Big news (IMO) for SCS watchers: after a couple of years of (AFAIK) no new Google Earth SCS island imagery updates, we just got a bunch of new material (up to 12/2018) for the PRC island bases, Scarborough Shoal, Woody Island, etc. For starters, here's Subi Reef as of 12/2018.
To see this imagery, you'll need the desktop Google Earth app, as Google Maps is still showing what I think was the latest previous imagery, 4/2016 (1st image). With the desktop app, you can use the date slider bar to pull up the latest stuff - what I've found is through 12/2018.
Here's a great new image of the much-discussed retractable roof buildings, along with a point air-defense tower (left).
Here's a shot of a whole bunch of smaller (fighter-size) and larger hangars, as well as other support structures then (2016) and now (12/2018).
Back to where it all started - here's the original Subi Reef structure in 2015, 2016, and 2018.
Here's a great shot of Subi's now-buried hardened underground fuel/water tanks, shown in 2016 and then 2018.
Off to Mischief Reef: here it is in 4/2016 and then 12/2018.
Another then-and-now for hardened fuel and water tanks, this time at Mischief Reef. Look at the scale - that array of tanks is thousands of feet long.
More retractable-roof buildings and air defense towers on Mischief Reef. But hey, these are mostly civilian-supporting facilities, right? 🤨
Here's a set of concrete pads sized for what I imagine will be something like a SAM battery or the like. And what-do-you-know, there are military vehicles parked on them. Any guesses as to what they might be?
Off to Fiery Cross Reef: here it is in 2016 and then 2018.
Here's the site of an antenna farm, air defense tower, and an unknown taller building with a parking ramp (there's one of these on each island), in 2016/2018.
And more of the like, same island.
Small and large hangars, support buildings, etc., on Fiery Cross in 2016 and then 2018.
Multi-story barracks, what I'm guessing are senior officer quarters (with a recreational pool, lower left), etc., then and now.
And folks, anyone can go look at this. Just download Google Earth and take a look, for free. You're welcome. 😁 google.com/earth/versions/
As for the speculation that, hey, maybe China removed the SAM batteries that they deployed to Woody Island... cnn.com/2018/06/06/asi…
...well, it looks like they still have SOMETHING under tarps on that same beach. I'd put my money on something other than beach chairs, Hobie cats, etc. (imagery dtd 11/12/2018)
And where Woody Island used to have under-construction facilities (2016) it now (2018) looks like they're hardened, buried tanks, storage buildings, etc.
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"
I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is... news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".
But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.
Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷♂️
Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.
Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷♂️
We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.
We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).
While US BMD could have something to do with it, I think there's more to it: Xi has said China will have a "world-class" military, and this is probably part of that.
Also, a robust nuclear force is insurance against a US nuclear response to large-scale PRC conventional strikes.
First, the report provides a section on PLARF force structure, with an estimate ICBM brigades have 6-12 launchers, other brigades 24-48—a detail I don't recall from previous reports.
Also, it details there's probably different C2 for nuclear vs. conventional ops, also new AFAIK.
The report also reveals the DF-21C MRBM is on its way out, with no more dedicated brigades operating it (I assume there are still DF-21D anti-ship brigades?).
Ok, here we go: some thoughts on the 2024 DoD China Military Power report, or CMPR, which was released yesterday (finally!).
I'll focus on updates I thought were interesting/consequential - areas new or different from last year's report.
(part 1)
In general, I'd say the report has few surprises this year (but one significant one, detailed in the next installment).
The PLA continues on its trajectory of significant improvements in reach and capability, with no signs of slowing down.
For comparisons between the 2024 and 2023 reports, this year's report will be on the left, last year's on the right.
First up: total numbers. The PLA remains the largest active-duty military in the world, though some numbers dropped a bit due to a change in counting methods.
1. Everyone involved in reporting this clearly understands that nuclear submarines had not—yet—been built in Wuhan, and that this was a new development: a significant expansion of nuclear submarine production outside of Huludao.
1. cont'd: rumors of a new "auxiliary nuclear powerplant for electricity generation for fitting into conventional submarine designs" (like the subs they've been building at Wuhan) have been circulating for years, so not that surprising of a development.cimsec.org/pla-navys-plan…
2. Everyone also understands the Yangtze is shallow, which is why for years the subs being built there have been taken downriver on barges. The new boat is only ~10% longer than previous classes, nothing like the size of PRC SSNs, so no reason to think it couldn't be so also.