Big news (IMO) for SCS watchers: after a couple of years of (AFAIK) no new Google Earth SCS island imagery updates, we just got a bunch of new material (up to 12/2018) for the PRC island bases, Scarborough Shoal, Woody Island, etc. For starters, here's Subi Reef as of 12/2018.
To see this imagery, you'll need the desktop Google Earth app, as Google Maps is still showing what I think was the latest previous imagery, 4/2016 (1st image). With the desktop app, you can use the date slider bar to pull up the latest stuff - what I've found is through 12/2018.
Here's a great new image of the much-discussed retractable roof buildings, along with a point air-defense tower (left).
Here's a shot of a whole bunch of smaller (fighter-size) and larger hangars, as well as other support structures then (2016) and now (12/2018).
Back to where it all started - here's the original Subi Reef structure in 2015, 2016, and 2018.
Here's a great shot of Subi's now-buried hardened underground fuel/water tanks, shown in 2016 and then 2018.
Off to Mischief Reef: here it is in 4/2016 and then 12/2018.
Another then-and-now for hardened fuel and water tanks, this time at Mischief Reef. Look at the scale - that array of tanks is thousands of feet long.
More retractable-roof buildings and air defense towers on Mischief Reef. But hey, these are mostly civilian-supporting facilities, right? 🤨
Here's a set of concrete pads sized for what I imagine will be something like a SAM battery or the like. And what-do-you-know, there are military vehicles parked on them. Any guesses as to what they might be?
Off to Fiery Cross Reef: here it is in 2016 and then 2018.
Here's the site of an antenna farm, air defense tower, and an unknown taller building with a parking ramp (there's one of these on each island), in 2016/2018.
And more of the like, same island.
Small and large hangars, support buildings, etc., on Fiery Cross in 2016 and then 2018.
Multi-story barracks, what I'm guessing are senior officer quarters (with a recreational pool, lower left), etc., then and now.
And folks, anyone can go look at this. Just download Google Earth and take a look, for free. You're welcome. 😁 google.com/earth/versions/
As for the speculation that, hey, maybe China removed the SAM batteries that they deployed to Woody Island... cnn.com/2018/06/06/asi…
...well, it looks like they still have SOMETHING under tarps on that same beach. I'd put my money on something other than beach chairs, Hobie cats, etc. (imagery dtd 11/12/2018)
And where Woody Island used to have under-construction facilities (2016) it now (2018) looks like they're hardened, buried tanks, storage buildings, etc.
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.
Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos). rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
Anyway, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization is mostly to bolster CCP credibility
- over the PLA’s history it's prioritized political loyalty & CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning elevate a broader array of threats versus remote possibility of war w/ China
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.
First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with China
It will surprise no one who follows me that, while some of his points on the history of the PLA and CCP are valid, I disagree with his larger overall conclusion: that the threat of military aggression from the PLA in the future is remote due to a lack of combat readiness.
One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.
What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2…
Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).
They’ll either pass ahead or behind.
However, if the other vessel/plane stays in the same spot in your field of view, but is just getting bigger, then you have a problem - CBDR.
Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.
Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".
I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024:
Next, let's zoom in, starting with #1 above.
Since I know of no designation for this type of vessel, I'm going to make one up: the T-LPT (i.e., civilian-crewed auxiliary landing platform—transfer). And I'll call this one the Type 1.
I'm pleased to announce the release of a new report I co-authored with @timothyawalton for @HudsonInstitute titled Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific.
Some folks may recall a preliminary assessment I posted in 2023 on this topic, as I came to realize that China appeared to be engaged in a nationwide, robust effort to harden its air bases - and that the US was doing relatively little in this area.
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"
I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is... news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".
But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.
Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷♂️