As is typical, NYPD responds to any calls for transparency or accountability by saying they will make it harder for them to catch terrorists. But, we’re not talking about terrorists, we’re talking about protesters.
NYPD says info in the public square isn’t entitled to privacy protection. But Handschu places limits on social media monitoring—even on public websites. NYPD can conduct general topical research, but they can’t run online searches for protesters’ names or individual identifiers.
Just because information is available to the public doesn’t give police free reign to collect it. For example, the Supreme Court held that police need a warrant to track a person’s public movements using a GPS device. supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf…
A public records suit revealed NYPD stored photos and Twitter posts of BLM protesters for >4 years. This raises serious concerns about compliance with the Handschu Guidelines. cc @georgejoseph94theappeal.org/years-after-pr…
A separate @NYCLU suit asked for records about NYPD’s use of Stingrays to interfere with #BLM protesters’ ability to use their phones. A judge rejected NYPD's non-response, and ordered them to confirm or deny whether any records exist. cc @aliwinstonnytimes.com/2019/01/14/nyr…
Deputy Commissioner Miller says NYPD only uses Stingrays to find phones, not to listen to conversations, read texts or emails, or download other data. But some devices can do just that. And just to find 1 phone, Stingrays trick every cell in its radius to give up identifying info
During a protest, that could mean dozens of phones. What does NYPD do with data from bystander phones? The public should know what technologies NYPD uses, and what privacy protections are in place.
The truth is, NYPD can’t keep its tools secret forever. The public already knows NYPD uses everything from Stingrays and license plate readers to social media monitoring software and predictive policing algorithms.
Meanwhile, potential criminals and terrorists will be hard pressed to completely abandon the use of cell phones, modern transportation, or the Internet. Even after the Wiretap Act, criminals used phones – and cops caught them.
Ultimately, Deputy Commissioner Miller is asking the public to simply trust that the NYPD is following the law. He says that civil liberties groups unfairly paint NYPD as a shadowy org, and that we sow public mistrust. But NYPD's actions speak for themselves.
Just looking at recent history, NYPD engaged in unconstitutional surveillance of Muslims and spied on protesters during the RNC Convention, throughout Occupy Wall Street, and during #BlackLivesMatter marches. Protesters have every right to worry that they’re being watched.
Someone must watch the watchmen. The #POSTAct's basic transparency & accountability measures would help restore public trust. Instead of responding to lawsuits and news scandals, the NYPD would have upfront conversations about its tools and protections for New Yorkers’ privacy.
It’s time for the City Council to step in. @DRichards13 should schedule a new hearing for the #POSTAct. The bill carefully balances the need for democratic oversight and transparency with NYPD’s need for operational secrecy. @Vanessalgibson@bradlander@JumaaneWilliams
Cities across the country from Oakland CA to Somerville MA have already passed even stronger police accountability measures. New Yorkers deserve public oversight of policing done in their name. #CCOPS, cc @b_haddy, @ACLU, @EFF, @accessnowaclu.org/issues/privacy…
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After the death of a local teen, grieving classmates wore lanyards, said his name, & filmed music videos. NYPD labeled them a gang.
Today, 31 organizations and academics call on the NYPD Inspector General to audit the NYPD's gang database. brennancenter.org/our-work/resea…
We believe the gang database’s vague and subjective standards make it unreliable as an investigative tool and result in ongoing discrimination against Black and Latinx New Yorkers. slate.com/technology/202…
The racial bias of the gang database is uncontested: NYPD testified it is 97.7% Black or Latino.
Under the guise of gang policing, the NYPD is continuing the same discriminatory policing that fueled their illegal stop-and-frisk program. theintercept.com/2019/06/28/nyp…
The basics: ALPRs use cameras and software to scan the plates of every car that passes by. They can log the time and date, GPS coordinates, and pictures of the car. Some versions can even snap pictures of a car’s occupants and create unique vehicle IDs. theintercept.com/2019/07/09/sur…
In 1 week, the LAPD scanned more than 320 mil plates. Private companies like Vigilant Solutions sell cops (and ICE) access to their private database of billions of scans, while Flock Safety sells ALPRs to paranoid homeowners and lets them share with police cnet.com/news/license-p…
THREAD: I analyzed Citizen's contact tracing app when they were pitching it to NYC. Unsurprisingly, its approach to privacy is terrible, continues to encourage paranoia-as-a-service, and has wide latitude for law enforcement access.
This app collects A LOT of personal information, including location data, copies of gov-ID, COVID-19 diagnosis information, and undefined “health information.” They only commit to deleting Bluetooth data & gov-id in 30 days. Nothing else is subject to any regular deletion policy.
Location data is hard to anonymize, but Citizen isn't really interested that. They'll show you a map that makes it easy to re-identify a sick person.
This creates a dangerous opportunity for exposing people’s identities and subjecting them to online/offline harassment.
Great piece, featuring very important points raised by leading thinkers in this space.
I would raise a few more, with a focus on the US and its marginalized communities: slate.com/technology/202…
1) Most GIFCT removals are for "glorification." That can capture a broad swath of content, incl. general sympathies with a group or debate about its grievances.
If that sounds fine, consider your own support for BLM or antifa, and our gov's attempt to label them as terrorists.
2) The closed-door involvement of the US government in the GIFCT is worrying, not comforting.
Consider the FBI's investigation of the fictional Black Identity Extremist movement, and its current interrogation of protestors for connections to antifa. theintercept.com/2020/06/04/fbi…
Twitter has policies that prohibit platform manipulation, violence, terrorism, harassment, and hateful conduct. But today's actions announce a number of ad-hoc decisions that introduce new vaguely defined terms. Why? Here's a short analysis:
There are existing rules against platform manipulation, which covers things like spam, coordinated activity, and multiple accounts. But Twitter made these removals under a new prohibition against "coordinated harmful activity." What does this term mean? What's different?
Thread on DHS' new PIA for expanding the Terrorist Screening Database to include ppl suspected of association w/"Transnational Organization Crime."
Serious concerns w/vague definitions, bad data, & wide info-sharing; Latinos are likely the most at risk. dhs.gov/sites/default/…
Last year, a federal judge ruled that the terrorist screening database violated the rights of Americans that were on the list. Rather than scale back, this PIA covers an expansion to track even more people. Many of the same concerns apply. nytimes.com/2019/09/04/us/…
The PIA acknowledges that this new category goes beyond the initial purpose of the watchlist (terrorism). But because the President said this group of people is ALSO a national security threat, it's fine? 🤷🏽♂️