On Friday, the #EuroSummit will meet to take stock of where we are on #Eurozone reform. It will be another "keep the ball rolling" summit without concrete decisions. Still, it will be worth paying attention to the fineprint.
Thread:
1/ This edition will be the first under new leadership: With Charles Michel, we have again a @eucopresident from a € member state. Will be interesting to see if he makes EMU an explicit priority of his mandate. @Lagarde and @vonderleyen will attend for the first time.
2/ The #EuroSummit will again meet in "inclusive format". That means that all heads except @BorisJohnson are invited to participate, but he won't come to the normal #EuCo either. So even member states that have no intention to join the euro still have an equal say in the debate.
2/ The substance to be discussed is rather thin and it is unlikely that anything will be finally decided. Topics on the menu are the usual suspects:
- ESM reform
- banking union
- BICC
Basis for the discussion is the letter by @mariofcenteno👇 consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press…
3/ On ESM reform: In June, leaders had asked the Eurogroup to get the package ready for final approval by this week. They have failed to do so because 🇮🇹 has put in a veto last week for reasons that I do not fully understand. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press…
4/ @mariofcenteno claims that there is an "agreement in principle" that is subject to "national procedures". But it looks a lot more like @gualtierieurope primarily needs to garner more support at home for a deal that the previous government including @matteosalvinimi negotiated.
5/ On substance, formally there is still disagreement on the legal status of the Terms of References on single-limb collective action clauses. Again, not sure that this completely captures the political dimension of the veto. So it seems nothing will move here until 🇮🇹 moves.
6/ On banking union: Things are stuck. Despite the opening by @OlafScholz a few weeks back, ministers did not propose the opening of political talks on all BU elements, i.e. including deposit insurance and the treatment of sovereign bonds. Instead, technical talks will continue.
7/ What matters here is the language in the conclusions. The Centeno letter contains two crucial points:
First, he says that work on all BU elements should be done "on a consensual basis". If leaders take up that formulation in the conclusions, it would be a really bad sign:
8/ Most banking union legislation falls under QMV - it would be nuts to re-intergovernmentalise this policy area. So hopefully leaders do not follow Centeno here.
Second, the letter argues that work on BU should be brought "forward within this institutional cycle".
9/ It would be very welcome if leaders take up the idea of giving the work on BU a clear time frame - and 2024 seems a reasonable objective. But ideally, they would go further than Centeno and fix 2024 as the deadline for the actual *completion* of banking union.
10/ Finally, the instrument formerly known as Eurozone budget a.k.a. BICC: My sense is that leaders will not touch this sad creature in earnest until they have to - and that will be when they meet as actual #EUCO and decide on the MFF.
11/ Until then, the Eurogroup will continue to negotiate. But the really big remaining sticking point, namely whether or not there will be an IGA to put in additional resources at a later stage, will not be solved by ministers but by the leaders. Just not now.
12/ So to sum up, look for two things on Friday: How will @eucopresident formulate his ambition for EMU deepening? And what language will leaders use on banking union?
And then we all meet again in June 2020 for a new decade of Eurozone reform. The ball keeps rolling.
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FAZ reports that the federal president is consulting with the chancellor and the leader of the opposition on next steps if the coalition collapses.
Good moment to run you through the main options and steps that would follow if indeed it's over:
There are essentially two ways this could end. Lindner could just pull the plug. FDP ministers would resign from their posts. Or Scholz runs out of patience and asks the federal president to remove Lindner (and presumably also the other FDP ministers).
The government would have no majority in parliament anymore. But in Germany, you cannot force a chancellor or a government out of office by simple no-confidence vote. The Bundestag would need to elect another chancellor to do that. And there is no majority in sight for anyone.
Draghi hat seinen Bericht zur Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas vorgelegt - und natürlich konzentriert sich die Diskussion in 🇩🇪 sofort auf die Frage neue EU-Schulden ja/nein/vielleicht.
Warum das ein Fehler und dieser Bericht eine große Chance auch aus Berliner Perspektive ist:
Der Bericht ist zunächst eine ziemlich schonungslose Standortbestimmung der europäischen Wirtschaft im globalen Vergleich. Und Draghi sagt: Es sieht nicht gut aus. Als zentrale Gründe macht er fehlende Produktivität und mangelnde Innovation aus.
Außerdem nennt er die Herausforderungen durch Fachkräftemangel, hohe Energiepreise und notwendige Dekarbonisierung. Und eben die globale, teilweise unfaire, Konkurrenz. Klingt alles bekannt aus der deutschen Debatte? Eben.
The Draghi report has just dropped - and it is surprisingly good and low-bullshit.
My initial takeaways:
Such reports tend to be boring to read: Because the authors are mincing their words, because of too many cooks in the kitchen, because the "outside expert" is not really allowed to say what they want or do not know what they want to say.
The Letta report suffered from several of these ailments. The Draghi report suffers from none thereof. The man obviously knows what he wants to say and doesn't mince his words. The report is refreshingly low-bullshit, puts fingers in obvious wounds and largely avoids euphemisms.
The 🚦 agreement is actually pretty good news for a number of Eurozone files, including the fiscal rules and EDIS.
Here are the main bits:
1/ Most importantly, the text says that the fiscal rules can be "developed further" to reach three goals: Secure growth, safeguard debt sustainability and foster green investment. They should also become "simpler and more transparent, also to strengthen implementation".
2/ This is pretty big. No red lines here, but an open and constructive opening position for negotiations that can very well include a change to the rules themselves. It will be now up to the Commission and other member states to take up the offer that is in that text.
Das @_FriedrichMerz-Interview im @handelsblatt ist beeindruckendes Anschauungsmaterial, wie sich ein Teil der Konservativen im europapolitischen Wald verirrt hat und jetzt nicht mehr herausfindet.
Warum das ein Problem ist:
1/ Es geht mit dem klassischen Motiv los, dass man höllisch aufpassen muss, den faulen Südeuropäern (hier stv 🇮🇹🇪🇸) nicht ihr Hallodritum zu finanzieren. Dass gerade diese Länder die ambitioniertesten Pläne zur Verwendung der EU-Gelder vorgelegt haben, bleibt natürlich unerwähnt.
2/ Es geht dann weiter zu den Schuldenregeln. Hier räumt auch Merz ein, dass die Einhaltung für viele Länder schwierig wird. Und dann wird es spannend: Er drückt sich extrem wortreich um eine Antwort herum, ob man die Regeln denn nun wirklich so einhalten sollte.
Commissioner @PaoloGentiloni announces in @SZ that the Commission will only present its proposal for fiscal rules reform once there is a consensus among eurozone countries. Here's why this is a wise approach and why we are still far away from that point: sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/eu-…
1/ A weird feeling has grown in recent months that an expenditure rule is the way to go to reform the SGP and that what we basically need now is a Commission proposal that the technocrats then can tweak so that everyone is happy. Everyone is now waiting for that proposal.
2/ In my view, this feeling is a trap and the Commission is now trying to avoid falling into this trap by basically asking member states to come to a consensus what they want before puttting out a proposal.