#ISIS releases 12th episode in its allegiance renewal series - latest from militants in Yemen. I'm pretty sure this is the biggest IS series on a given theme. Even during its media heyday when IS used to release coordinated vids on a subject, there didn't used to be that many
Similar to other episodes in the series, while the latest seeks to strike a tone of defiance in the face of hardships, it carries a clear admission of territorial losses and overall weakness, which the group spins as temporary and a test from God.
Unsurprisingly, in the video IS takes a swipe at its rival in Yemen AQAP, calling them 'Jews of Jihad'.
IS set up shop in Yemen in Nov 2014, sparking years of cold war with AQAP. This changed in Jul 2018 when the two finally locked horns in Bayda. Matters came to a head in Mar 2019 when the two groups started carrying out deadly attacks on each other. Tit-for-tat attacks continue
1/ The AQAP statement of 20 Oct mourning the killing of of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is not the first from al-Qaeda to lament the death of a Hamas leader, but the first to openly weigh in on the jihadist/Islamist ideological divisions over Hamas
2/ The important Yemen branch urged jihadists/Islamists to set aside their reservations about Hamas, which it did not name, and come together in support of the Palestinian cause. It expressed its "astonishment" and disappointment that "some" would not even offer words of support due to their ideological differences with Hamas. Al-Qaeda's South Asia branch (AQIS) also issued condolences over Sinwar and mentioned Hamas by name
3/ It remains to be seen if the new AQAP message will calm divisions between pragmatic and hardline jihadists, or cause a further rift. In April, an al-Qaeda message of condolences to Ismail Haniyeh over the death of some of his family members triggered a strong backlash against al-Qaeda by some of its own supporters
1/ Interesting editorial in IS’s weekly paper al-Naba. To mark the start of new Hijri/Islamic year 1446 (started on 7 Jul), IS focuses on the importance of the purity of “intentions” and “sincerity” in actions, away from vanity and efforts to gain recognition and publicity. The group uses this segue into two key messages:
2/ The first says that although it’s important to avoid vanity in jihadist action (i.e. done for credit or fame), it is nevertheless important to document actions through wills and messages (e.g. pledge to IS or a message or SM post about motive) in certain circumstances so the purpose of the action is clear and it can inspire others. Last week the editorial praised lone actors inspired by IS who had left behind pledges to the group
3/ The second message appeared to be a dig at/warning to IS supporters, who in recent months have been at each other’s throats over a number of issues. The new editorial urges them to be sincere in their efforts, avoid arrogance and criticises actions (online support, productions, campaigns) done mainly for the sake of gaining “likes and viewings”
🧵Today, 29 Jun, marks the 10th anniversary of IS’s “caliphate” declaration. The group’s leadership celebrated the date in Mar (that’s where it fell in Hijri calendar), boasting that despite past setbacks, today IS was “growing stronger and expanding”, and called for recruits to its branches. In this thread I’ll summarise key takeaways from our in-depth analysis of IS activity in the first half of 2024:
1/ There was a notable increase in IS attacks in the first half of 2024, which included deadly attacks in Iran (3 Jan), Russia (22 Mar) and Turkey (28 Jan). There was also a surge in IS activity in Syria, Mozambique and DR Congo. This followed a year (2023) full of setbacks for IS as its attack figures plummeted, showing IS’s ability to adapt and endure (graph below shows quarterly figures, taken from IS's own claims of activity)
2/ In Syria this year, IS has claimed numerous deadly attacks on government forces, esp in the desert-like area known as the Badia. The recurrent ambushes prompted the Syrian gov, with the help of Russian air force, to launch a military campaign against IS in the desert this month. Last year IS was more secretive about its activity in Syria, failing to claim or belatedly claiming some attacks. We’ve noticed this behaviour creep back in the past month, as IS has been tight-lipped about some attacks it’s been widely blamed for
🧵Sharing key points as I listen to IS leadership msg, with little or no insight at this point:
1/ marks 10th anniversary of its "caliphate" declaration (Ramadan of 2014, which that year fell on 29 Jun). Says despite IS was left for dead in Iraq & Syria (2017, 2019), it expanded to Africa & other places - "growing stronger & expanding" still
2/ urges IS members/militants to stay united and obey their leadership and stay true to their "bay'ah" pledge, and not be misled by lies or distortions (hint of possible divisions or disillusionment among some?)
1/ Important to note that contrary to some reports by media outlets saying that IS’s Afghanistan-focused "Khorasan Province" branch (ISKP or ISIS-K) claimed responsibility for the Moscow attack, IS has NOT claimed the attack in the name of that particular branch, at least not yet
2/ The only claim that has come out so far is a brief one by IS’s official news outlet Amaq. In that claim, similar to most of Amaq’s style of reporting, no IS branch or regional affiliates were mentioned. Amaq simply attributed the attack to “soldiers of the Islamic State”
I normally don't like to share pics of IS's statements, but felt it's important to do so (above) to clarify that no branch was mentioned in that claim
The new video from #ISIS's Syria branch is very disturbing in terms of the violence, showing dozens of executions of individuals in Syria who allegedly worked for government or Kurdish-led forces (SDF) across the country /1
The video appeared to have two key purposes: to deter anyone from working against IS in Syria, and to prove that the group continues to have capability and reach in the country, despite losing territory and leadership figures /2
In terms of production quality, the video is reminiscent of IS's pre-caliphate products, with limited production sophistication. Even the use of the infamous IS nashid Salil al-Sawarim harks back to the early days of IS propaganda and scenes of drive-by shootings /3