I welcome today's thorough report of the Coroner in the London Bridge/Borough Market inquest with its sensible recommendations across a variety of #CONTEST areas for actions that could prevent future deaths …ndonbridgeinquests.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/upl…. /1
They complement and supplement the 126 recommendations arrived at by MI5 and CT Policing, with my assistance, in the months immediately following the 2017 attacks: daqc.co.uk/2017/12/05/rep…. /2
The headline changes related to the exploitation of data (a huge topic); multi-agency engagement; and new roles for MI5 and JTAC in analysing and combating extreme right-wing terrorism. /3
Others related to triage, leads, prioritisation, information management, former subjects of interest, lone actors, extremist material, explosive precursors, vehicle hire, disruptive and port powers, prisons intelligence, PREVENT, research and innovation. /4
Together, they amounted to the most ambitious programme for operational CT reform for at least 12 years. I reported on their implementation in February 2019 (published in June gov.uk/government/pub…). /5
The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament made further recommendations, and commented on progress made since 2017, in its own report of November 2018 docs.google.com/a/independent.…. /6
After four completed attacks in 2017, it is not hard to identify things that could have been done differently, and better. That is why these numerous recommendations were considered necessary by the security forces and others. /7
None of these reports will be any consolation to those who lost loved ones in the terrorist attacks on Westminster Bridge, Manchester Arena, London Bridge/Borough Market and the Finsbury Park Mosque, or to those who still suffer from the physical or mental effects. /8
Nor can their numerous recommendations, even if fully implemented, guarantee that similar attacks will never recur. Such guarantees are simply not possible in a free society. /9
But if properly given effect, they will strengthen the hand of police and MI5, without compromising the sound legal and ethical framework within which they willingly work. /10
It is to the credit of our security services (if not to those responsible for the wilder predictions of the last decade) that fewer than 100 people have been killed by terrorism on British soil since in the 18 years since 9/11. /11
MI5 and CT Policing deserve the credit I gave them in February for their considerable and for the most part productive efforts in implementing the 2017 recommendations. /12
The Chief Coroner's recommendations, together with those that came before them, should strengthen the ability of our security forces to prevent or stop the great majority of terrorist attacks in Britain. /12A ends
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My independent review of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is published today. The Act generally works well, but my review examines some specific proposals for change. .gov.uk/government/pub…
A one-page summary of my #IPA2016 review is here. Tl;dr the Act has worked well so far, but an amending Bill should address some specific points and by 2030, technological change will require us to rewrite the vocabulary of surveillance and its oversight. https://t.co/ZmqH05jSpggov.uk/government/pub…
The rule of law is an undefined statutory concept. Lord Keen, who resigned over the “limited and specific” breach of international law in #IMA2021, and I sought clarity from our Law Officers in @HLConstitution https://t.co/aK3jpkk2ZL (0905:45-0920:15)./1Parliamentlive.tv parliamentlive.tv/event/index/5b…
There are well-established international definitions by the CoE Venice Commission and the EU (whose conditionality regulation of 2020 was the subject of a 25-judge ruling recently). So it would not be impossible to arrive at our own definition. /2
But it is clear from the Law Officers’ replies this morning that there is no common view within government, even though differences in relation to the issue of international law may have been pragmatically resolved. /3
I've been looking at the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, added in its current form to the #NationalSecurityBill on the last day of its passage through the Commons. No html version available yet but it's Part 3 (ss 62-81) of the Bill: bills.parliament.uk/publications/4…. /1
I think I understand why the activities of specified persons (e.g. China, Russia, Iran and entities they control) need to be registered (cll 62-65). Hostile states need careful watching and hopefully this (and the penalties for non-compliance) will help. /2
Less obvious is why ALL governments and ALL bodies incorporated outside the UK should be required to register "political influence activities" including contacting an MP or issuing public communications aimed at influencing UK government decisions (cll 66-70). /3
The long-awaited Ouseley report into closed material proceedings has now been published. tl;dr - CMPs have enabled more cases to be tried, but special advocates need better resources.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…
Most of the concerns expressed during the passage of the #JSA2013 are found not to have been realised in practice. But there are 20 practical recommendations for improvement of the system. /2
The #NIProtocolBill is here, together with the claimed legal “justification” which is the doctrine of necessity. Sounds thin to me, not to say threadbare. gov.uk/government/new…
In short - necessity rarely excuses a breach, and only when (inter alia) the State’s act is the only way to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril, and when no other essential interest is seriously impaired by the breach: jusmundi.com/en/document/wi…
Useful 🧵 on today’s #CJEU Dwyer judgment - a notorious murder in Ireland that was only solved because location data was routinely saved for 2 yrs in case police needed access in a criminal investigation. /1
This enabled the crime to be pinned on a previously unsuspected architect, whose professional movements over a long period corresponded with those of the incriminating phone. /2
I was an expert witness in the case so will not comment further on a judgment that largely follows #CJEU precedent, whatever you think of it (other approaches are available: see #ECtHR). /3