2
Five observations: 1. Simple metrics (like R0 or global average temperature) cut through politically, but can gain a life of their own and obscure wider, diverse societal aims and values. /3
I agree that techno determinism is silly. On the other hand, total fungibility re the societal effects of a technology is also non-credible. The Q is what social and technical futures arise/are likely to be created by a particular tech in a particular social configuration.
A global solar manipulation system with single point delivery (if it were possible) is unlikely to facilitate a more decentralised set of power relations globally. In my view it's also not likely to be created without a concomitant concentration of geopower.
I agree the original binary of compatible/incompatible is
not helpful but in the blog the concept of democracy isn't defined either. If we think democracy is fundamentally about distributing power, then there is a case to say that certain SRM methods don't really excel at it
Thread/ 1 One of the risks of game theoretic models of policy dilemmas is translation back to real world. Firstly, model set-ups claim to be 'simplification' of a target system but this assumes we know the system's basic form already. Catch-22...
3/ Second, assuming this leap of faith (abstraction=simplification of actual real world) exacerbates already substantial risk of slippage IMO, from 'this model world works like this' to 'the target real world works like this'. I think this is an example of such slippage
There is plenty of racism in Western society and academia in general. More's the pity that a poorly crafted article singling out of Securitization Theory as 'avowedly conservative' (WTF?), anti-black and in the service of white supremacy was published in SD. Bad error.
From Buzan & Wæver's short reply in SD: "if one is interested in ..racism in relation to the formation of securitization theory, the obvious source to examine would be Wæver et al. (1993).(..) This is all about the risks involved in European security turning towards security..
policies on behalf of ‘identities’ and against supranational integration, other national and ethnic identities, and migrants. The explicit formulation of securitization theory grew out of its largely implicit role in this book, which deals with racism in several chapters."