1/Why can't BMD printed ballots be trusted as an expression of voter intent? Because voters won't notice fraudulent outputs of compromised BMDs. It's the most widely replicated experiment in election security dating back a decade or more when ppl were concerned about VVPAT...
2/...as summarized in the NAS "Securing the Vote" report (nap.edu/25120): without complete record of votes expressed, voters would be unable to recall all of their prior choices.
3/Furthermore, hundreds of studies over 100 yrs point to fundamental limitations of human memory that would inhibit ballot verification by voters: (read.amazon.com/kp/embed?asin=…): "An important characteristic of the factual data base of memory is its remarkable reliability."
4/All of which means that cheating is impossible to detect because the original expression of voter intent has been lost & replaced by machine-markings. If the machine has been compromised, fraudulent ballots will be swept into the audit trail and counted as if they were valid
1/ It only took $100M and a national trauma for GA to come around: Georgia Republicans want to get rid of new voting machines (read entire thread) | 11alive.comtwitter.com/intent/user?sc…
3/ Beyond the policy advantages, the science says it’s the only way to go if you want more secure and auditable elections: liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/el…
1/Dear legislators debating new ways to enhance confidence in elections: get rid of #BallotMarkingDevices and other expensive vulnerable voting tech. Voters don’t understand it. Losing side will always cry foul. Use more #HandMarkedPaperBallots and mandatory audits. Invest in
2/Better more accurate scanning technology and error tolerant manual counting methods (and training/assessment methods so they can be uniformly applied)
3/More transparent, less tech heavy ways of registering/authenticating voters
1/ Apropos of nothing except the randomness of scientific attribution. Ironic when applied to randomness itself. Amusing that in their book "Algorithms to Live By: The Computer Science of Human Decisions," (academia.edu/42264255/Brian…) the following passages appears:
2/"One of the key results on the role of randomness in polynomial identity testing is what’s called the Schwartz–Zippel lemma."
3/and the accompanying citation "See Schwartz, “Fast Probabilistic Algorithms for Verification of
Polynomial Identities”; Zippel, “Probabilistic Algorithms for Sparse Polynomials”;
and DeMillo and Lipton, “A Probabilistic Remark on Algebraic Program Testing.” "
1/Fulton County (GA) will put multiple BMDs in cabinets like this one. Voters will use simultaneously. Unclear how many BMDs per cabinet but this pic shows at least 2. Perpendicular orientation means there is no configuration where all machines are visible to election officials.
2/Nothing prevents one voter from grabbing printout from another BMD undetected. A lo tech vulnerability for creating chaos & denial of function.
3/Apparently also possible for one voter to access back of adjacent touchscreen panel. Depending on the orientation of the cabinet this might not be detectable by EOs or adjacent voters.
1/Like this: Ballot marking devices have essential security flaws. Like all computers they can be hacked, misprogrammed, misconfigured & misused. Because printed ballots from a compromised machine cannot be trusted as an expression of voter intent, audits cannot detect cheating.
2/Why can't BMD printed ballots be trusted as an expression of voter intent? Because voters won't notice fraudulent outputs of compromised BMDs. It's the most widely replicated experiment in election security dating back a decade or more.
3/...as summarized in the NAS "Securing the Vote" report: without complete record of votes expressed, voters would be unable to recall all of their prior choices. nap.edu/25120
1/While I appreciate @benadida constant references to the shortcomings of hand marked ballot, it’s blindingly obvious that there’s no equivalence to machine marked ballots.
2/By whatever mechanism mistabulation occurs, RLAs are designed to confirm correctly reported outcomes.
3/I still do not really understand the argument about mistabulating bubble marks. I’m sure it happens, but evidently it happens so rarely that no one in the business of establishing benchmarks for high volume op scan devices has bothered to document it.