🧵1/ IS has finally commented on the 1 Jan attack in New Orleans and suggested the action was inspired by IS messaging and incitement, rather than being directly orchestrated by the group. Notably, IS did not indicate any connection between itself and the perpetrator, Shamsud-Din Jabbar, who was shot dead 2/ This IS commentary featured in the editorial of the group's weekly newspaper al-Naba, which was published on 9 Jan. The article was titled, "We [IS] were there!" It echoes a Naba editorial in Jul 2024 in which IS took credit for inspiring a range of attacks in the West and in Russia

🧵On latest IS message about events in Syria, featured in the editorial of the group's weekly publication al-Naba on 12 Dec (and covered in detail, with insight and context in BBCM output: )monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0002y… 1/ IS says it will continue its “jihad” in Syria, claiming the HTS-led Islamist authority was imposed through “infidel” intervention and won’t establish Islamic rule. IS compared HTS to the Taliban in Afghanistan, using similar arguments to justify ongoing attacks there

🧵on reports and clips of revenge attacks against alleged former gov/military personnel and "Shabiha" (Assad henchmen) in Syria 1/ On 9 Dec, the HTS-led rebel authority in Damascus issued a decree granting amnesty to military conscripts and foot soldiers not implicated in human rights abuses

1/ The current HTS-led rebel offensive in Syria is making waves, not just for its relatively swift territorial gains, but for the relatively widespread support it’s getting among pro-opposition voices. This includes segments of the local population, journalists, activists, clerics, and militants (as far as I can gauge from social media activity and online debates on X's Spaces tool - despite dissenting voices and some critics in pro-opposition spaces) 2/ Over the past years, one of the biggest challenges for the Syrian opposition has been disunity: fragmentation, factionalism, and the involvement of global jihadist groups that severely weakened the revolutionary cause

1/ The HTS-linked Islamist rebel authority in Syria has launched a well-coordinated PR campaign aimed at projecting a sense of professionalism, transparency, and moderation while distancing itself from its jihadist roots. Through official messaging, it has sought to reassure a broad spectrum of key players and populations 2/ Notably, the rebels have made efforts to pacify potential adversaries like Russia and Iraq, emphasising that they mean no harm to these nations and aspire to establish positive future relations with them. This is clearly part of a strategy to diplomatically isolate the Assad government. A similar message was directed at the Kurdish-led SDF forces in Aleppo, urging them to withdraw to the northeast. The rebels assured the Kurds of their respect and described them as an integral part of Syria’s social fabric, underscoring a commitment to inclusivity

1/Rebel groups in northern Syria have announced a new offensive, named "Repelling the Aggression", targeting government forces in western Aleppo. They claim to have already captured a string of villages. There a number of interesting points about this op: 2/ The offensive has been supported by a highly coordinated and well-organised media campaign mostly run by propagandists linked to the Idlib-based militant group HTS

1/ The AQAP statement of 20 Oct mourning the killing of of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is not the first from al-Qaeda to lament the death of a Hamas leader, but the first to openly weigh in on the jihadist/Islamist ideological divisions over Hamas 2/ The important Yemen branch urged jihadists/Islamists to set aside their reservations about Hamas, which it did not name, and come together in support of the Palestinian cause. It expressed its "astonishment" and disappointment that "some" would not even offer words of support due to their ideological differences with Hamas. Al-Qaeda's South Asia branch (AQIS) also issued condolences over Sinwar and mentioned Hamas by name

1/ Interesting editorial in IS’s weekly paper al-Naba. To mark the start of new Hijri/Islamic year 1446 (started on 7 Jul), IS focuses on the importance of the purity of “intentions” and “sincerity” in actions, away from vanity and efforts to gain recognition and publicity. The group uses this segue into two key messages: 2/ The first says that although it’s important to avoid vanity in jihadist action (i.e. done for credit or fame), it is nevertheless important to document actions through wills and messages (e.g. pledge to IS or a message or SM post about motive) in certain circumstances so the purpose of the action is clear and it can inspire others. Last week the editorial praised lone actors inspired by IS who had left behind pledges to the group

🧵Today, 29 Jun, marks the 10th anniversary of IS’s “caliphate” declaration. The group’s leadership celebrated the date in Mar (that’s where it fell in Hijri calendar), boasting that despite past setbacks, today IS was “growing stronger and expanding”, and called for recruits to its branches. In this thread I’ll summarise key takeaways from our in-depth analysis of IS activity in the first half of 2024: 1/ There was a notable increase in IS attacks in the first half of 2024, which included deadly attacks in Iran (3 Jan), Russia (22 Mar) and Turkey (28 Jan). There was also a surge in IS activity in Syria, Mozambique and DR Congo. This followed a year (2023) full of setbacks for IS as its attack figures plummeted, showing IS’s ability to adapt and endure (graph below shows quarterly figures, taken from IS's own claims of activity)

