New working paper, Coalition Politics and War Termination, with some game-theoretic models, a case study of the end of WWI on the Western Front, and a null-result Cox model *in the lit review*.
scott-wolford.com/uploads/2/5/2/…
(1/x)
scott-wolford.com/uploads/2/5/2/…
(1/x)
This one came directly from teaching #WWIinrealtime: after years of talking about military victory, why did the Allies grant Germany an armistice they knew would be fragile in 1918?
(2/x)
(2/x)
I wrote down a model where (a) coalition partners have to agree to grant an armistice if their opponent asks for one and (b) one partner will get a larger share of the postwar pie if the war continues than if the war ends today.
(3/x)
(3/x)
Most of the time, the rising partner can force a continuation of the war to realize its rising power and reap the associated gains, but when it's not rising *too* fast and when its stakes are lower than the declining partner, then the war ends in an "early" armistice.
(4.x)
(4.x)
Just like WWI in the West, where the Entente tolerates a fragile armistice rather than the "American peace" that would follow a war that continued into 1919 or 1920, as they'd been planning for.
(5/x)
(5/x)
The model explains how intra-coalition politics shapes the duration of war, both compared to other coalition wars and to bilateral wars.
Fun stuff, in my entirely biased opinion.
(6/6)
Fun stuff, in my entirely biased opinion.
(6/6)
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