#ISIS releases 12th episode in its allegiance renewal series - latest from militants in Yemen. I'm pretty sure this is the biggest IS series on a given theme. Even during its media heyday when IS used to release coordinated vids on a subject, there didn't used to be that many
Similar to other episodes in the series, while the latest seeks to strike a tone of defiance in the face of hardships, it carries a clear admission of territorial losses and overall weakness, which the group spins as temporary and a test from God.
Unsurprisingly, in the video IS takes a swipe at its rival in Yemen AQAP, calling them 'Jews of Jihad'.
IS set up shop in Yemen in Nov 2014, sparking years of cold war with AQAP. This changed in Jul 2018 when the two finally locked horns in Bayda. Matters came to a head in Mar 2019 when the two groups started carrying out deadly attacks on each other. Tit-for-tat attacks continue
🧵Key topics from IS's first leadership message in two years.. 1/ ISIS/IS on 21 Feb released its first leadership message since Mar 2024, covering a wide range of mostly predictable themes. These included calls for jihad against the Syrian government and army, appeals for followers in the West to intensify attacks against "Christians and Jews", calls for sympathisers worldwide to migrate to IS branches, vague and non-committal remarks on IS-linked prisoners in Syria, and now customary tributes to IS's Africa branches, which it said had received foreign fighters.
2/ The 35-min audio msg - whose title can be translated as "Right from wrong is now clear" - was delivered by IS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari, who was rumoured to have been killed in Jul. He opened with greetings from the group's "caliph", Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, to Muslims in general and to IS militants and supporters in particular on the occasion of Ramadan, which he described as a "valuable opportunity" to intensify jihad.
3/ Reflecting IS's ongoing fixation on the new government in Syria - which it loathes given its past rivalry with its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa - the group called on its militants in the country to devote all their efforts to fighting the government and army, describing their members as "apostates". The spokesman said that jihad in Syria had not ended but simply entered a new "chapter".
The spokesman also reached out to the "remnants" of rival Islamist groups in Syria, urging them to defect to IS, in an apparent attempt to exploit the dissatisfaction felt by many hardline Islamists towards al-Sharaa government. It also gloated at al-Qaeda's fate in Syria, saying after al-Qaeda supported al-Sharaa (formerly known as Jolani) against IS, he "stabbed them in the back".
The first and largest part of the message, as well as its title, was devoted to Syria.
🧵#AlHolCamp #Hasakah #ISIS #AlNaba 1/ Unlike its online supporters, who have openly called for militant action and practical assistance in support of women held at al-Hol camp and other IS-linked detainees in eastern Syria, IS, in its first comment on the issue (through its weekly paper al-Naba) adopted a more political and analytical tone and stopped short of issuing any explicit call to action.
It's unclear whether this reflected a deliberate attempt to keep operational guidance discreet.
2/ In the al-Naba editorial, titled "Your Hol and our Hol not alike", IS adopted a tone of glee and vindication towards the SDF, arguing that the Kurdish-led force had been used and discarded by the US. It claimed that Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who IS said currently enjoyed the favour of President Trump, would ultimately meet the same fate.
3/ IS appeared particularly vexed by what it described as celebratory rhetoric from al-Sharaa's supporters, who, according to the group, portrayed the government's takeover of al-Hol as an act of "liberating women and children" from the grips of extremism.
Such framing appeared to strike a sensitive nerve for IS, as it implicitly contrasted the group's inability to free its detained women with claims that a rival force had succeeded where it had failed. This was despite reports that government forces moved quickly to seal the camp and prevent further departures after some women were said to have escaped during the transition in control.
🧵A few key takeaways from JNIM’s (al-Qaeda in the Sahel) slew of Ramadan and Eid images, which we have extensively covered in BBCM reporting:
1/ They reflect JNIM’s ongoing effort to boost, expand and diversify its media offering, drawing on "best practice" from other militant groups, esp its jihadist rival, IS
2/ The Ramadan and Eid images serve multiple purposes. The display of dozens of fighters - often shown worshipping, cooking, or eating together - is a clear show of numbers, force and community. That these activities take place openly and in broad daylight signals a sense of confidence
🧵1/ IS has finally commented on the 1 Jan attack in New Orleans and suggested the action was inspired by IS messaging and incitement, rather than being directly orchestrated by the group. Notably, IS did not indicate any connection between itself and the perpetrator, Shamsud-Din Jabbar, who was shot dead
2/ This IS commentary featured in the editorial of the group's weekly newspaper al-Naba, which was published on 9 Jan. The article was titled, "We [IS] were there!" It echoes a Naba editorial in Jul 2024 in which IS took credit for inspiring a range of attacks in the West and in Russia
3/ Commenting on global speculation about IS's potential involvement in the New Orleans attack, the group said that it does not hastily attribute every attack to itself simply because the perpetrators adhered to its ideology or were inspired by its messaging. The group implied that it adheres to specific "criteria" when deciding whether to claim affiliation with an attack or attacker
🧵On latest IS message about events in Syria, featured in the editorial of the group's weekly publication al-Naba on 12 Dec (and covered in detail, with insight and context in BBCM output: )monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0002y…
1/ IS says it will continue its “jihad” in Syria, claiming the HTS-led Islamist authority was imposed through “infidel” intervention and won’t establish Islamic rule. IS compared HTS to the Taliban in Afghanistan, using similar arguments to justify ongoing attacks there
2/ IS welcomed the release of "Muslim prisoners" from Assad’s jails but didn’t specify if IS members were among them. Online, IS supporters hinted some members may have been freed but warned against sharing sensitive details. Others called for exploiting unrest to target prisons and camps holding IS members in NE Syria
🧵on reports and clips of revenge attacks against alleged former gov/military personnel and "Shabiha" (Assad henchmen) in Syria
1/ On 9 Dec, the HTS-led rebel authority in Damascus issued a decree granting amnesty to military conscripts and foot soldiers not implicated in human rights abuses
2/ This sparked anger among some hardline Islamists in Syria and online, particularly on Telegram. Critics called the stance weak, unfair to victims, incompatible with Sharia, and an attempt to appease the West