There are a couple of odd things about the elusive "gregoratior" who posted the UK-US trade leaks on Reddit (h/t @Gmvolpi and @MarkDiStef for their digging).
The first is the redditor's use of English, which seems non-native.
When you start looking into the use of language, some of the wording in the main article seems uncomfortable with "a" and "the", too.
"thus placing UK 'take it or leave it' position".
Could just be telegraphic English, but it's odd.
This peroration, too.
"From betraying partners and the interests of own citizens."
The "Gregoratior" persona really hasn't left enough evidence for a conclusive analysis.
As @Gmvolpi pointed out, the persona's also on Before It's News, a popular site for disinformation campaigns. It posted four stories there, including the leak.
Problem is, three of those stories were copied from elsewhere.
The second one was originally posted by a user called "b" on Moon of Alabama, another common site for disinfo.
The third one came from "b" on Moon of Alabama too.
This wasn't exactly covert, as the source links were at the end of the posts. But it means that we don't have much original language from "Gregoratior" to go on.
There's not much to go on in the associated Twitter account, either. It was created on October 2, just after the Before It's News account started posting.
(There are rumours that the Twitter account was suspended. They're wrong. @gregoriator is suspended, @gregoratior is not.)
The only thing the Twitter account did was post the Reddit link to dozens of Labour and LibDem MPs, mainstream media, conspiracy theorists, and, weirdly, Waterstone's.
There's not enough evidence here for solid attribution. All of these could have innocent explanations.
It does add more questions about who was behind this persona, and how they got the leak, though.
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🚨BREAKING🚨 @Meta took down two covert influence ops:
Big one from Russia🇷🇺 targeting Europe with spoofed media websites like the Guardian and Spiegel
First one from China 🇨🇳 to focus on both sides of domestic US 🇺🇸 politics and Czech-China relations. about.fb.com/news/2022/09/r…
@Meta The operations were very different, but both worked on multiple social media platforms and petitions sites.
The Russian op was even on LiveJournal (cute).
List of domains, petitions etc in the report. #OSINT community, happy hunting!
@Meta China: this was the first Chinese network we’ve disrupted that focused on US domestic politics ahead of the midterms and Czech foreign policy toward China and Ukraine.
It was small, we took it down before it built an audience, but that’s a new direction for Chinese IO.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Takedowns from around the world:
Cyber espionage in South Asia;
Harassment in India;
Violating networks in Greece, South Africa, India;
Influence ops from Malaysia & Israel
AND... about.fb.com/news/2022/08/m…
A deep dive into a Russian troll farm, linked to people with ties to what’s known as the Internet Research Agency.
It used fake accounts across the internet to make it look like there’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine - and to pretend the troll farm's doing a good job.
The operation called itself “Cyber Front Z”.
We think of it as the Z Team, because it was about as far from being the A Team as you can get.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Much to dig into:
State & non-state actors targeting Ukraine;
Cyber espionage from Iran and Azerbaijan;
Influence ops in Brazil and Costa Rica;
Spammy activity in the Philippines... about.fb.com/news/2022/04/m…
🚨 TAKEDOWN 🚨
This weekend, we took down a relatively small influence operation that had targeted Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and websites. It was run by people in Russia and Ukraine: about.fb.com/news/2022/02/s…
It consisted of approx 40 accounts, Groups and Pages on FB and IG, plus on Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram.
It mainly posted links to long-form articles on its websites, without much luck making them engaging. It got very few reactions, and under 4k followers.
It ran a few fake personas posing as authors. They had fake profile pics (likely GAN), and unusually detailed public bios - e.g. former civil aviation engineer, hydrography expert.
The op posted their articles on its websites and social media, & amplified them using more fakes.
Personal 🧵 based on years of OSINT research into influence operations since 2014.
Looking at the Russian official messaging on “de-nazification” and “genocide”, it’s worth putting them in context of the many different Russian IO that targeted Ukraine over the years.
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013. @Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27) graphika.com/reports/irans-…