🧵Sharing key points as I listen to IS leadership msg, with little or no insight at this point: 1/ marks 10th anniversary of its "caliphate" declaration (Ramadan of 2014, which that year fell on 29 Jun). Says despite IS was left for dead in Iraq & Syria (2017, 2019), it expanded to Africa & other places - "growing stronger & expanding" still

1/ Important to note that contrary to some reports by media outlets saying that IS’s Afghanistan-focused "Khorasan Province" branch (ISKP or ISIS-K) claimed responsibility for the Moscow attack, IS has NOT claimed the attack in the name of that particular branch, at least not yet 2/ The only claim that has come out so far is a brief one by IS’s official news outlet Amaq. In that claim, similar to most of Amaq’s style of reporting, no IS branch or regional affiliates were mentioned. Amaq simply attributed the attack to “soldiers of the Islamic State”

The new video from #ISIS's Syria branch is very disturbing in terms of the violence, showing dozens of executions of individuals in Syria who allegedly worked for government or Kurdish-led forces (SDF) across the country /1 The video appeared to have two key purposes: to deter anyone from working against IS in Syria, and to prove that the group continues to have capability and reach in the country, despite losing territory and leadership figures /2

Thread: Jihadists and Islamists have been divided over the Taliban’s banning female university education, although the majority have politely criticised the move, deeming it a violation of a Sharia /1 Some jihadists wondered if the ban reflected internal Taliban rivalry, with hardliners in Taliban ranks "winning" on the subject of female education /2

🧵 Summary: #ISIS has announced the death of its leader, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, and announced his successor, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi / 1 Similar to last leader (Abu al-Hasan), and one before him (Abu Ibrahim), IS did not reveal the ID of the new leader. It only gave his nom de guerre and said he was a veteran jihadist of IS /2

🧵1) Key topics in new IS leadership message. Apologies if I’m repeating observations already shared by fellow analysts 👇 2) The message, again delivered IS spokesman Abu Umar al-Muhajir, rather than mysterious leader, typically covered a wide range of topics, from praising the group's "successes" in certain countries, to calling for recruits

🧵In its latest release featuring al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda failed to follow his name with the phrase “May God protect him” حفظه الله – said for the living – leaving his status vague /1 The audio msg, packaged as a vid, is part part 7 of a series titled “Deal of the Century”, all of which have been fronted by Zawahiri. In all past episodes, AQ media followed Zawahiri’s name with the phrase “May God protect him” (see eg on R); but not this time (see eg on L)/2

Al-Qaeda has now released the trailed propaganda by AQ official Abu Muhammad al-Masri, who was assassinated in Iran in Aug 2020. It's a 271-page book/booklet offering Masri's account of events and "memoir" on the subject of the 9/11 attacks /1

https://twitter.com/Minalami/status/1568953615095857153

Similar to a 500-page book released on last year’s anniversary of 9/11, on that occasion by AQAP leadership figure Ibrahim al-Qawsi (aka Khubayb al-Sudani)....

“Pragmatic” jihadist voices linked to Syria-based militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have been calling on al-Qaeda to disband and urging its branches – with focus on those in Yemen (AQAP) and North Africa (AQIM) – to ditch the al-Qaeda brand and association and go local /1 HTS-linked figures like Abu Maria al-Qahtani & Abd al-Rahman al-Idrisi seem to be suggesting that AQ branches should follow HTS' example in breaking away from AQ and its global agenda, and focus on local projects that can win over local population and mitigate intl. action /2

🧵1) The latest releases by al-Qaeda – a statement from its “General Command” and 7th issue of its flagship magazine One Ummah – are the first by the group since news about the death of its leader al-Zawahiri in Kabul on 31 Jul – which neither the statement or magazine refer to 2) The only ref to Zawahiri is a poem in One Ummah attributed to him, and which was released some months ago about the subject of hijab in India. Conveniently, no phrase (explained in following tweet) follows his name to indicate whether he's alive or dead

🧵Taliban statement of 4 Aug on the subject of AQ leader al-Zawahiri's reported death in Kabul has divided jihadists. While some considered it weak and submissive, others saw it as justified "trickery" in Islam during times of war to avert a backlash against the Afghan rulers /1

https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1555150782361640961

Our team @BBCMonitoring has released three insight pieces: What al-Zawahiri's death means for al-Qaeda; Who are the potential successors; and What al-Zawahiri said in his flurry of messages this year. This is in addition to the jihadist reaction pieces we have filed /1 The first argues that while the death of Zawahiri, if confirmed by al-Qaeda, will be a symbolic and emotional blow for the group, it is unlikely to hinder its operations /2